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In a setting of intense competition for international capital, companies diligently
have to respond to an increasing demand by investors for greater transparency and
more effective mechanisms of corporate control. In this context, the term “corporate
governance“ has attracted major attention in the professional sphere and across 
different areas of academic research.
Despite the fact that publicly traded real estate companies provide a unique experi-
mental laboratory in corporate governance research due to a number of peculiarities
arising from the characteristics of real estate assets and the regulatory requirements
in connection with the REIT structure, corporate governance in general as well as its
impact on firm value remain largely unexplored in real estate literature. 
The book at hand supplements contemporary real estate literature by investigating
the link between a broad set of principal corporate governance mechanisms and 
the market valuation of publicly traded real estate companies from the UK, France,
the Netherlands and Germany, while addressing major econometric shortcomings
of previous corporate governance studies, including omitted variable bias, endo-
geneity and reverse causality. The results of the analysis have important practical im-
plications for strategic decision-making of both top-executives of publicly traded
real estate companies as well as investors. 
Therefore, this book is essential reading not only for researchers and students of
business administration but also for top-executives of publicly traded real estate
companies and investors.
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Foreword I 
 
Foreword 
Over the past decade and in the context of the current real estate and financial 
crisis, the discussion on corporate governance has received tremendous atten-
tion both in theory and in practice. In a setting characterized by an increasingly 
aggravating competition for capital, corporate governance has become a crucial 
success factor for companies that are dependent on external funds.  
At the same time, there is only little theoretical knowledge with respect to 
the complex nature of corporate governance and a lack of valuable recommen-
dations for practitioners. Real estate research, in particular, has scarcely cov-
ered the topic, yet, in spite of the peculiarities related to the corporate govern-
ance structure of listed property companies. 
With his doctoral dissertation, Nicolas Kohl fills the knowledge gap by inves-
tigating the significance of corporate governance in the public real estate sector. 
He specifically examines the relationship between principal corporate govern-
ance mechanisms and the market valuation of publicly traded real estate com-
panies across four major European real estate capital markets – the UK, 
France, the Netherlands and Germany. Thereby, the thesis incorporates an ex-
tensive theoretical as well as a state-of-the-art empirical analysis. 
As opposed to prior real estate corporate governance studies, Nicolas Kohl 
makes use of a particular instrumental variable estimation methodology that 
permits to explicitly account for the complex and dynamic interactions among 
different corporate governance mechanisms and the simultaneous nature of the 
process determining corporate governance and firm value.  
Overall, with its sophisticated research design, the dissertation of Nicolas 
Kohl contributes decisively to the emerging international theoretical and empiri-
cal real estate corporate governance literature. It is a highly innovative work that 
provides significant insight into the corporate governance structure of European 
publicly traded real estate companies. Without any doubt, the obtained results 
will be very useful in the academic debate on corporate governance as well as 
for the strategic decision-making of top-managers of listed property companies 
and investors. 
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We are convinced that this dissertation will become widely accepted by re-
searchers and practitioners and hope that it provides impetus to further re-
search on this topic.  
 
Prof. Dr. Karl-Werner Schulte HonRICS CRE 
Prof. Dr. Stephan Bone-Winkel 
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schäfers 
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Preface III 
 
Preface 
The idea for this doctoral thesis was born during my first two years working for 
the Chair of Real Estate Management at the University of Regensburg. After 
having had the opportunity to participate in a variety of interesting projects in 
the field of real estate capital markets and diverse discussions with investment 
bankers, consultants and corporate managers, I soon became aware of the sig-
nificance of corporate governance in today’s equity markets. At the same time, I 
realized that the topic had been largely unexplored in real estate research with 
the exception of a very limited number of theoretical as well as empirical corpo-
rate governance studies that are exclusively focusing on US REITs. However, 
given the fact that publicly traded real estate companies, as opposed to listed 
companies from other business sectors, reveal unique agency issues and dis-
pose of a distinct governance structure, more extensive research on the issue is 
necessary with respect to public real estate markets. 
In response to the lack of corporate governance research in real estate lit-
erature, this dissertation is aimed to theoretically and empirically investigate the 
link between a set of principal corporate governance mechanisms and the mar-
ket valuation of publicly traded real estate companies across the major Euro-
pean real estate capital markets. The findings of this thesis have important 
practical implications for strategic decision-making of both managers of listed 
property companies as well as investors.  
There is a number of individuals that deserve special appreciation for sup-
porting me throughout the lengthy process of successfully completing this doc-
toral thesis. Foremost, I wish to thank my dissertation chairman and academic 
mentor, Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schäfers, for his unwavering support and for con-
tinuously challenging me in a way that made me excel to my full potential. Get-
ting the chance to learn from his outstanding analytical and didactic skills, his 
knowledge as well as his professional experiences was invaluable to the ac-
complishment of my study. After working with Prof. Dr. Schäfers for three years, 
it is now clear to me why he is at the top of his field, both academically and pro-
fessionally.  
IV Preface 
 
In addition, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Prof. Dr. 
Klaus Röder for taking on the co-chairmanship of the advisory committee for my 
doctoral thesis. His comprehensive knowledge on capital markets and his con-
structive comments in a number of meetings from the first presentation of my 
dissertation project to the final version of the thesis were very helpful to me. 
Another person that deserves special recognition is Prof. Dr. Rolf Tschernig 
who provided me with excellent guidance and assistance concerning the 
econometric model and diverse test statistics. Therefore, I am particularly grate-
ful. Furthermore, I owe special thanks to Dr. Jürgen Ernstberger and Dr. An-
dreas Schillhofer for their helpful comments and advice throughout the prepara-
tion of the dissertation. I am also pleased to acknowledge the outstanding 
commitment of Kai Schulte who devoted long hours to assist me in the collec-
tion of annual report data relevant for the construction of the real estate trans-
parency index. 
Moreover, my thanks go to my doctoral candidate colleagues and friends 
who made the time in Regensburg a truly memorable experience. In this regard, 
I want to particularly thank Michael Trübestein, Johannes Högner, Dr. Florian 
Egger, Stefanie Forster-Kraus, Claudia Nebauer, Tobias Pfeffer, Helmut 
Schleich and all my other colleagues who provided distraction and supported 
me during my dissertation time.  
I consider myself very fortunate to have had the opportunity to meet and 
work with all these outstanding people. It is hard to believe that a brighter and 
more enjoyable group of individuals can be assembled anywhere else. Un-
doubtedly, without their presence and assistance the task of writing my thesis 
would have been far more arduous. 
Finally and most importantly, I would like to thank my parents for having 
made my previous education possible and for encouraging me in all my deci-
sions and endeavors. Together with my beloved brother, they are the ones I 
know I can count upon when it gets tough. My gratefulness for their ongoing 
support in all aspects and stages of life is invaluable to me and cannot be ex-
pressed with words alone. This dissertation is dedicated to them. 
NICOLAS KOHL 
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Introduction 1 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation for the Study 
Companies that are publicly traded on a stock exchange are typically character-
ized by a separation of ownership and control. Professional managers are re-
sponsible for operational and strategic decision making while shareholders 
merely provide the capital and act as residual risk takers of the company.1 In 
this constellation, managers are supposed to run the company on behalf of 
shareholders with the objective to maximize equity value on a long-term basis.2 
However, managers sometimes pursue their own interest by extracting private 
benefits at the cost of shareholders.3 In recent years, numerous examples of 
mismanagement and financial fraud have been covered by the media, e.g. En-
ron, WorldCom and Siemens, to name just a few. 
In a setting of intense competition for international capital, companies dili-
gently have to respond to an increasing demand by investors for higher trans-
parency and more effective mechanisms of corporate control. In this context, 
the topic of corporate governance has attracted major attention in the profes-
sional sphere and across different areas of academic research.4  
Particularly, institutional investors, as being influential participants in today’s 
global equity markets, highly appreciate “good” firm-specific corporate govern-
ance. According to a McKinsey survey from 2002, addressing more than 200 
institutional investors with investments across the world, corporate governance 
is considered as important as key financial indicators by more than 50% of the 
respondents. At the same time, these institutional investors declare that they 
are willing to pay a premium of up to 30% for companies with “good” corporate 
governance structures.5 In other words, companies that do not care for corpo-
                                            
1  See Berle/Means (1932), pp. 119f; Gordon (1945), p. 47. 
2  See Jensen (2001), p. 299. 
3  See Berle/Means (1932), p. 333; Stiglitz (1985), p. 134; Williamson (1985), p. 312; 
Hart/Moore (1995), p. 568. 
4  See Shleifer/Vishny (1997), p. 737. 
5  See McKinsey & Company (2002). 
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rate governance and reveal below-average governance structures will eventu-
ally be punished with lower market valuations. 
The discussion on agency conflicts resulting from the separation of owner-
ship and control as well as on governance mechanisms to reduce related 
agency costs have been subject to academic literature for a long time. Since 
Smith (1776) and Berle/Means (1932) addressed potential conflicts of interest 
between management and shareholders of companies, the understanding on 
key issues of corporate governance has improved. Nevertheless, a well-
developed theory about the complex nature of corporate governance is still 
lacking.6 
From a theoretical as well as a professional point of view an important issue 
with regard to corporate governance is whether it is rewarded by capital market 
participants in terms of higher market valuations. There is a need for decision 
makers of publicly traded companies and for investors to better understand how 
corporate governance mechanisms interact and how different corporate gov-
ernance structures affect the market value of the firm. The information may 
serve managers to adequately adjust the corporate governance structure of 
their companies and to implement a corporate governance guided management 
strategy that increases shareholder value. Contrariwise, investors may use this 
knowledge in their stock selection process to adequately supplement their port-
folios.  
While general finance literature includes numerous empirical studies on the 
impact of corporate governance on firm value across different capital markets 
around the world, academic work on the topic is still embryonic in real estate 
literature and therefore requires further theoretical elaboration and empirical 
scrutiny.  
The question remains why to specifically focus on the public real estate sec-
tor. Prior research by Gillan et al. (2003) provides evidence that corporate gov-
ernance structures differ across industries which basically justifies a closer ex-
amination of the interrelation of different governance mechanisms and their 
                                            
6  See Larcker et al. (2007), p. 965. 
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significance in predicting the market value of the firm within an industry. As op-
posed to listed companies from other business sectors, publicly traded real es-
tate companies offer a unique experimental laboratory in corporate governance 
research since they reveal a unique governance structure.7 This uniqueness 
stems from the peculiarities of real estate as an asset class and the special 
regulatory requirements that go along with a tax-transparent REIT structure as 
a specific form of publicly traded real estate companies.8 In this context, it re-
mains interesting to find out which corporate governance mechanisms play a 
significant role in the governance structure of publicly traded real estate com-
panies. 
 
                                            
7  See Sagalyn (1996), p. 35; Friday (1997), p. 8; Bebchuk et al. (2005), p. 16; Feng et al. 
(2005), p. 282; Eichholtz/Kok (2008), p. 142; Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), p. 328. 
8  See for instance Sagalyn (1996), p. 35. 
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1.2 Objective of Analysis 
This dissertation is intended to theoretically and empirically analyze the impact 
of corporate governance on the market valuation of publicly traded real estate 
companies across the four major European real estate capital markets: the UK, 
France, the Netherlands and Germany. 
The study is supposed to complement contemporary real estate literature in 
four basic ways. First, the focus of the investigation is placed on a European 
sample. Prior empirical real estate corporate governance research of that kind 
does only exist for US samples. Second, instead of concentrating on single cor-
porate governance provisions in isolation or relying on self-constructed or pro-
fessionally prepared corporate governance indices, which are likely to be in-
adequate proxies for a multi-dimensional and dynamic corporate governance 
construct, a large set of widely accepted corporate governance mechanisms is 
applied. Third, the transparency of real estate-specific disclosure, measured on 
the basis of the EPRA Best Practice Recommendations, a well recognized in-
dustry standard for a more transparent real estate-specific disclosure, is explic-
itly taken into account as a separate governance mechanism. Finally, the 
econometric problem of joint endogeneity is addressed by the use of instrumen-
tal variable estimation treating all corporate governance mechanisms as en-
dogenous. More specifically, for the purpose of the analysis a simultaneous 
system of equations is specified that is estimated using three-stage least 
squares (3SLS). This approach permits to explicitly consider any bi-directional 
interrelations between the single corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
value. 
The main objectives of the analysis are, on the one hand, to provide evi-
dence that “good” corporate governance leads to higher market values and, on 
the other hand, to investigate which corporate governance mechanisms are 
economically relevant in order to provide decision-makers with a road map on 
how to increase shareholder value and to offer investors a guideline on which 
companies to select for their portfolios. 
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1.3 Research Questions and General Theoretical Frame of Reference 
With regard to corporate governance of publicly traded real estate companies in 
Europe, the study at hand is supposed to address the following research ques-
tions: 
 
 Is there a relationship between firm-specific corporate governance and the 
market valuation of publicly traded real estate companies? 
 Does “good” corporate governance imply a higher valuation by the capital 
market? Or do publicly traded real estate companies with higher market 
valuations dispose of better governance structures? 
 If there is a causal relationship between corporate governance and capital 
market valuation, is it economically relevant for decision makers of respec-
tive companies or for investors?  
 Is a greater use of particular corporate governance mechanisms positively 
related to the valuation of publicly traded real estate companies by the capi-
tal market?  
 Do complementary effects and substitution effects exist among different 
corporate governance mechanisms? 
 Which consequences can be derived for a corporate governance-guided 
management strategy in the real estate sector as well as for the investment 
strategy of real estate investors? 
 
The overall theoretical frame of reference for this dissertation is the aca-
demic discipline of real estate economics which is represented by the “House of 
Real Estate Economics” (see figure 1), originally developed by 
Schulte/Schäfers (1995/97). 
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Figure 1: House of Real Estate Economics 
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Source: Schulte/Schäfers (1997), p. 17. 
 
The field of real estate economics deals with the explanation and the design 
of real estate-related decision-making of economic agents and is aimed to pro-
vide valuable recommendations on how to improve the decision-making proc-
ess of managers in the real estate sector. Since the real estate business in-
volves expertise from diverse fields, the discipline of real estate economics 
follows an interdisciplinary approach, accounting for a variety of academic dis-
ciplines, including business administration, economics, law, spatial planning, 
architecture and engineering. 
Being the principal subject of investigation in this thesis, corporate govern-
ance only concerns selected elements of the House of Real Estate Economics. 
In terms of the interdisciplinary aspects, the topic is subject to the academic 
disciplines of business administration, economics and law. In line with the un-
derstanding of the term in the context of this doctoral thesis, corporate govern-
ance is primarily concerned with real estate investors and publicly traded real 
estate companies that are classified as the institutional aspects in figure 1. With 
respect to the management aspects, corporate governance generally has to be 
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attributed to the function of strategy development as part of the strategy-specific 
aspects, for the topic has major implications for the strategic management of 
listed property companies. 
Providing the basic theoretical framework, the House of Real Estate Eco-
nomics is complemented by the principal-agent theory as well as the concept of 
corporate governance which will be presented in further detail in chapters 2.1 
and 2.2, respectively. 
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1.4 Course of Analysis 
The dissertation is basically composed of six chapters (see figure 2) which are 
briefly summarized in the following paragraphs.  
 
Figure 2: Summary of Contents 
Theoretical and Conceptual FrameworkTheoretical and onceptual Fra e ork2
IntroductionIntroduction
1
Corporate Governance of Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies: A Global Perspectiveorporate overnance of Publicly Traded eal Estate o panies: lobal Perspective
3
Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm ValueI pact of orporate overnance on Fir  Value
4
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the Market Valuation of Publicly Traded Real Estate CompaniesE pirical nalysis of the I pact of orporate overnance on the arket Valuation of Publicly Traded eal Estate o panies
5
Summary and ConclusionSu ary and onclusion6
Motivation for the Studyotivation for the Study Objective of Analysisbjective of Analysis
Research Questions and
General Theoretical Frame
of Reference
Research uestions and
eneral Theoretical Fra e
of Reference
Course of AnalysisCourse of Analysis
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Summary of Essential FindingsSu ary of Essential Findings Concluding RemarksConcluding Re arks
6.1 6.2
Theory of Principal-Agent-RelationshipsTheory of Principal-Agent-Relationships Concept of Corporate GovernanceConcept of Corporate overnance Listed Property VehiclesListed Property Vehicles
2.1 2.2 2.3
Reasons for the Rising
Importance of Corporate Governance in
Real Estate Capital Markets
Reasons for the Rising
I portance of Corporate Governance in
Real Estate Capital arkets
Corporate Governance Standards
in the Real Estate Industry
Corporate overnance Standards
in the Real Estate Industry
Unique Corporate Governance
Structure of Publicly Traded
Real Estate Companies
Unique Corporate overnance
Structure of Publicly Traded
Real Estate Co panies
3.1 3.2 3.3
Theoretical Relationship
between Corporate Governance
and Firm Value
Theoretical Relationship
bet een Corporate overnance
and Fir  Value
Empirical Evidence on the
Impact of Corporate Governance
on Firm Value
E pirical Evidence on the
I pact of Corporate overnance
on Fir  Value
Econometric Problems of
Empirical Studies on Wealth
Effects of Corporate Governance
Econo etric Proble s of
E pirical Studies on ealth
Effects of Corporate overnance
Development of HypothesesDevelop ent of Hypotheses
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
Introduction and General
Background on the Applied 
Methodology
Introduction and eneral
Background on the Applied 
ethodology
Sample SelectionSa ple Selection Methodology andEmpirical Results
ethodology and
E pirical Results
5.1 5.2 5.3
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
Subsequent to the introduction in chapter 1, chapter 2 provides the theoreti-
cal and conceptual foundations necessary for a comprehensive understanding 
of the analysis subject to this doctoral thesis. It specifically describes the fun-
damental aspects of agency theory, corporate governance and the link between 
these two concepts. Furthermore, it defines the different types of listed property 
vehicles being examined in the course of this dissertation. 
Following the rather general elaboration on corporate governance in chapter 
2, chapter 3 is supposed to illustrate the peculiarities of corporate governance 
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in the public real estate sector that justify an empirical investigation of the gov-
ernance setting of publicly traded real estate companies. After a brief enumera-
tion of some general developments pointing to an increased significance of cor-
porate governance in listed property markets, the uniqueness of the 
governance structure of listed property companies is outlined. 
With regard to the empirical analysis in chapter 5, chapter 4 generally deals 
with the impact of corporate governance on firm value, which is a highly rele-
vant issue in theory as well as in practice. In addition to a brief elaboration on 
the theoretical relationship between corporate governance and corporate value, 
the chapter presents an overview of selected empirical corporate governance 
studies in finance and real estate literature. Afterwards, some major economet-
ric problems of prior empirical corporate governance studies are pointed out 
that need to be addressed in contemporary corporate governance research. At 
the end of chapter 4, the hypotheses of the thesis that need to be tested by the 
empirical investigation in the subsequent chapter, are developed based on the 
previous theoretical argumentation and the empirical findings of prior corporate 
governance research. 
Chapter 5 then presents the empirical analysis of the study including the 
reasoning for the sample selection, the definition and descriptive statistics of the 
variables, a comprehensive description of the estimation method, the specifica-
tion of the econometric models and the empirical results. 
Chapter 6 eventually provides a summary of the essential findings of the 
study as well as some concluding remarks. 
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2 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Theory of Principal-Agent Relationships 
In academic literature, the principal-agent theory is generally considered to be 
the starting point for a theoretical discussion on corporate governance. There-
fore, chapter 2.1 is intended to present the basic ideas behind that particular 
theoretical frame of reference.  
 
2.1.1 Separation of Ownership and Control in the Modern Corporation 
In the early days of industrialization companies tended to be privately-owned 
entities that were managed by their founders based on their own best interest. 
These companies were limited in size by the personal wealth of their respective 
owners.9 Technological advances along with the expansion of markets in-
creased the scale and complexity of companies. In order to finance new tech-
nologies necessary to capture economies of scale, additional capital, far be-
yond the means of individual entrepreneurs, was required.10 These 
circumstances paired with the mobilization of property interests through the de-
velopment of public capital markets lead to an increasing professionalization of 
management and dispersion of shareholdings, ultimately resulting in a growing 
separation of corporate ownership11 and corporate control.12 
This new form of firm organization, that Berle/Means (1932) referred to as 
the “modern corporation”, is characterized by shareholders who provide capital 
                                            
9  See Berle/Means (1932), p. 2. 
10  See for instance Baumol (1959), pp. 96f and Thompson (1964), p. 21. For a more detailed 
description of the development and the changing process of production and distribution as 
well as the ways in which they have been managed see Chandler (1977). 
11  According to Fama (1980), p. 290, ownership of capital should not be confused with owner-
ship of the firm. He emphasizes the irrelevance of the concept of ownership of the firm refer-
ring to the “nexus of contracts” perspective which considers the firm as a set of contracts 
covering the way inputs are joined to create outputs and the way receipts from outputs are 
shared among inputs. This notion seems to be important in order to understand that share-
holders do not exercise direct control over a firm’s assets or decisions. Instead of being con-
sidered as the owners of the firm they rather should be regarded as its “residual risk takers”, 
the party that has the most to lose in case the company fails. For further elaboration on the 
concept of residual risk taking in public companies see Alchian/Demsetz (1972) and 
Fama/Jensen (1983a, 1983b), among others. 
12  See Berle/Means (1932), pp. 4f; Gordon (1945), pp. 23, 28. 
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in return for stock, and professional managers who direct the company based 
on their convictions of how best to employ the capital entrusted to them.13 The 
organizational structure of the modern corporation has some decisive advan-
tages for both, shareholders as well as managers. Shareholders, on the one 
side, are able to participate in any profits arising from value creation of entre-
preneurial activities even though they lack the necessary managerial skills and 
experiences.14 In addition, they are able to benefit from the limited liability fea-
ture of equity claims in corporations15 and the cost efficiencies resulting from 
the delegation of decision control16. Managers, on the other side, can pursue 
profitable business opportunities even though they lack large personal wealth.17 
Nevertheless, the separation of ownership and control also comes at a cost. 
Owners of large public companies, as opposed to owners who manage their 
own firm, cannot initiate or implement managerial decisions. Their participation 
is basically limited to voting at shareholder meetings.18 As a consequence, the 
value of their stake in the company depends entirely on the aptitude and will-
ingness of the managers, in other words, on factors and forces they cannot di-
rectly influence. Since the management does not bear a major share of the 
wealth effects of strategic and operational decisions their interests may not al-
ways be in line with those of shareholders.19 This would seem to imply that cor-
porate resources are not entirely used in the pursuit of shareholder wealth. The 
conflicts arising from this situation create a major problem for economic effi-
ciency and have been subject to academics for a long time. A theoretical frame 
of reference analyzing potential conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders is commonly known as agency theory which will be further elabo-
rated in the following chapters. 
 
                                            
13  See Millstein/MacAvoy (1998), p. 1292. 
14  See Shleifer/Vishny (1997), p. 740. 
15  See Alchian/Demsetz (1972), p. 788. 
16  See Alchian/Demsetz (1972), p. 788; Fama/Jensen (1983a), p. 308. 
17  See Fama/Jensen (1983b), p. 333; Shleifer/Vishny (1997), p. 740. 
18  See Gordon (1945), p. 160. 
19  See Berle/Means (1932), pp. 6f; Fama/Jensen (1983a), p. 304; Hart (1983), p. 366. 
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2.1.2 Classification of the Agency Theory within Economic Literature 
In addition to property rights and transaction cost theory, agency theory is part 
of the new institutional economics research tradition introducing what is gener-
ally called the “new theory of the firm”. In contrast to neo-classical economics, 
new institutional economics explicitly accounts for market imperfections to de-
scribe, explain and predict economic relationships. 
Neo-classical theory is based on the assumption of perfect capital markets, 
which permit a frictionless exchange of property rights. According to Modi-
gliani/Miller (1958), perfect capital markets are characterized by the non-
existence of transaction and information costs, among others. This implies, on 
the one hand, that markets can be accessed and used in order to transfer prop-
erty rights at no cost and, on the other hand, that no information asymmetries 
exist between market participants, permitting transactions to take place instan-
taneously without loss of efficiency.20 While treating the firm as a “black box”, 
adherents to the neo-classical theory believe that only the market is capable to 
organize efficient contracting. 
However, markets in modern economies deviate from the neo-classical 
ideal due to a variety of distortionary forces, like transaction costs and informa-
tion asymmetries that prevent the market mechanisms to work efficiently.21 
Based on this understanding of capital markets, new institutional economics 
provides a theoretical framework permitting to analyze the firm itself while fo-
cusing on the minimization of transaction costs22 and information asymmetries. 
In this context, researchers are concerned with the efficient design of institu-
tions, such as contracts and organizational structures, and their impact on the 
behavior of economic agents which is basically assumed to be rationally and 
morally bounded.23 New institutional economists conceive the firm as a legal 
                                            
20  See Achleitner (2001), pp. 45f. 
21  See Stigler (1967), pp. 290f; Williamson (1985), pp. 299f; Stein (2003), p. 114. 
22  See Learmount (2002), p. 4. This notion was originally brought forward by Coase (1937), but 
has been further developed by Williamson (1985). 
23  See Picot et al. (2005), pp. 45f. For the notion of bounded rationality see Simon (1957). 
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construct which serves as a nexus for a set of contracts between individuals24, 
e.g. managers and shareholders (see figure 3).25  
 
Figure 3: Simplified Illustration of the Relationship between Shareholders and Managers 
Shareholders
CONTRACT
Managers
Service
Compensation
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
These contracts are considered incomplete26 in the sense that the rights of 
the contracting parties cannot be precisely incorporated for all future contingen-
cies27, which may lead to conflicts between the parties in case of diverging in-
terests.28 The analysis of such conflicts of interest between economic agents is 
subject to the agency theory that emerged from the seminal papers of 
Spence/Zeckhauser (1971), Alchian/Demsetz (1972), Ross (1973) and Jen-
sen/Meckling (1976). Agency theory has basically developed along two lines: 
the “positive theory of agency” and the “principal-agent theory”.29 While the 
principal-agent theory is a more general theoretical stream, that focuses on dif-
                                            
24  See Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 310; Fama (1980), p. 290. The so-called contractual view of 
the firm originated in the work of Coase (1937) and was further developed by Jen-
sen/Meckling (1976) and Fama/Jensen (1983a, 1983b). 
25  In most general terms, shareholders and managers sign a contract that specifies what the 
managers are supposed to do with the capital and how the returns are divided between them 
and the shareholders; see Shleifer/Vishny (1997), p. 741. 
26  For a more comprehensive elaboration on the notion of incomplete contracts see 
Grossman/Hart (1986) and Hart/Moore (1990). 
27  See Shleifer/Vishny (1997), p. 741; Rudolph (2006), p. 141. 
28  Grossman/Hart (1986) explain that the difficulty to design complete contracts creates room 
for agents to behave opportunistically. 
29  See Jensen (1983), p. 334. 
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ferent principal-agent relationships, such as the ones between employer and 
employee, lawyer and client, buyer and supplier30, the positivist stream exclu-
sively investigates the relationship between managers and shareholders in 
large companies. In contrast to the principal-agent literature, the positive 
agency literature is usually less abstract and mathematical and more empirically 
oriented.31 
 
                                            
30  See for instance Harris/Raviv (1978). 
31  See Jensen (1983), p. 334; Eisenhardt (1989), p. 59. 
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2.1.3 Definition and Premises of the Principal-Agent Relationship 
Jensen/Meckling (1976) generally define an agency relationship as a bilateral 
contract under which one party (principal) mandates another party (agent) to 
perform some kind of service by delegating decision making authority.32 As pre-
viously indicated in chapter 2.1.2, a variety of different agency relationships ex-
ist in the corporate setting. Due to the focus of this doctoral thesis, the attention 
of the subsequent examination is confined to the contracting relationship be-
tween shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) of the public corpora-
tion following the positive agency theory. 
Being the agent in the above mentioned relationship, managers are ex-
pected to use the privileges and powers entrusted to them exclusively for the 
benefit of the shareholders as their interest appears.33 In line with shareholder 
value theory34, there is the widespread conviction that managers are supposed 
to direct the company on behalf of the shareholders with the primary objective 
to maximize profit35 or, more precisely, shareholder value36. 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of the Conflicts of Interest between Shareholders and Management 
Principal
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Objective:
Increase of 
shareholder value
Agent
(Management)
Objective:
Increase of power, prestige 
and personal wealth
Conflicts of 
interest
Agency Theory
The analysis of the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers 
 
Source: Own illustration.  
                                            
32  See Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 308. 
33  See Berle (1931), p. 1049; Berle/Means (1932), p. 333. 
34  For further reading on shareholder value theory it is referred to Rappaport (1981, 1986). 
35  See Berle/Means (1932), pp. 119ff; Baumol (1959), p. 51. 
36  See Jensen (2001), p. 299. 
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However, due to incomplete contracts and diverging interests and objec-
tives (see figure 4) managers may not, and often do not, act in the best interest 
of shareholders.37 Since managers are not able to capture a major share of the 
wealth effects of their decisions they have obviously less incentives to maximize 
equity value than if they were the principals of the company.38 This situation of 
conflict has already been pointed out by Adam Smith in his seminal work “The 
wealth of nations”, originally published in 1776. Therein he states: 
 
“The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the manag-
ers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be ex-
pected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. 
Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small 
matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a 
dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must al-
ways prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a com-
pany.”39 
 
Trying to maximize their personal utility40 in terms of greater power, prestige 
and private wealth41, managers are tempted to extract private benefits at the 
cost of shareholders. These benefits may come in different forms. Managers 
may, for instance, directly divert funds into their own pockets42, improve their 
                                            
37  See Berle/Means (1932), p. 333; Grossman/Hart (1982), p. 107; Easterbrook (1984), p. 652; 
Demsetz/Lehn (1985), p. 1173; Stiglitz (1985), p. 134; Williamson (1985), p. 312; Hart/Moore 
(1995), p. 568.  
38  See Fischel (1982), pp. 1262f; Fama/Jensen (1983a), p. 304. 
39  See Smith (1776), p. 229. 
40  A fundamental premise underlying agency theory is the one of opportunistic and utility-
maximizing individuals. For academic reference see Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 308; Wil-
liamson (1985), p. 6; Jensen (1994), p. 41; Learmount (2002), p. 4; Clarke (2004), p. 5. 
41  See Berle/Means (1932), pp. 122ff; Gordon (1945), pp. 305ff; Williamson (1963), p. 1034; 
Eisenberg (1976), p. 31. 
42  See Berle/Means (1932), p. 333; Shleifer/Vishny (1997), p. 742. 
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terms of employment43, pretend to be qualified in order to get or keep a job, or 
pursue non-value maximizing investment strategies.44  
Closely related to the notion of conflicting interests is the one of asymmetric 
information, indicating that one party is better informed than the other. Informa-
tion asymmetries are only relevant if the contracting parties have diverging in-
terests. Otherwise, all information would be automatically revealed, since nei-
ther party would benefit from hiding any information.45 In real life situations, 
information is not freely available to all parties. Especially shareholders are at a 
disadvantage because managers sometimes dispose of information that they 
are reluctant to share for opportunistic reasons and that cannot be observed or 
verified by external observers.46 The following chapter provides a more pro-
found insight into the concept of asymmetric information. 
 
                                            
43  See Williamson (1985), p. 312. 
44  Morck et al. (1988a), p. 293. A more comprehensive overview on different forms of agency 
problems will be presented in chapter 2.1.5. 
45  See Macho-Stadler/Pérez-Castrillo (2001), p. 6. 
46  See Leland/Pyle (1977), p. 371; Pratt/Zeckhauser (1985), pp. 2f. 
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2.1.4 Concept of Asymmetric Information 
2.1.4.1 Types of Asymmetric Information Problems 
In the context of the principal-agent relationship, three types of information 
problems need to be differentiated: adverse selection, moral hazard and hold 
up.47 
The information problem of hidden characteristics or adverse selection re-
fers to a situation in which the principal does not know certain characteristics of 
the agent ex-ante, meaning prior to the closing of a contract.48 It is argued that 
the agent, at the time he is being hired, may intentionally hide his or her nega-
tive qualities and pretend to have skills or abilities that are in fact non-existent.49 
However, the principal does not recognize these characteristics until the con-
tract has been concluded. In a situation where bad agents hide their negative or 
below-average characteristics and good agents are not able to disclose their 
positive or above-average characteristics, the latter group may withdraw from 
the market.50 Eventually, this leads to a selection of undesirable agents which is 
commonly referred to as the adverse selection problem, originally proposed by 
Akerlof (1970).51 
A second information problem is the one of hidden action and information 
which is also known as moral hazard.52 In contrast to adverse selection, moral 
hazard is concerned with information asymmetries that occur ex-post, that is, 
after a contract has been signed. Here, the principal is either not able to ob-
                                            
47  See Picot et al. (2005), p. 74. 
48  See Macho-Stadler/Pérez-Castrillo (2001), p. 11; Picot et al. (2005), p. 74; Rudolph (2006), 
p. 142. 
49  See Eisenhardt (1989), p. 61. 
50  See Picot et al. (2005), p. 74. 
51  In his “market for lemons” model, analyzing a market for used cars, Akerlof (1970) describes 
how information asymmetries and market mechanisms may lead to a successive retention of 
above-average agents, ultimately resulting in a collapse of the market. Other relevant contri-
butions with respect to the adverse selection problem have been provided by Roths-
child/Stiglitz (1976), Myers/Majluf (1984), among others. 
52  Previous literature dealing with the moral hazard problem include e.g. Zeckhauser (1970), 
Arrow (1971), Ross (1973), Mirrlees (1974), Harris/Raviv (1978) and Holmström (1979). 
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serve53 or to assess the decisions and actions of the agent.54 It is argued that 
the agent may not abide by the agreed-upon effort55 and may intentionally ex-
ploit the information deficit of the principal56. Due to a cost and time restraint the 
principal is basically not able to continuously verify the action of the agent. In 
addition, he might not even be capable to assess whether the decision or action 
taken by the agent is actually appropriate and whether the output was predomi-
nantly affected by the efforts of the agent or some arbitrary exogenous fac-
tors.57 
The last of the three information problems is hidden intention, which has 
also come to be known as hold-up. The hold-up problem, which was introduced 
by Williamson (1975), Goldberg (1976) and Klein et al. (1978) has become 
widely accepted among economists as an essential determinant of contractual 
and organizational structure.58 Compared to the two other information problems, 
hold-up is not predominantly concerned with information asymmetries between 
principal and agent but rather with information asymmetries between the con-
tractors and third parties, particularly courts. It is primarily based on the notion 
that complete and unanimously verifiable contracts cannot be specified or le-
gally enforced.59 Due to a variety of uncertain future contingencies, that cannot 
be specified ex-ante, contracts will always be incomplete to a certain extent, 
providing one contracting party (agent) with a certain freedom on how to render 
its services.60 In a hold-up situation the agent opportunistically exploits such 
                                            
53  See Holmström (1979), p. 74; Macho-Stadler/Pérez-Castrillo (2001), p. 9; Stiglitz (2000), p. 
1453; Rudolph (2006), p. 142. 
54  See Picot et al. (2005), p. 75. 
55  See Arrow (1985), pp. 38f; Eisenhardt (1989), p. 61. 
56  See Picot et al. (2005), p. 75; Rudolph (2006), p. 142. 
57  See Scharfstein (1988), p. 186; Richter/Furubotn (2003), p. 174; Picot et al. (2005), p. 75. 
Agency theory assumes that the output generated by the firm not only depends on the capa-
bilities and efforts of the managers but on various exogenous factors. See also Arrow 
(1985), p. 37. 
58  See Rogerson (1992), p. 777. 
59  See Picot et al. (2005), p. 75. 
60  See Spremann (1990), p. 569; Picot et al. (2005), p. 75. 
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contractual gaps at the expense of the principal who is de facto powerless from 
a legal perspective.61 
 
2.1.4.2 Measures Reducing Information Asymmetries 
Depending on the type of information problem the principal can generally revert 
to different conceptual measures that help to reduce information asymmetries, 
of the sort outlined in the preceding chapter (see table 1). 
 
Table 1: Overview of Measures Reducing Information Asymmetries 
Alignment of interestsMonitoring, alignment of 
interests
Screening, signaling, self-
selection, alignment of 
interests
Counteractive Measures
After conclusion of 
contract
After conclusion of 
contract
Prior to conclusion of 
contract
Timing of the Problem
Hidden intentionHidden action and 
information
Hidden characteristicsOrigin of the Problem
Contracts are incomplete 
and cannot be verified
Efforts of the agent 
cannot be observed or 
judged
Qualities (skills and 
abilities) of the agent are 
unknown
Information Problem 
of the Principal
Hold-UpMoral HazardAdverse Selection
 
Source: Own illustration following Picot et al. (2005), p. 77. 
 
Basically, in all three cases (adverse selection, moral hazard and hold-up) 
incentive alignment or bonding systems, where the interests of the agents are 
aligned with those of the principals, can help to effectively reduce information 
asymmetries and to prevent opportunistic behavior of the agent. These may 
include performance-based remuneration structures or specific contractual obli-
gations urging agents to abide by specific rules.62 
                                            
61  See Goldberg (1976), p. 439; Spremann (1990), p. 568. 
62  See Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 325; Eisenhardt (1989), p. 61; Spremann (1990), pp. 581ff; 
Achleitner (2001), p. 52. 
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In addition to bonding mechanisms, adverse selection can be counteracted 
by reducing information asymmetries with the means of screening, signaling 
and self-selection prior to signing the contract. Screening here refers to the col-
lection of relevant information on the agent63, which permits principals to re-
ceive a more detailed and reliable picture on his qualities and efforts. In con-
trast, signaling is based on the idea that above-average agents are interested in 
trustworthy communicating their qualities and motivation by sending binding 
signals to the principals, e.g. by providing certificates and diplomas or by creat-
ing reputation.64 Thus, the agent provides an indication that he will be the eligi-
ble candidate for the job and that he will behave in accordance with the princi-
pal’s interests after the contract has been concluded. Self-selection eventually 
refers to the process by which the agent reveals information about himself 
through the choices that he makes.65 Here, the agent may choose among dif-
ferently designed contracts. According to the agent’s choice the principal is able 
to assess the qualities of the agent.66 
A significant measure to encounter the moral hazard problem is monitor-
ing.67 Monitoring an agent is costly and limited to a certain extent, as these 
costs rise exponentially with increasing monitoring efforts.68 However, monitor-
ing mechanisms, such as budgeting or reporting systems and the board of di-
rectors as primary internal supervisory body69, can reduce information asymme-
tries and increase the vigilance with respect to managerial fraud and 
mismanagement. 
 
                                            
63  See Picot et al. (2005), p. 78; Rudolph (2006), p. 142. 
64  See Achleitner (2001), p. 50; Picot et al. (2005), p. 78; Rudolph (2006), p. 142. 
65  See Stiglitz (2000), p. 1450. 
66  See Picot et al. (2005), p. 78. 
67  See Holmström (1979), p. 74; Achleitner (2001), p. 52; Rudolph (2006), p. 142. 
68  See Holmström (1979), p. 74. 
69  See Eisenhardt (1989), p. 61. 
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2.1.5 Agency Problems 
In the past, corporate head offices have often been a prominent arena for unre-
strained and morally questionable leadership, motivated by managerial discre-
tion. Top-level executives can hire and fire employees as they desire, allocate 
capital where they wish and reorganize the company as they please70, fre-
quently colliding with the interests of shareholders. On balance, there are many 
possible manifestations of the agency conflict between managers and share-
holders. Some of the most relevant and well documented categories of agency 
problems in the positive agency literature include: 
 
 outright stealing, 
 perquisites, 
 empire building, 
 entrenching investments, 
 shirking, 
 reputation and career concerns, 
 overconfidence.71 
 
A straight-forward agency problem is outright stealing of corporate re-
sources.72 In a more general sense, this may comprise excessive compensation 
packages73 approved by managers themselves or by some related or depend-
ent members of the board of directors. Furthermore, managers may sell outputs 
to a company they personally own at below market prices.74 In a more specific 
                                            
70  See Berle/Means (1932), p. 124; Morck (2004), p. 6. 
71  For a good review of agency problems see Stein (2003). 
72  See Durnev/Kim (2005), p. 1463. 
73  See Peasnell et al. (2003), p. 235. 
74  See La Porta et al. (2000), p. 4. 
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sense, managers may directly withdraw corporate funds to increase personal 
wealth.75  
In addition to outright theft, perquisite consumption represents a second 
category of agency problems. Apart from the agreed upon compensation, in-
cluding fixed and variable components, managers may take advantage of addi-
tional non-pecuniary conveniences. These may include tickets to cultural or 
sporting events, lavish office accommodations, corporate meetings scheduled 
at luxury resorts, the use of corporate jets for personal purposes or borrowing 
from the firm below the market interest rate.76  
Another type of agency problem is “empire building”. The term refers to the 
tendency of managers to enlarge their companies beyond the optimal size dis-
regarding whether such growth goes along with an increase in shareholder 
wealth.77 Hereby, the motivation of managers is basically twofold. In the first 
place, corporate growth is usually associated with an increase in compensation 
and monetary rewards, augmenting personal wealth of the respective execu-
tives.78 Perhaps even more important, managers are motivated by non-
monetary rewards. They are for instance interested in increasing personal 
power and prestige by multiplying the resources under their command and by 
reigning over influential empires.79 
A fourth category of agency problems is entrenching investments. Here, 
managers invest in projects that are designed to require or reward their qualities 
and experiences.80 Such management-specific investments are often con-
structed in a way that makes it very costly for shareholders to replace top ex-
ecutives of the company.81 
                                            
75  See Shleifer/Vishny (1997), p. 742; La Porta et al. (2000), p. 4. 
76  See Brealey/Myers (2000), p. 321; Peasnell et al. (2003), p. 235. 
77  See Jensen/Murphy (1990), p. 149; Stulz (1990), p. 4; Bhojraj/Sengupta (2003), p. 455; 
Stein (2003), p. 121; Hartzell et al. (2004), p. 2. 
78  See Baumol (1959), p. 42; Murphy (1985), p. 32; Jensen (1986), p. 323; Stulz (1990), p. 4. 
79  See Gordon (1945), pp. 305ff; Eisenberg (1976), p. 31. 
80  See Shleifer/Vishny (1989), p. 123; Brealey/Myers (2000), p. 321; Tirole (2001), p. 1. 
81  See Shleifer/Vishny (1989), p. 123. 
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Another form of agency problems can be subsumed under “shirking” or “re-
duced effort”. Identifying and implementing profitable and valuable investment 
opportunities in a very competitive environment requires a great deal of effort 
and a high level of stress resistance. Since managers are not the residual 
claimants receiving the major share of the wealth effects of their decisions, it is 
often argued that they have less incentive to exert as much effort as if it was 
their money that was at risk.82 As stressed by Baumol (1959) and Ber-
trand/Mullainathan (2003), managers prefer the “quiet life” when it comes to 
making tough and uncomfortable decisions. In this context, they are reluctant to 
undertake risks and avoid outstanding accomplishments which may possibly 
raise expectations on future performance.83  
Another source of conflict may arise from reputation and career concerns on 
the part of managers.84 Though such concerns may to some extent lead to bet-
ter agents85, they may also hinder managers to make value-enhancing deci-
sions as preferred by shareholders. In this respect, three problems can be dis-
tinguished: short-termism, herding and conservatism. With regard to the first 
problem, Narayanan (1985) argues that managers may be particularly inter-
ested in boosting short-term performance measures at the cost of the long-term 
value of the company. His view has been supported by empirical findings of 
Dechow/Sloan (1991) and others. Herding is another phenomenon that can be 
observed in connection with career concerns. Here, managers tend to follow the 
decisions of other managers while ignoring their own intuition and know-how.86 
This may be explained by managerial risk aversion which leads us to the final 
problem regarding career concerns, conservatism. Holmström/Costa (1986) 
point out that reputation and career concerns may be related to a reluctance of 
managers to engage in new investment projects. It is argued that the outcome 
of the new project will provide information about managerial ability, which man-
                                            
82  See Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 313; Harris/Raviv (1978), p. 21; Harris/Raviv (1979), p. 232; 
Brealey/Myers (2000), p. 321; Stein (2003), p. 120. 
83  See Baumol (1959), p. 92. 
84  See Stein (2003), p. 122. 
85  See Fama (1980), p. 292. 
86  See Scharfstein/Stein (1990), p. 465; Zwiebel (1995), p. 2; Stein (2003), p. 123. 
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agers may want to hide. Particularly risk averse managers may want to avoid 
any variation in wages determined by labor markets in response to their per-
formance.87 Apart from avoiding new investment projects, managers may also 
choose to invest in less risky projects88, decide to diversify the company’s op-
erations as this reduces the risk of the company to go out of business89, or 
avoid liquidating poorly-performing subsidiaries in fear of admitting to have 
failed.90  
The final type of agency problems is overconfidence. As suggested by Roll 
(1986) managers may be overly optimistic about particular investment projects. 
They may, for instance, pay too much for a target in corporate takeovers simply 
due to excessive pride.91 
 
                                            
87  See Stein (2003), p. 124. 
88  See Hirshleifer/Thakor (1992), pp. 438f. 
89  See Peasnell et al. (2003), p. 235. See for instance Berger/Ofek (1995) for empirical evi-
dence on the negative effect of diversification on firm value. As Grossman/Hart (1982) indi-
cate, bankruptcy reduces managers’ benefits associated with their position.  
90  See Boot (1992), p. 1402; Baker (2000), p. 1. 
91  See Roll (1986), p. 197; Malmendier/Tate (2004), p. 1. 
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2.1.6 Agency Costs 
Agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, as described in chapter 
2.1.5, incur non-negligible costs on the part of shareholders which are also re-
ferred to as agency costs. According to Jensen/Meckling (1976), agency costs 
include monitoring and bonding costs as well as a “residual loss”.92  
Monitoring costs can be considered as the price of all efforts of the principal 
to reduce his informational disadvantage by observing or controlling the agent.93 
Typical monitoring measures include auditing and budgeting systems and the 
board of directors.94 By contrast, bonding costs refer to the price of all meas-
ures used to align the interests of the agent with those of shareholders.95 These 
may include effective incentive structures, such as equity-based compensation 
systems, that enable managers to participate in the wealth effects of their deci-
sions.96 However, in spite of total monitoring and bonding efforts it is not possi-
ble for shareholders to prevent all value-decreasing behavior of the agent. The 
actual loss resulting from such value-reducing decisions is called “residual loss 
of welfare”97 and represents the last component of agency costs. 
In the end, agency costs can be substantial, reducing a company’s produc-
tivity98 and eventually shareholder value. Therefore, shareholders are highly 
interested in minimizing agency costs. In view of this line of argumentation, it is 
obviously important to establish checks and balances on managerial behavior. 
A system dealing with such checks and balances with the objective to mitigate 
agency problems and to reduce related agency costs is corporate governance 
which will be further dealt with in the following chapters.  
                                            
92  See Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 308. 
93  See Picot et al. (2005), p. 73. 
94  See Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 323. 
95  See Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 308. 
96  See Shleifer/Vishny (1997), p. 744. 
97  See Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 308. 
98  See Börsch-Supan (1998), p. 206; Börsch-Supan/Köke (2002), p. 295. 
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 27 
 
2.2 Concept of Corporate Governance 
2.2.1 Definitions of Corporate Governance 
The term “corporate governance”, originating from the Anglo-Saxon usage, has 
not been introduced to academic literature in its actual meaning until the mid 
1980s.99 Even though, a clear and unanimously accepted definition does not yet 
exist, numerous varying definitions of the term can be found in the literature.  
Cadbury (1992), for instance, generally defines corporate governance as a 
“system by which companies are directed and controlled”100. In turn, according 
to Baums (2001) corporate governance is primarily concerned with “the func-
tionality of management bodies, their cooperation and the control of their con-
duct”101. However, these definition attempts have a rather broader scope and 
do not capture the complexity of the term.  
Clearly, there are more specific definitions of corporate governance. But, 
prior to going into further detail it is necessary to distinguish between two fun-
damentally deviating perceptions of corporate governance, one with the em-
phasis on the interests of all stakeholders of a company (stakeholder model of 
corporate governance) and one focusing only on the interests of shareholders 
(shareholder value model of corporate governance).102  
Stakeholder-oriented definitions include the ones of Schmidt/Tyrell (1997), 
John/Senbet (1998) and Witt (2001). They respectively define corporate gov-
ernance as follows: 
 
“Corporate governance … is a complex concept …. [It] refers to the totality 
of the institutional and organizational mechanisms, and the corresponding 
decision-making, intervention and control rights, which serve to resolve con-
                                            
99  The precise term can basically be traced back to Eells (1960), p. 108, to denote “the struc-
ture and functioning of the corporate polity”. However, it seems that Williamson (1984, 1985) 
was the first to use the term in the transaction cost context. 
100  See Cadbury (1992), p. 15. 
101  See Baums (2001), p. 20. 
102  For an overview of the different corporate governance models see Goergen (2007). 
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flicts of interest between the various groups which have a stake in the 
firm.”103 
 
“Corporate governance deals with mechanisms by which stakeholders of a 
corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management such 
that their interests are protected.”104 
 
“The term corporate governance refers to the organization of management 
and control within a company with the aim of reconciliation of interests be-
tween the different interest groups (shareholders, managers, employees, 
bondholders, suppliers, clients, …).”105 
 
However, shareholder-oriented definitions tend to dominate in corporate 
governance literature. This may be explained by the long Anglo-Saxon corpo-
rate governance research tradition which favors the maximization of share-
holder value as the primary corporate goal.106 A representative selection of fre-
quently quoted definitions, including those of Shleifer/Vishny (1997), 
Gillan/Starks (1998) and La Porta et al. (2000), is provided below: 
 
”Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.“107 
 
”Corporate governance is a … system of laws, rules, and factors that control 
operations at a company.“108 
 
                                            
103  Schmidt/Tyrell (1997), p. 342. 
104  John/Senbet (1998), p. 372. 
105  Witt (2001), p. 85. 
106  See Dufey et al. (1998), p. 47. 
107  Shleifer/Vishny (1997), p. 737. 
108  Gillan/Starks (1998), p. 4. 
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”Corporate governance is, to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through 
which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the in-
siders.“109 
 
By virtue of the object of investigation of this thesis, the understanding of 
corporate governance is derived from the shareholder model of corporate gov-
ernance. Accordingly, corporate governance is specifically defined as a com-
plex system of interdependent, internal and external mechanisms by which cor-
porate management is controlled with the intention to protect the invested 
capital of shareholders against a potential misuse or expropriation. 
The subsequent chapters will examine the overall structure of a corporate 
governance system and present the most relevant control mechanisms on an 
individual basis. 
 
                                            
109  La Porta et al. (2000), p. 4. 
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2.2.2 Structure of a Corporate Governance System 
A system of corporate governance is composed of a variety of mechanisms, in 
other words devices, rules and market forces, that work together to reduce con-
flicts of interest between managers and shareholders as well as agency costs 
arising from such conflicts.110 A decisive aspect with respect to the understand-
ing of corporate governance systems is the interdependence among the differ-
ent mechanisms. These do not only complement but also substitute each other 
in their quest for better governed companies.111 Thus, where one mechanism is 
used more others may be used less providing the same disciplining effect.112 
Based on contemporary corporate governance literature eight major catego-
ries of control mechanisms can be identified:  
 
 board structure (Baysinger et al. (1985), Brickley et al. (1988), Weissbach 
(1988), Rosenstein/Wyatt (1990), Hermalin/Weisbach (1991), Lipton/Lorsch 
(1992), Byrd/Hickman (1992), Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), Mill-
stein/MacAvoy (1998)), 
 incentive structure (Jensen/Warner (1988), Morck et al. (1988a), McCon-
nell/Servaes (1990), Jensen/Murphy (1990), Chung/Pruitt (1996), 
Loderer/Martin (1997), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Demsetz/Villalonga (2001), 
Peasnell et al. (2003)), 
 capital structure (Stiglitz (1985), Jensen (1986), Hart/Moore (1995), Zwiebel 
(1996)), 
 ownership concentration (Zeitlin (1974), Demsetz/Lehn (1985), 
Shleifer/Vishny (1986), Holderness/Sheehan (1988), Zeckhauser/Pound 
(1990), Admati et al. (1994), Smith (1996), Maug (1998), Demsetz/Villalonga 
(2001)), 
                                            
110  See Stapledon (1996), pp. 10f. 
111  See Agrawal/Knoeber (1996), pp. 378f; John/Senbet (1998), p. 391; Peasnell et al. (2003), 
p. 232; Beiner et al. (2004), p. 334. 
112  Williamson (1985), p. 306, already argues that the incremental impact of a governance 
mechanism on reducing agency problems depends on the set of mechanisms employed by 
the company.  
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 transparency of disclosure (Williamson (1985), Eisenberg (1976), Stapledon 
(1996), Jensen/Murphy (1990), Bushman/Smith (2001), Khanna et al. 
(2004), Durnev/Kim (2005)), 
 laws and regulation (La Porta et al. (1997), La Porta et al. (1998), Lombar-
do/Pagano (2002), La Porta et al. (2002), Shleifer/Wolfenzon (2002), Klap-
per/Love (2004), Durnev/Kim (2005)), 
 market for corporate control (Manne (1965), Jensen/Ruback (1983), Jensen 
(1988)),  
 market competition (Baily/Gersbach (1995), Nickell et al. (1997), Beiner 
(2005)).113 
 
These can be classified as internal114 or external mechanisms of corporate 
governance (see table 2).115 
 
Table 2: Overview of General Categories of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 Laws and regulation
 Market for corporate control
(e.g. hostile takeovers)
 Market competition
(e.g. product market, labor market)
 Board structure 
(e.g. board size, board independence)
 Incentive structure
(e.g. equity-based remuneration, managerial 
ownership)
 Capital structure
(e.g. leverage)
 Ownership concentration
(e.g. block ownership, institutional ownership)
 Transparency of disclosure
External Corporate Governance MechanismsInternal Corporate Governance Mechanisms
 
Source: Own illustration. 
                                            
113  For a similar but sometimes less comprehensive classification see Baysinger/Butler (1985), 
p. 103; Jensen (1993), p. 850; Hart (1995), p. 681; Agrawal/Knoeber (1996), pp. 377f; Dufey 
et al. (1998), pp. 49ff; Himmelberg et al. (1999), pp. 381f; Becht et al. (2002), pp. 21f; Bush-
man/Smith (2001), p. 238; Börsch-Supan/Köke (2002), p. 313; Gillan et al. (2003), p. 1; 
Schillhofer (2003), p. 26; Beiner (2005), p. 22; Larcker et al. (2007), p. 966.  
114  “Internal” here refers to as being influenced or affected by the company or its shareholders; 
see also Toksal (2004), p. 45. 
115  See also Walsh/Seward (1990), p. 421, 423ff; Agrawal/Knoeber (1996), pp. 378f; Dufey et 
al. (1998), pp. 49ff; Bushman/Smith (2001), p. 238; Gillan et al. (2003), p. 1; Clarke (2004), 
p. 7. 
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Board structure, incentive structure, capital structure, ownership concentra-
tion and transparency of firm-specific disclosure are often regarded as a com-
pany’s internal corporate governance structure which refers to the sum of all 
management-disciplining provisions that can be influenced by the company it-
self or its shareholders. In contrast, a company’s external corporate governance 
structure comprises all disciplining mechanisms induced by external institutions, 
such as the market or the state. They include laws and regulation, the market 
for corporate control and market competition (see figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: General Illustration of a Corporate Governance System 
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Source: Own illustration. 
 
Each of the above mentioned corporate governance mechanisms will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
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2.2.3 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
2.2.3.1 Board Structure 
As a company’s primary internal supervisory body, the board of directors is 
widely perceived to play a pivotal role in corporate governance.116 It is a legally 
constituted entity within the corporate setting whose members have the fiduci-
ary duty and the responsibility to ensure that the company is managed in the 
interests of shareholders.117 The directors are legally enforced to act collectively 
on behalf of shareholders who are not able to adequately exercise control 
themselves due to a wide dispersion of ownership.118 
Worldwide, there are basically two main forms of board structures that are 
often associated with different models of corporate governance: the one-tier 
structure and the two-tier structure. In countries with one-tier board systems, 
such as the US or the UK, companies are governed by a single board where 
the functions of management and management control are combined in a single 
body. Hence, one-tier boards consist of executive and non-executive directors. 
On the contrary, in countries with two-tier board systems, such as Germany and 
the Netherlands, companies are governed by a management board and a su-
pervisory board, two separate bodies differentiating between management and 
control function.119 
Regardless of the respective board system, the board of directors120 gener-
ally has to perform three main functions: selecting and hiring top managers, 
monitoring their decisions and actions, and replacing incumbent management if 
                                            
116  See Baysinger/Butler (1985), p. 109; Williamson (1985), p. 306; Weisbach (1988), p. 431; 
Gillan/Starks (1998), p. 13; John/Senbet (1998), p. 379; Shivdasani/Yermack (1999), p. 
1829; Beiner et al. (2004), p. 327.  
117  See Morck et al. (1988a), p. 307; Friday/Sirmans (1998), p. 411; Peasnell et al. (2003), p. 
234; Bhojraj/Sengupta (2003), p. 456.  
118  See John/Senbet (1998), p. 373. 
119  For a more detailed delineation of the different characteristics regarding the two board sys-
tems see Jungmann (2006). 
120  In the subsequent course of this thesis “board of directors” refers to the board of directors in 
one-tier systems as well as the supervisory board in two-tier systems. 
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it performs poorly.121 In practice, boards of directors do not always exercise the 
active control over management with which it is credited in theory.122 Mace 
(1971), for instance, documents that directors may remain loyal to misguided 
management. Similarly, Morck (2004) contends that directors seem to be para-
lyzed in the presence of dominant and powerful CEOs. 
In order to serve as effective governance devices it is commonly agreed 
that boards of directors have to meet certain criteria with respect to composition 
and size.123 With regard to the first, directors must be independent of the man-
agers they monitor124, so that they are less inclined to ignore or tolerate mis-
management or self-serving behavior.125 If directors are part of the executive 
team or in any other way closely related to management they are likely to have 
interests that diverge from those of shareholders.126 As argued by Jensen 
(1993) and Conyon/Peck (1998), executive directors tend to have less incentive 
to admonish or remove the CEO since their careers are dependent on the 
CEO’s courtesy. Furthermore, some researchers, including Fama (1980), 
Fama/Jensen (1983a) and Weisbach (1988), argue that independent non-
executive directors monitor managers more carefully since they are concerned 
about their reputations in the directorial labor market. Those directors who fail to 
adequately monitor and discipline incumbent management bear reputation 
costs reducing the probability of a potential future employment as an independ-
                                            
121  These responsibilities are by no means exhaustive. In addition, directors are responsible for 
setting and overseeing the company’s policies for compensating management, providing ad-
vice to top management, ratifying material corporate decisions and handling crisis situations. 
For a more comprehensive review on the role of the board of directors see Bates (1940), 
Mace (1971), Eisenberg (1976) and Klein (1998), among others. 
122  See Gordon (1945), p. 94; Jensen (1993), p. 862; Millstein/MacAvoy (1998), p. 1292.  
123  See John/Senbet (1998), p. 379; Beiner et al. (2004), p. 327; Feng et al. (2005), p. 285. 
124  See Winter (1977), p. 285; Fama (1980), p. 293f; Baysinger/Butler (1985), p. 108; Weisbach 
(1988), p. 431; Millstein (1993), pp. 1490f; Brickley et al. (1994), pp. 371f; Lapides/Torres 
(1997), p. 232; Hermalin/Weisbach (1998), p. 97; Millstein/MacAvoy (1998), p. 1292; Beiner 
(2004), p. 327; John/Senbet (1998), p. 373; Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), p. 287; Adams/Ferreira 
(2005), p. 2; Feng et al. (2005), p. 282; Black et al. (2006), p. 407; Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), p. 
337. 
125  At the same time some economists, e.g. Fama/Jensen (1983a) and Baysinger/Butler (1985), 
argue that the board of directors should include some executives or insiders as they provide 
internal knowledge and therefore valuable information to outsiders facilitating the monitoring 
and decision making function of the board. 
126  See Fama/Jensen (1983a), pp. 313-315. 
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ent director on another company’s board.127 In view of the argumentation 
sketched out above, it is reasonable to assume that independent members of 
the board typically exert more effective control than other directors. 
The second characteristic of the board that makes it more effective is its 
size. Lipton/Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) claim that the 
ability to control management decreases as boards become larger. They argue 
that larger boards tend to operate less effectively due to increasing coordination 
and communication problems. With a greater number of directors on the board 
it is certainly more difficult for them to communicate their ideas and to make 
adequate decisions in the limited time available.128 Therefore, it can be pre-
sumed that small boards typically provide better disciplining and monitoring 
than large boards. 
Eventually, smaller and more independent boards of directors should con-
tribute to a more rigid governance of companies. 
 
2.2.3.2 Incentive Structure 
Incentive systems are considered to serve as another important control mecha-
nism in a company’s corporate governance structure. According to Jen-
sen/Murphy (1990), a well crafted incentive structure does not only have an ef-
fect on how executives behave but also on what type of executives it attracts. A 
greater emphasis on performance-based remuneration necessarily attracts 
more highly motivated and competent managers since they are better off than 
in companies without such incentives.129  
The most common way to incentivize managers is to introduce a variable 
compensation package that may consist of monetary rewards relating to certain 
accounting-based performance measures, e.g. return on assets (ROA), return 
on equity (ROE), return on investment (ROI) and price earnings ratio (P/E), or 
stock-based bonuses that can include corporate shares or stock options.130 
                                            
127  See Conyon/Peck (1998), p. 295. 
128  See Lipton/Lorsch (1992), p. 65. 
129  See Fama (1980), p. 292; Jensen/Murphy (1990), p. 139. 
130  See Grossman/Hart (1982), p. 107; Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), p. 330. 
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Accounting-based performance measures are rather inappropriate to de-
termine the success of a company and hence the ability and commitment of its 
managers for two major reasons. First, book values are easy to manipulate and 
can be sugarcoated. For example, managers are able to inflate accounting 
measures by understating expenses, by overstating revenues or by off balance 
sheet financing.131 Second, a performance-oriented remuneration relating to 
historical accounting figures that merely provide information on the past per-
formance disregarding the development of future performance may cause man-
agers to behave myopic. In this context, managers may be interested in boost-
ing short-term earnings at the cost of sustainable long-term shareholder value 
appreciation.132  
Therefore, it is generally more effective to establish equity-based remunera-
tion systems. Many academics and researchers hold the opinion that the best 
and easiest way to ensure that managers will act in the very interests of share-
holders is to give them an equity stake in the company.133 In a formal setting, 
Jensen/Meckling (1976) argue that higher levels of managerial ownership help 
to align the interests of managers with the ones of shareholders whereas man-
agers’ propensity to take value-decreasing decisions declines (convergence-of-
interest hypothesis).134 Having a substantial fraction of their personal wealth 
tied to the success of the company, managers bear the financial costs resulting 
from mismanagement or value-diminishing decisions.135 Consequently, holding 
                                            
131  See Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), p. 330. 
132 See for instance Narayanan (1985), p. 1469; Dechow/Sloan (1991), pp. 87f; Ghosh/Sirmans 
(2006), p. 334. 
133  See Gordon (1945), p. 293; Jensen/Murphy (1990), p. 139; Chung/Pruitt (1996), p. 1137; 
Stapledon (1996), p. 12; Loderer/Martin (1997), p. 224; Himmelberg et al. (1999), p. 354; 
Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), p. 292; Beiner (2005), p. 27; Han (2006), p. 472. 
134 Leland/Pyle (1977) present a slightly different reasoning for increased managerial owner-
ship. They suggest that a higher managerial stake conveys a positive signal to the market 
indicating the quality the company’s investment decisions. Other researchers, including Stulz 
(1988), Bebchuck/Jolls (1999) and Peasnell et al. (2003), assert that high levels of manage-
rial ownership may also have a detrimental effect on firm value since managers may take 
value-decreasing decisions at the expense of other shareholders without fear of being re-
placed (entrenchment hypothesis). For instance, owning large stakes in the company make 
it easier for managers to resist mergers even though these would imply an increase in corpo-
rate value.  
135  See Chung/Pruitt (1996), p. 1137; Friday et al. (1999), p. 72. 
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a greater stake in the company, managers are inclined to more efficiently allo-
cate the assets under their control and to increase shareholder value.136  
In summary, it can be assumed that greater managerial stock ownership 
tends to have a disciplining effect on corporate management and hence repre-
sents a relevant corporate governance mechanism that has to be taken into 
consideration. 
 
2.2.3.3 Capital Structure 
One strand of corporate governance literature claims that the financing policy or 
the capital structure of a company is a relevant factor in reducing agency costs. 
As stressed by Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) and Hart/Moore (1995), among 
others, leverage helps to discourage the diversion of free cash flows by corpo-
rate management (free-cash-flow hypothesis).137 The basic intuition behind this 
hypothesis is that increased debt levels force management to pay out a higher 
fraction of their free cash flows to meet debt service obligations. Hence, this 
leaves managers with fewer funds they might potentially invest in non-
profitable, value-decreasing projects.138  
In addition, Grossman/Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986) delineate that the 
threat in connection with a possible failure to meet debt service payments in the 
future further encourages managers to apply more effort and to make their 
companies more efficient. The threat of potential bankruptcy is particularly se-
vere in the presence of exceptionally high debt ratios. In such situations, debt 
holders tend to be even more vigilant and closely verify the decisions and ac-
tions taken by management. But also in less severe situations debt holders per-
form a general monitoring function that serves to discipline managers139 and 
makes sure that management does not jeopardize the provided capital. De-
pending on the performance of managers they are able to accept or reject fur-
                                            
136  See Jensen/Meckling (1976), p. 313; Chung/Pruitt (1996), pp. 1137, 1139; Ghosh/Sirmans 
(2006), p. 352. 
137  The free-cash-flow hypothesis was originally proposed by Jensen (1986). 
138  See Stulz (1990), p. 4; Hart/Moore (1995), p. 568; Friday (1997), p. 2. 
139  See Friday (1997), p. 2. 
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ther requests for debt capital in the future and thereby induce managers to run 
the company in an appropriate way.  
Nonetheless, for reasons of completeness it has to be pointed out that there 
are also negative agency-related effects attributed to leverage. A widely known 
problem associated with high debt ratios is the one of underinvestment, intro-
duced by Myers (1977). He indicates that if companies heavily rely on debt fi-
nancing, managers are restricted in their ability to pursue value-creating pro-
jects because of large debt service requirements. In turn, Jensen/Meckling 
(1976) argue that managers of highly levered companies might also engage in 
promising but very risky projects with low probability of success. 
Taking these undesirable effects of leverage on managerial behavior into 
account, the effectiveness of leverage as a governance mechanism is difficult to 
assess from a theoretical point of view. 
 
2.2.3.4 Ownership Concentration 
Concentrated ownership in blocks of securities held by large private or institu-
tional shareholders, that are unaffiliated with corporate management, is widely 
regarded to provide a powerful check on managerial behavior.140  
The rationale for this conviction is straight-forward. Roe (1990) emphasizes 
that agency conflicts do not only emerge from the separation of ownership and 
control but also from the diffuse and atomic nature of ownership characterizing 
public corporations. A small shareholder holding a miniscule stake in a com-
pany generally should have no incentive to engage in monitoring activities or to 
take corrective measures141 for two fundamental reasons. First, the costs asso-
ciated with such activities would simply be too high142 compared to the benefits. 
Secondly, other shareholders would benefit without incurring any costs by “free-
                                            
140  See Zeitlin (1974), pp. 1089ff; Stiglitz (1985), p. 144; Shleifer/Vishny (1986), p. 463; Admati 
et al. (1994), p. 1099; Gillan/Starks (1998), p. 15; Becht (1999), p. 1073; Anderson/Reeb 
(2003), p. 1311; Gillan/Starks (2003), pp. 5, 25; Clarke (2004), p. 8. 
141  See Gillan/Starks (2003), p. 4. 
142  See Fama/Jensen (1983a), p. 309; Shleifer/Vishny (1986), p. 462; McConnell/Servaes 
(1990), p. 598. 
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riding” on his efforts.143 In comparison, a large shareholder with a significant 
stake in the company is very likely to be induced to monitor and control corpo-
rate management as the probability that the additional return resulting from 
monitoring and taking corrective action outweighs the costs.144 In addition, they 
have the necessary voting power to enforce their concerns.145 As an indication 
for the hypothesis of better monitoring by large shareholders, Kaplan/Minton 
(1994) and Kang/Shivdasani (1995), for instance, find empirical evidence that 
the presence of large shareholders incurs greater management turnover. In 
turn, Shleifer/Vishny (1986) and Shivdasani (1993) further suggest that large 
shareholders may facilitate value-enhancing takeover attempts by third parties. 
An active role of monitoring can be particularly ascribed to institutional in-
vestors, such as insurance companies, mutual and pension funds.146 Based on 
their mandate, they have a responsibility and obligation towards their clients to 
make sound decisions with respect to their current and future investments147 
and to take appropriate actions to ensure shareholder value creation and 
maximization148. By virtue of their size and the significant amount of financial 
assets under their control institutional shareholders are able to exert great pres-
sure on corporate management either directly by exercising their voting power 
(shareholder activism)149 or indirectly by selling a company’s shares (Wall 
Street rule)150,151. In recent years, institutional investors have become increas-
                                            
143  See for instance Admati et al. (1994), p. 1100; Gillan/Starks (1998), p. 15. The “free-rider” 
problem was proposed by Grossman/Hart (1980). 
144  See Gillan/Starks (1998), p. 14; Maug (1998), p. 67; Sirmans (1999), p. 22. According to 
Barclay/Holderness (1989) and Dyck/Zingales (2004) holding large blocks of securities is 
associated with additional value or private benefits. They find that block trades are on aver-
age priced at significant premiums to the quoted price. 
145  See Sirmans (1999), p. 22. 
146  See Stapledon (1996), pp. 207f; Bhojraj/Sengupta (2003), p. 456; Chan et al. (2003), pp. 
89f; among others. Institutional investors are professional asset gatherers through which 
predominantly private individuals achieve diversification in their personal portfolios; see Ad-
mati et al. (1994), p. 1098.  
147  See Eisenberg (1976), p. 58. 
148  See Pozen (1994), p. 141. 
149  For a comprehensive discussion on the role of institutions in shareholder activism see Gil-
lan/Starks (2003).  
150  See Admati/Pfleiderer (2005), p. 1. 
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ingly active152, meaning that they actually participate in or at least decisively 
influence the strategic direction of companies153 in order to make sure that 
value-increasing policies are being pursued. There is numerous empirical sup-
port for the effectiveness of institutional shareholders in monitoring and actively 
influencing corporate management. Jarrell/Poulsen (1987) and Brickley et al. 
(1988), for instance, find evidence that institutional shareholders are more likely 
to vote against takeover amendments that destroy shareholder value. In addi-
tion, Hartzell/Starks (2003) document a negative relation between institutional 
ownership and excessive managerial compensation. Moreover, Wahal (1996) 
reveal that the announcement of activist institutional sharholders’ pressure 
leads to positive abnormal returns. Similarly, Smith (1996) finds that institutional 
shareholder activism significantly increases stock prices.  
Overall, by means of monitoring and shareholder activism concentrated 
ownership appears to be an important component of a well-functioning corpo-
rate governance system. 
 
2.2.3.5 Transparency of Disclosure 
Transparency of disclosure refers to the disposal of all material facts and infor-
mation relevant for the decision-making process of investors in a timely, struc-
tured and comprehensive manner. 
Disclosures are made on the responsibility of management154 and are coor-
dinated by a company’s investor relations department which is supposed to or-
ganize the communication process between management and capital market 
participants.155 Disclosures include ad-hoc publication of important news as well 
as financial reports that are disseminated on a quarterly, semiannual and/or 
                                                                                                                                
151  See Gillan/Starks (2003), p. 1. Hirschman (1970) describes these alternatives as “voice” and 
“exit”, respectively. 
152  See Admati et al. (1994), p. 1098; Lapides/Torres (1997), p. 230; Gillan/Starks (2003), p. 14. 
153 See for instance Jensen (1993), p. 867. Pozen (1994) indicates that institutional shareholder 
proposals encourage managers to make organizational changes that enhance shareholder 
value. 
154  See Berle/Means (1932), p. 317. 
155  See Schillhofer (2003), p. 35. 
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annual basis.156 It is commonly argued that disclosure helps to reduce informa-
tion asymmetries between managers and shareholders.157 In this view, it may 
be interpreted as a mechanism that provides safeguards against managerial 
discretion158 by constraining managers’ possibilities to act as they please. High-
quality disclosure allows shareholders to more adequately assess a company’s 
current financial situation, to more successfully anticipate future develop-
ments159 and to more accurately judge the performance of management160.  
In principle, one has to differentiate between mandatory and voluntary dis-
closure. Mandatory disclosure is determined by a country’s legal framework, for 
national regulations require companies to disclose business and firm-specific 
information in accordance with certain accounting standards, such as the US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP) and the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), to harmonize the way in which managers 
communicate with investors.161 These standards are merely minimum require-
ments and have a rather general character162 but do not necessarily adapt to 
the unique nature of the individual businesses. Depending on the business sec-
tor companies might disclose additional, business sector-specific information 
that makes disclosure of the respective companies more transparent.163 
According to voluntary disclosure literature, there are different motives for 
managers to be committed to more transparent reporting practices.164 
Barry/Brown (1985), Healy/Palepu (1993) and Lang/Lundholm (1993), for in-
                                            
156  Other forms of communication may include management forecasts as well as conference 
calls and presentations for analysts and principal investors; see Healy/Palepu (2001), p. 406.  
157  See Williamson (1984), p. 1205; Diamond/Verrecchia (1991), p. 1325; Bushman/Smith 
(2001), p. 239; Healy/Palepu (2001), p. 407. 
158  See Eisenberg (1976), p. 35; Williamson (1985), p. 306; Jensen/Murphy (1990), p. 144. 
159  See Williamson (1984), p. 1205; Williamson (1985), pp. 301f. 
160  See Holmström (1979), p. 89; Stapledon (1996), p. 12. 
161  External auditors are supposed to provide assurance that a company’s financial statements 
are generated in compliance with local accounting standards. 
162  See Healy/Palepu (2001), p. 412. 
163  Moreover, additional information other than financial figures may be important to investors. 
In support of this intuition, Mandl et al. (2008) find empirical evidence that extra-financial in-
formation, such as the quality of a company’s human capital conveys value-relevant informa-
tion to the public. 
164  For a more comprehensive illustration of the different motives for voluntary disclosure see 
Healy/Palepu (2001), pp. 420ff. 
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stance, hypothesize, that managers who intend to issue debt or equity or en-
gage in a capital market transaction using shares to acquire another company, 
have incentives to provide voluntary disclosure in order to reduce a company’s 
external financing costs. Furthermore, Trueman (1986) suggests that managers 
may want to voluntarily disclose information to signal their competence to the 
market.165  
For the reasons given above, transparency of disclosure can be considered 
as non-negligible mechanism of a company’s corporate governance.166 
                                            
165  In contrast, Verrecchia (1983), Darrough/Stoughton (1990) and Gigler (1994), among others, 
conclude that managers may not be interested in disclosing voluntary information in fear to 
lose their competitive edge in the market. 
166  See also Bushman/Smith (2001). 
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2.2.4 External Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
2.2.4.1 Laws and Regulation 
The legal or regulatory environment of a company, implying both laws and their 
enforcement, can be regarded as another basic element of corporate govern-
ance.167 
One major reason for the willingness of investors to finance companies in 
the first place is that their rights and powers are protected by law.168 However, a 
differentiated view has to be applied to providers of equity capital and those of 
debt capital. Shareholders are generally more exposed to opportunistic behav-
ior by managers than debt holders since their rights are less precisely specified 
in contracts169 and contractual violations are more difficult to verify by courts or 
other regulatory institutions170. There is a wide range of legal rules that particu-
larly help to protect shareholders against expropriation by managers or that 
permit shareholders to monitor managers more cheaply and effectively. These 
include e.g. voting right rules, disclosure rules, anti-fraud rules and insider-
trading rules.171 
The quality of legal protection can vary decisively across different countries 
and jurisdictions. Typically, as the extent and quality of protective rules as well 
as the efficiency of law enforcement increases, capital market participants tend 
to have a higher motivation to finance companies. Empirical support for this ar-
gument comes from La Porta et al. (1997) who provide strong evidence that the 
development of capital markets is affected by the respective legal environment. 
Thereafter, legal regimes with high levels of investor protection and great effi-
ciency of legal enforcement are associated with larger and broader capital mar-
kets, indicating a greater willingness to provide companies with capital.  
                                            
167  See La Porta et al. (1997), p. 1131; La Porta et al. (2000), p. 4; Daines (2001), p. 525f; 
Lombardo/Pagano (2002), p. 1; Bruno/Claessens (2006), p. 1. 
168  See Shleifer/Vishny (1997), p. 752; La Porta et al. (2000), p. 4. 
169  See Lombardo/Pagano (2002), p. 1; Schillhofer (2003), p. 39. 
170  See Shleifer/Vishny (1997), p. 752. 
171  See also Nowak (1997), p. 49; La Porta et al. (1998), pp. 1122f; La Porta et al. (2000), pp. 
6f. 
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Consistent with the notion that better legal protection mitigates agency prob-
lems, Klapper/Love (2004) show that companies from countries with weak legal 
environments have on average lower corporate governance rankings. Further-
more, Daines (2001) and La Porta et al. (2002) find a significantly positive as-
sociation between the quality of laws protecting shareholders and market valua-
tion. Similarly, Lombardo/Pagano (2002) document that the respect for legal 
rules and judicial efficiency are significantly positive correlated with the risk-
adjusted return on equity.  
Even though playing a role in corporate governance, legal protection is lim-
ited to a certain extent by virtue of the design of legal systems and the difficulty 
to verify all types of opportunistic behavior of managers. Hence, it appears to 
merely constitute a basic component in a corporate governance system that 
needs to be complemented by other disciplining mechanisms. 
 
2.2.4.2 Market for Corporate Control 
There is a wide-spread belief among academics that capital markets perform a 
monitoring and disciplining function through what is generally referred to as the 
market for corporate control.172 Traditionally, the market for corporate control is 
represented by financiers who try to get control over a company to replace in-
cumbent management and to improve resource allocation.173 Thereby, corpo-
rate resources are redistributed from poor or underperforming to good or out-
performing management teams.174 
One important premise in connection with the market for corporate control is 
that the efficiency of management is correctly reflected in current share prices. 
As the share price deteriorates following poor managerial performance a com-
pany is likely to become a hostile takeover target.175 Other market participants 
                                            
172  See Manne (1965), p. 112; Winter (1977), p. 289; Jensen/Ruback (1983), p. 6; Jensen 
(1988), p. 23; Holmström/Tirole (1993), pp. 678f; Stapledon (1996), p. 11. 
173  In contrast, Jensen/Ruback (1983), p. 6, regard the market for corporate control as “a market 
in which alternative managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate re-
sources”. 
174  See Stapledon (1996), p. 11. 
175  See Manne (1965), p. 112; Scharfstein (1988), p. 186. 
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may sooner or later identify that the company is undervalued. Consequently, 
they will try to take over the company, typically by making a tender offer to mi-
nority shareholders, in order to replace management176 and to capture the as-
sociated gain in value.  
Consistent with this intuition, Morck et al. (1988b) find that predominantly 
poorly performing companies tend to be targeted for takeovers. In turn, Jen-
sen/Ruback (1983) show that target firms experience significantly positive ab-
normal returns between 20% and 30% right after a takeover transaction has 
been executed. Furthermore, Martin/McConnell (1991) document a significantly 
positive turnover rate for top managers of poorly performing companies after a 
successful completion of tender offer takeovers. Thus, it can be presumed that 
hostile takeovers as well as the threat of such takeovers and the inherent threat 
of being fired motivate managers to run the company in the interests of share-
holders.177  
Nonetheless, some researchers cast doubts on the effectiveness of corpo-
rate takeovers as a governance mechanism. Shleifer/Vishny (1988, 1997), for 
instance, argue that takeovers are so expensive that they only address major 
agency problems. Moreover, Shleifer/Vishny (1988) highlight that takeovers can 
also be associated with increased agency costs when the acquiring party over-
pays in the acquisition process. In contrast, Stein (1988) suggests that takeover 
pressure can have undesirable effects to the extent that managers sacrifice 
long-term shareholder interests by boosting short-term earnings in order to 
keep up current stock prices and to prevent potential takeover attempts. A simi-
lar line of argumentation is provided by Easterbrook/Fischel (1981) and Morck 
                                            
176  See Winter (1977), p. 289; Shleifer/Vishny (1988), p. 11; Shleifer/Vishny (1997), p. 756. 
177  See Manne (1965), p. 113; Grossman/Hart (1982), p. 107, Jensen/Ruback (1983), pp. 29f; 
Morck et al. (1988b), p. 103; Scharfstein (1988), p. 185; Holmström/Tirole (1993), p. 679; 
Stapledon (1996), p. 11; Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), p. 291; Cremers/Nair (2005), p. 2864. Ac-
cording to Stapledon (1996), p. 11, equity as well as debt issuances can be considered as a 
second disciplining mechanism in the context of the market for corporate control. If a com-
pany is inefficiently managed and performs poorly it will be difficult to raise capital on equity 
as well as on debt capital markets. Equity placements may only be possible at substantial 
discounts whereas debt capital will only be granted at higher interest rates, ultimately raising 
a company’s cost of capital. This, however, has a significantly negative impact on the firm’s 
competitive position, implying a greater risk of going out of business. Therefore, managers 
should be interested to avoid any sort of mismanagement or reduced effort. 
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et al. (1988b), among others, who indicate that managers may resist corporate 
takeovers by applying diverse defensive tactics. 
In summary, the market for corporate control appears to be a governance 
mechanism that serves as a last resort after other, predominantly internal 
mechanisms have failed to react. 
 
2.2.4.3 Market Competition 
Apart from a country’s legal or regulatory environment and the market for corpo-
rate control, competitive forces in product and managerial labor markets may 
serve as external mechanisms of corporate control. The basic notion is similar 
to the one of neo-classical economics which claims that the market takes care 
of all inefficiencies.178  
Such inefficiencies may include costs resulting from mismanagement or 
managerial diversion of corporate resources which are eventually reflected in a 
company’s product prices. As pointed out by Jensen (1986), competition in 
product markets leads to a price-equilibrium with a minimum average cost of 
activity. It can be argued that this necessarily increases pressure on manage-
ment to enhance efficiency of resource allocation and, hence, to cost-efficiently 
run their companies in order to stay competitive and to survive in the market.179 
Managers may be particularly interested to avoid losing competitiveness and 
possibly going into bankruptcy due to the loss of benefits associated with their 
position180 and potential reputation costs that would worsen their chances for 
attractive future employment opportunities.  
Moreover, managers find themselves in a situation of competition with other 
executives from inside and outside the firm. In this context, they may not only 
be interested to avoid bad news in connection with their person but to perform 
                                            
178  Alchian (1950) and Stigler (1958) have expressed the view that managerial discretion cannot 
survive in competitive markets. This intuition has been empirically supported by 
Giroud/Mueller (2007). 
179  See Hart (1983), p. 366; Jensen (1986), p. 323; Baily/Gersbach (1995), p. 308; Sirmans 
(1999), p. 2; Börsch-Supan/Köke (2002), p. 312. 
180  See Grossman/Hart (1982), pp. 108, 131. 
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exceptionally well for reasons of internal promotion and external advance-
ment.181  
Given the assumption that managerial labor markets are highly competitive 
and adequately assess the managerial talents182, executives are only able to 
guard their positions if they are successful in what they are supposed to do: 
create and maximize long-term shareholder value. Otherwise, they will get re-
placed by other managers who are at least as well qualified and who are more 
committed to the job. 
However, it is often questioned how efficient those market mechanisms ac-
tually work.183 Jensen (1993) and Schillhofer (2003), for instance, allude that 
product and factor markets do not instantaneously perform their control function 
but start to react only after a certain time-lag.184 Furthermore, it can be asserted 
that the market mechanism in managerial labor markets does only work well in 
business sectors with a great pool of skilled and qualified executives. If there is 
only a limited number of individuals with the necessary skills and experiences to 
run a particular company, managers are obviously less pressured, for they are 
aware of their significance for the company.  
For reasons of market inefficiencies, one can conclude that market competi-
tion, similarly to the market for corporate control, does only serve as a potential 
secondary control mechanism that may come into effect after other governance 
mechanisms have failed. 
 
 
                                            
181  See Alchian/Demsetz (1972), p. 788; Stapledon (1996), p. 11; Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), p. 
291. 
182  See Fama (1980), p. 292. 
183  See for instance Demsetz/Lehn (1985), p. 1159; Stapledon (1996), pp. 15f. 
184  See Jensen (1993), p. 850; Schillhofer (2003), p. 43. 
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2.3 Listed Property Vehicles 
To get an idea of the companies being examined in the course of this disserta-
tion, the two following chapters shall define the two principal types of listed 
property vehicles. These include publicly traded real estate companies as a 
more general form and real estate investment trusts (REITs) as a more specific 
form of listed property vehicles. 
 
2.3.1 Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies 
In a number of countries publicly traded real estate companies are not defined 
by law and do not reveal any regulatory peculiarities that clearly distinguish this 
type of corporation from a judicial point of view. As a consequence, there is no 
unanimous definition of publicly traded real estate companies in practice and in 
literature.185 
Nevertheless, by virtue of their assets, public real estate companies differ 
decisively from other listed companies. Therefore, an appropriate definition can 
be derived from the field of activity and the corporate objective. Thereafter, pub-
licly traded real estate companies may generally be defined as companies that 
are regularly traded on a stock exchange and that have a principal share of 
revenues originating from real estate-related activities, which essentially include 
the acquisition, management and sale of real estate assets.186 Real estate bro-
kerage firms, construction companies and service providers, such as facility 
management or real estate consulting firms, do not fall into that category. 
As an indirect investment vehicle, publicly traded real estate companies 
provide investors with the opportunity to invest in income producing real estate 
assets with relatively low levels of equity capital, to better diversify their portfolio 
and to benefit from increased liquidity. However, there is a difference to other 
indirect forms of real estate investments, e.g. open-end and closed-end real 
estate funds, which can basically be traced back to the unique characteristics of 
                                            
185  See Rehkugler (2003), p. 5; Rehkugler et al. (2005), p. 12. 
186  See Pfnür (2004), p. 259. Broader definitions further include the development of real estate 
assets as principal field of activity; see for instance Rehkugler (2003), pp. 5f; Rehkugler et al. 
(2005), pp. 12f. 
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public capital markets. The value of the investment does not only reflect the 
property-specific qualities, the conditions of regional real estate asset markets 
and general economic conditions but also accounts for the sentiment of capital 
market participants. It is their assessment and belief concerning the future 
prospects of the property company that determines its market value. Thus, in-
vestors have to understand both, real estate and equity markets, to make sound 
investment decisions. 
 
2.3.2 Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are a particular form of listed property 
companies which was initially created and introduced by US Congress in 1960 
with the intention to enable individual investors to invest in large-scale real es-
tate properties and mortgages.187 The major difference to regular publicly 
traded real estate companies is that REITs are exempt from corporate taxa-
tion.188  
In order to obtain a REIT status and thereby benefit from the associated tax 
release, companies need to meet certain criteria or requirements, which can 
largely be confined to the following. First, most of the REIT’s total assets must 
be real estate, mortgages, cash and government securities. Second, a major 
share of the REIT’s revenues has to originate from direct or indirect ownership 
of real estate (rents, mortgage interests, etc.). Third, REITs typically have to be 
widely held. And fourth, they are required to pay out most of their taxable in-
come to shareholders.189  
                                            
187  See Campbell/Sirmans (2002), p. 391; Chan et al. (2003), p. 3; Hartzell et al. (2004), p. 7; 
Block (2006), p. 42. In the USA there are basically three types of REITs that need to be dif-
ferentiated: equity REITs, mortgage REITs and hybrid REITs. Equity REITs usually pur-
chase, manage, maintain, sell and occasionally develop real estate properties, whereas 
mortgage REITs invest in securitized loans that are secured by real estate assets; see for 
instance Block (2006), p. 10. The third type is a combination of the equity and mortgage 
REITs.  
188  See Geltner/Miller (2001), p. 635; Chan et al. (2003), p. 3; Clauretie/Sirmans (2003), p. 421; 
Block (2006), p. 42. 
189  See Friday et al. (1999), p. 73; Geltner/Miller (2001), p. 636; Campbell/Sirmans (2002), pp. 
389f. 
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Since their inception, REITs have obtained tremendous international recog-
nition as a principal vehicle for indirect investments in real estate. Numerous 
countries around the world have introduced their own REIT regime following the 
US role model: at first the Netherlands (1969), Australia (1971) and Luxemburg 
(1988), which were later followed by Belgium (1995), Japan (2000), France 
(2003), the UK (2007) and Germany (2007), among others. By virtue of the 
varying national legislations, the individual regimes are different from one an-
other with respect to the exact design of the REIT regulation. For an overview of 
the differences between selected REIT-regimes see table 3. 
 
Table 3: General Overview of Selected REIT Regimes 
min. 85%
max. 60% of shares 
held by an individual 
shareholder
100%
2003
Société
d’Investissements 
Immobiliers Cotée 
(SIIC)
France
min. 90%
max. 10% of shares 
held by an individual 
shareholder
min. 75%
2007
UK Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
(UK-REIT)
UK
min. 90%
max. 10% of shares 
held by an individual 
shareholder
min. 75%
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Investment Trust 
(G-REIT)
Germany
100%min. 90%Dividend Payout 
Ratio Restriction
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shareholder
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Ownership 
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19691960Year of Inception
Fiscale
Beleggingsinstelling
(FBI)
US Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
(US-REIT)
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NetherlandsUSA
 
Source: Own illustration following EPRA (2007). 
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3 Corporate Governance of Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies: A 
Global Perspective 
3.1 Reasons for the Rising Importance of Corporate Governance in Real Es-
tate Capital Markets 
Within the last two decades basically four major capital market trends can be 
identified that have significantly contributed to an increasing relevance of corpo-
rate governance in the public real estate sector worldwide. These include the 
increasing significance of capital markets for real estate funding, the profes-
sionalization or institutionalization of shareholdings, a more tense competition 
for international capital and numerous financial and accounting scandals of the 
recent past. While the first development is specific to the public real estate sec-
tor, the three remaining trends also apply to capital markets in general. 
 
3.1.1 Increasing Significance of Capital Markets for Real Estate Funding 
Over the past years, there has been a continuing tendency toward the capitali-
zation of real estate via capital markets190 which is documented by the consid-
erable growth of public real estate markets worldwide. Since the early 1990s 
the market capitalization of the global universe of publicly traded real estate 
companies, represented by the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global index, has in-
creased from € 91 billion in 1990 to € 687 billion in 2006 which corresponds to a 
relative increase of 655% in 16 years (see figure 6). Most of the growth can be 
attributed to the period from 2003 to 2006. During that time market capitaliza-
tion has increased on average by 34% per year. 
 
                                            
190  See Raiman (1999), p. 21; Sirmans (1999), p. 1. 
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Figure 6: Development of FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global Market Capitalization between 1990 
and 2006 
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Source: EPRA Index Database (2007). 
 
In Europe, a similar development can be observed. Here, the market capi-
talization of publicly traded real estate companies, represented by the FTSE 
EPRA/NAREIT Europe index, has more than quadrupled from € 33 billion in 
1990 to € 153 billion in 2006 (see figure 7). As in the case of the global public 
real estate market, exponential growth can be documented in the past few 
years. Between 2003 and 2006 market capitalization has increased on average 
by 39% per year.  
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Figure 7: Development of FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Europe Market Capitalization between 1990 
and 2006 
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Source: EPRA Index Database (2007). 
 
An increasing relevance of organized capital markets as providers of exter-
nal finance for real estate investments necessarily entails a separation of own-
ership and control191 with all the problems previously specified. As a result, it 
can be argued that corporate governance becomes increasingly important in 
the public real estate industry. 
 
3.1.2 Institutionalization of Shareholdings 
In addition, there is a general trend toward institutionalization of sharehold-
ings192 which basically refers to the process of accumulation and managing of 
capital by professional investors, such as insurance companies, mutual and 
pension funds. Institutional investors have become significant players in global 
equity markets. Between 1990 and 2001 financial assets controlled by this type 
                                            
191  See also Sirmans (1999), p. 1; Roulac (2000), p. 387. 
192  See Smith (1996), p. 227; Nestor/Thompson (2001), p. 20; Learmount (2002), pp. 5f; Gil-
lan/Starks (2003), p. 3; Becht et al. (2002), pp. 11f; Drobetz et al. (2004), p. 268. The trend 
of institutionalization of shareholdings can also observed for real estate capital markets; see 
Chan et al. (1998), p. 372; Downs (1998), p. 638; Roulac (2000), p. 387; Chan et al. (2003), 
p. 94. 
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of investors have increased by approximately 193% in the USA, by 146% in the 
UK and by 213% in Continental Europe (see figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: International Development of Financial Assets Held by Institutional Investors be-
tween 1990 and 2001 
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Source: OECD Statistical Database (2003). 
 
Some of this growth may be attributed to reforms of national pension sys-
tems (e.g. in Germany and Italy) which require individuals to increasingly deal 
with growing capital resources for retirement rather than relying on the state. 
Institutional investors professionally manage the capital assets of private indi-
viduals on the principle of diversification using the most modern techniques in 
pursuing their investment strategies. In this context, good firm-specific corpo-
rate governance has become a critical screening criterion for institutional inves-
tors when evaluating investment opportunities. According to the “Global Inves-
tor Opinion Survey” conducted by McKinsey & Company in 2002, corporate 
governance is considered equally or more important than financial figures in 
North America as well as in Western Europe by approximately 55% of all institu-
tional investors being addressed (see figure 9). In addition, roughly 75% of the 
respondents claimed that they were willing to pay an average premium of 13-
30% for well-governed companies (see figures 10 and 11). 
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Figure 9: Significance of Corporate Governance Relative to Financial Figures for the Decision 
Making Process of Institutional Investors by Region 
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Source: Own illustration following McKinsey & Company (2002). 
 
 
Figure 10: Institutional Investors’ Willingness to Pay a Premium for a Well-governed Company 
by Region 
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Source: Own illustration following McKinsey & Company (2002). 
 
56 Corporate Governance of Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies 
 
Figure 11: Size of the Premium Institutional Investors are Willing to Pay by Region 
14% 13%
22%
30%
22%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Western
Europe
North America Latin America Eastern Europe
/ Africa
Asia
A
ve
ra
ge
Pr
em
iu
m
 (i
n 
%
)
A
ve
ra
ge
Pr
em
iu
m
 (i
n 
%
)
 
Source: Own illustration following McKinsey & Company (2002). 
 
As asset gatherers, institutional investors have large capital resources at 
hand and consequently are very influential in capital markets. They are able to 
exert great pressure on publicly traded real estate companies either directly by 
exercising control rights or indirectly by selling shares of companies that do not 
comply with internationally recognized corporate governance standards.193 
 
3.1.3 Competition for International Capital 
The integration of international capital markets and the competition for interna-
tional funds can be considered as another reason for an increasing awareness 
of corporate governance.194  
Based on the idea of diversification benefits, institutional investors increas-
ingly tend to allocate a certain percentage of their funds to international equities 
instead of holding a purely domestic portfolio. At the same time, certain compa-
nies desire to attract foreign capital. Fast growing companies in Europe, for in-
                                            
193  For a similar but more general argumentation see Gillan/Starks (2003), p. 1. 
194  See Nestor/Thompson (2001), pp. 19f; Becht et al. (2002), pp. 12f. 
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stance, have been increasingly raising capital by cross listing on foreign ex-
changes195, since national capital markets were too small to cost-efficiently pro-
vide enough capital to finance their growth.  
However, the decision to broaden the investor base on an international 
scale requires the respective companies to commit to international investment 
values and standards, predominantly set by institutional investors from the US 
and the UK. This includes Anglo-Saxon corporate governance standards, which 
are generally regarded as a role model.196 In this view, it appears that firms with 
better corporate governance structures have a non-negligible advantage over 
competitors since they are able to access capital markets at lower costs.197 This 
is particularly true for companies with large growth opportunities. 
 
3.1.4 Financial and Accounting Scandals 
Finally, numerous examples of financial and accounting scandals of the recent 
past (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Parmalat, Siemens), caused by malpractice 
of corporate management198, intensified the discussion on corporate govern-
ance issues.  
By the time cases of financial fraud or managerial expropriation were re-
vealed, equity value of the respective companies declined dramatically. Some 
companies were even forced into bankruptcy.199 As a consequence, investors 
increasingly demand higher transparency and better control mechanisms in or-
der to protect their invested funds.  
In response to the widespread failure in financial reporting, four fundamental 
changes could be observed. First, audit firms started to divest or to spin off their 
consulting business in order to avoid potential conflicts of interest. Second, Ar-
                                            
195  See Pagano et al. (2002), p. 2652. 
196  The financial strength and dominant presence of US and UK institutional investors in interna-
tional capital markets have contributed to a spread of shareholder value orientation and eq-
uity culture outside the Anglo-Saxon countries and have fostered a process of cross-national 
convergence of corporate governance principles. 
197  See Doidge et al. (2004), p. 2. 
198  See Becht et al. (2002), p. 14. 
199  See Agrawal/Chadha (2005), pp. 371f. 
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thur Andersen, one of the “Big Five” audit firms, went out of business due to 
financial fraud accusations. Third, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, imposing a number 
of corporate governance rules on all publicly traded companies in the US, was 
signed into US law in 2002. And finally, in 2003, the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and NASDAQ introduced an additional set of corporate governance 
rules, applicable to most publicly traded companies in the US.200 These US cor-
porate governance reforms have accelerated corporate governance activity 
around the world.201  
 
                                            
200  See Agrawal/Chadha (2005), p. 372. 
201  See Wong (2004), p. 9. 
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3.2 Corporate Governance Standards in the Real Estate Industry 
3.2.1 Need for Real Estate-Specific Corporate Governance Standards 
The developments, described above, indicate that it has become crucial for 
public real estate companies to adapt to internationally recognized corporate 
governance standards in order to be able to compete with peers for interna-
tional capital on a long-term basis.202  
Over the years, numerous national and international203 corporate govern-
ance codes have been developed and implemented that institutionalize interna-
tionally accepted corporate governance principles with the aim to increase 
transparency in global equity markets and to promote the confidence of inves-
tors and the public in the management and supervision of publicly traded com-
panies. These codes represent so-called “soft laws” or “best practice guide-
lines” that complement a country’s legal rules and usually work on a “comply-or-
explain” principle. Thereafter, companies are not necessarily obliged to strictly 
follow the recommendations but to explain any deviations from the code. 
It is necessary to point out that the real estate industry is characterized by 
some peculiarities that are not captured by contemporary corporate governance 
codes, which generally address all publicly traded companies without making 
any sector-specific distinctions. Particularly, the high degree of intransparency 
resulting from the local and decentralized nature of real estate markets as well 
as the non-standardized nature of real estate transactions204 require a special 
consideration in the design of corporate governance codes to adequately ad-
dress agency conflicts that are specific to publicly traded real estate companies. 
In addition to traditionally cited avenues of wealth expropriation, which have 
been discussed earlier in chapter 2.1.5, managers of publicly traded real estate 
                                            
202  For a similar but more general argumentation see Nestor/Thompson (2001), p. 2; Doidge et 
al. (2004), p. 2; Drobetz et al. (2004), p. 268. 
203 These include, for instance, the “OECD Principles of Corporate Governance”, which have 
become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other 
stakeholders worldwide; see OECD (1999). 
204  See Bone-Winkel (1994), p. 28; Friday (1997), p. 77; Sirmans (1999), p. 4; Freyend (2006), 
p. 149. For a more detailed elaboration on the uniqueness of the public real estate sector 
and its implications for agency relationship and corporate governance see chapter 3.3. 
60 Corporate Governance of Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies 
 
companies dispose of a variety of alternative ways to divert corporate re-
sources, including advising, consulting and property management agreements 
as well as real estate transactions involving related parties.205 One major 
source for agency conflicts stems from transactions with firms owned by man-
agers or other related parties that are not conducted at arms’ length. Here, as-
sociates of firm insiders may receive exclusive rights to purchase, sell or lease 
real estate properties of publicly traded real estate companies for terms that are 
more favorable than under competitive market conditions.206 In some cases, 
predominantly in the REIT universe, operational authority is transferred to an 
external advisor, which is frequently owned by firm insiders, directors or large 
shareholders.207 This situation creates substantial conflicts between the advisor 
and the shareholders of publicly traded real estate companies, especially if the 
advisor manages his own portfolio or has advisory agreements with other pub-
licly traded real estate companies. In such a case, the advisor may select more 
lucrative properties for their own operations providing the advised company with 
second best properties.208 Furthermore, the advisor might be interested in sell-
ing properties from one advised company to another, even though this is not in 
the best interest of their shareholders. Similarly, they may have an incentive to 
increase the size of the publicly traded real estate company, if their fees are tied 
to gross invested assets, though this may be detrimental to shareholder value 
creation.209  
Given the importance of corporate governance and the need to adjust exist-
ing corporate governance codes to the needs of the real estate sector, it is in-
teresting to see whether there have been efforts within the real estate sector to 
develop and deliver industry-wide corporate governance standards that provide 
a practical guideline for publicly traded real estate companies and their inves-
tors. 
                                            
205  See Friday (1997), p. 76. A comprehensive discussion on agency problems in publicly 
traded real estate companies is provided by Sagalyn (1996). 
206  See Sagalyn (1996), p. 36. 
207  See Friday (1997), p. 14. 
208  See Schotland (1980), pp. 161, 176; Sagalyn (1996), p. 36. 
209  See Sagalyn (1996), p. 36. 
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3.2.2 Role of Professional Real Estate Associations in Framing Corporate 
Governance Standards 
For real estate-specific corporate governance standards to be widely accepted 
and supported, they have to be designed and released by highly reputed pro-
fessional institutions that largely represent the companies within the industry. 
Such institutions include the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) 
and the European Public Real Estate Association (EPRA), on a cross-national 
level, and the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) 
and the Initiative Corporate Governance der Deutschen Immobilienwirtschaft 
(ICG), on a national level.  
The following paragraphs are supposed to briefly describe the purpose of 
these institutions and to examine the extent to which each of them has dealt 
with corporate governance issues and whether they have defined or published 
real estate-specific corporate governance principles. 
 
3.2.2.1 Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 
The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), founded in London in 
1868, is one of the most respected and highly recognized organizations for real 
estate professionals worldwide. It counts more than 120,000 members and op-
erates out of 146 countries with the objective to regulate and promote the real 
estate profession, to set and maintain the highest educational and professional 
standards and to provide independent advice, analysis and guidance.  
RICS membership, which is considered to be a hallmark in the real estate 
industry, is only granted to professionals who are prepared to abide by the or-
ganization’s stringent rules of conduct. These rules require RICS members, 
among others,  
 
 to act at all times with integrity and to avoid conflicts of interest and any ac-
tions or situations that are inconsistent with their professional obligations, 
 to carry out their professional work with due skill, care and diligence and 
with proper regard for the technical standards expected of them, 
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 to carry out their professional work in a timely manner and with proper re-
gard for standards of service and customer care expected of them, 
 to undertake and record appropriate lifelong learning and, on request, to 
provide RICS with evidence that they have done so, 
 to ensure that their personal and professional finances are managed appro-
priately, 
 to submit in a timely manner such information, and in such form, as the 
Regulatory Board may reasonably require, 
 to co-operate fully with RICS staff and any person appointed by the Regula-
tory Board.210 
 
By its efforts, RICS is contributing to a more professional and ethical behav-
ior of real estate professionals, including managers of publicly traded real estate 
companies. Accordingly, they should be less inclined to expropriate wealth of 
shareholders. However, though RICS occasionally addresses governance is-
sues in diverse newspaper and journal publications, it has not yet developed 
distinct corporate governance principles for the real estate industry.  
 
3.2.2.2 European Public Real Estate Association 
Formed in 1999, the European Public Real Estate Association (EPRA) is a non-
profit organization with headquarters in the Netherlands. Its members include 
the majority of the leading (listed) real estate companies and investment institu-
tions in Europe that together hold more than € 300 billion of real estate assets. 
The active participation of the member’s senior executives and respected real 
estate experts ensures that EPRA is a genuinely representative forum and pol-
icy-making body. 
Its primary mission is to promote, develop and represent the European pub-
lic real estate sector. In close co-operation with the National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts which promotes the US-REIT industry, EPRA strives 
                                            
210  See RICS (2007). 
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to set and maintain standards of best practice in accounting, reporting and cor-
porate governance. In January 2006, the EPRA Best Practices Committee pub-
lished a set of revised Best Practice Policy Recommendations that reflect in-
formation requirements of investors as well as analysts and contribute to an 
increasing transparency and comparability of listed property companies in 
Europe.211 
Only recently, EPRA released a research study on the corporate govern-
ance practices of European listed property companies. Defining the percentage 
of performance-based executive compensation, the independence of the super-
visory board, the existence of auditing mechanisms and the level of public dis-
closure as key factors of corporate governance, they generate a governance 
score for each property firm listed in the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Europe Index. 
They find a large variation of average corporate governance quality across and 
within different countries. The UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland turned out 
to be the countries with the highest average corporate governance scores.212  
 
3.2.2.3 National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
With more than 2,000 members, including listed real estate companies, inves-
tors and academics, the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(NAREIT) is a high-profile professional institution representing the US REIT and 
publicly traded real estate industry with a combined market capitalization of cur-
rently more than USD 312 billion as of year-end 2007.213  
Within the last couple of years, NAREIT has been involved in roundtable 
discussions and research studies on corporate governance. In 2005, for in-
stance, NAREIT sponsored a “Benchmark Survey”, which covered corporate 
governance in addition to other topics, such as tenant and investor relations. 
                                            
211  Even though, the EPRA Best Practice Policy Recommendations cannot be considered as a 
comprehensive corporate governance code, they are concerned with a crucial element of 
corporate governance in publicly traded real estate companies and that is the transparency 
of real estate-specific disclosure. For further details on the EPRA Best Practice Policy Rec-
ommendations see chapter 3.2.3.1. 
212  See EPRA (2008), p. 2. 
213  See NAREIT (2008). 
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Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that NAREIT has not yet developed own 
corporate governance standards, best practice recommendations or rules of 
conduct. It merely provides a guideline on the public disclosure of funds from 
operations (FFO), which were devised by NAREIT’s Best Practice Council to 
enhance the quality of financial reporting and disclosure practices in the REIT 
industry.214  
 
3.2.2.4 Initiative Corporate Governance der Deutschen Immobilienwirtschaft 
The Initiative Corporate Governance der Deutschen Immobilienwirtschaft (ICG) 
is a registered association that was formed in Fall 2002 with the intention to 
prepare and to establish principles of transparent and professional manage-
ment in the German real estate industry. Counting well-known corporate and 
individual members from the German property sector, the initiative has 
achieved remarkable results since its inception six years ago.  
 
                                            
214  See NAREIT (2004), p. 1. 
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Table 4: Principles of Proper and Fair Management in the Real Estate Economy 
Principles of Proper and Fair Management in the Real Estate Economy 
1. Professionalism, Transparency and Fairness in relation to shareholders / trustees ("investors"), business partners, 
tenants, staff and the public are the indispensable basis of entrepreneurial activity in the real estate sector, which 
constitutes an important part of the national economy. Compliance with these principles strengthens confidence in 
the real estate economy. For this reason, companies – in particular the providers of services – which do not oper-
ate real estate business in the narrower sense also feel bound by these principles; a significant part of the follow-
ing provisions therefore is not applicable to them on a word-for-word basis.  
2. Enterprises that work in or for the real estate economy operate their business in the interests of the investors and / 
or principals and are dedicated to the aim of increasing the value of the enterprise / real estate assets.  
3. The management has the necessary suitability and sufficient experience. It ensures the continuing further educa-
tion of managers, junior managers and specialists.  
4. Expert supervisory and consultation bodies improve the decision-making quality in real estate transactions. These 
bodies are appointed accordingly, and are provided with anticipatory, clear and comprehensive information by the 
management. 
5. An appropriate valuation of the real estate assets is undertaken in accordance with recognized valuation methods 
by qualified, independent experts on the basis of up-to-date and objective market information. The valuation 
method and its alteration, and the market values of the real estate portfolios, are explained in a suitable way. 
6. Real estate business usually involves a high capital commitment and long-term planning. For this reason, the 
establishment and continuing further development of an internal monitoring system and risk management is in-
dispensable. 
7. Conflicts of interest between staff, members of the management, supervisory and consultation bodies on the one 
hand and the real estate enterprise on the other hand, or between the enterprise and the investors, must be 
avoided or disclosed through suitable regulations.  
8. The audit of the annual accounts is important for the protection of investors and the establishment of confidence. 
The criteria of independence and qualification will be strongly emphasized in the selection of the auditors.  
9. The business model of the real estate enterprise, the organizational structure and the participation situation must 
be clearly shown, and any alterations explained.  
10. The information policy is characterized by the principles of credibility and equal treatment. Real estate enterprises 
provide information to institutional and private investors, German and foreign, and other market participants in an 
objective, clear, comprehensive form and language appropriate to the addressee, as well as in suitable media. 
Source: ICG (2005). 
 
The first major milestone was the release of the “Principles of Proper and 
Fair Management in the Real Estate Economy” which are presented in table 4. 
These principles commit the members of the sector to respect certain values, 
such as professionalism, transparency and fairness. Another milestone was the 
development of the “German Corporate Governance Code for the Real Estate 
Economy”215, which was adopted by the members’ meeting in 2003. This code 
contains real estate-specific recommendations that help to alleviate conflicts of 
interest in publicly traded real estate companies and explicitly addresses is-
sues, such as the valuation of real estate and the monitoring by the supervisory 
board. Moreover, the initiative has worked on further projects, including the de-
                                            
215  See ICG (2003). For further details on the German Corporate Governance Code for the Real 
Estate Economy see chapter 3.2.3.2. 
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sign of a value management system and a concept of certification for good cor-
porate governance.  
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3.2.3 Selected Transparency and Corporate Governance Standards in the 
Real Estate Industry 
As pointed out above, only the European Public Real Estate Association and 
the Initiative Corporate Governance der Deutschen Immobilienwirtschaft pro-
vide standards for real estate-specific transparency and corporate governance 
in a broader sense. The respective standards will be presented in the two sub-
sequent chapters. 
 
3.2.3.1 EPRA Best Practice Policy Recommendations 
Since 2005, all publicly traded companies in Europe are legally required to re-
port in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
which were created by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to 
improve comparability of financial statements around the world. Inasmuch as 
these standards address all publicly traded companies without distinction, they 
are not specific enough to account for sector-related characteristics.  
With respect to the real estate sector, EPRA strives to fill this particular gap 
with their Best Practice Policy Recommendations, a well established and 
widely-accepted industry standard for more transparent reporting practices that 
was released in a revised version in January 2006. Complementing the IFRS, 
the recommendations provide listed real estate companies with guidance on 
real estate-specific disclosure.216 They are structured as follows: 
 
 General items and narrative, 
 Accounting and valuation principles, 
 Presentation of accounts, 
 Notes and additional disclosure, 
 Portfolio information, 
                                            
216  See EPRA (2006), p. 3. 
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 Net asset value and earnings per share.217 
 
Apart from a dissemination of supplementary information on corporate 
management and strategy, EPRA therein recommends publicly traded real es-
tate companies to depict more details on the property holdings in their financial 
reports. Such information is supposed to be presented in a disaggregate form, 
broken down by country and property type and includes the data displayed in 
table 5. 
 
Table 5: Real Estate Portfolio Disclosure Recommendations by EPRA 
 Costs to date
 Costs to complete
 Future interest to be capitalized
 Forecast total cost
 Forecast completion date
 Lettable space
 Percentage let
 Estimated rental value on completion
Development and 
Redevelopment Property
 Average lease length
 Passing rent of leases expiring at different points in time
 Estimated rental value of leases expiring at different points in time
 Passing rent subject to review at different points in time
 Estimated rental value of passing rent subject to review at different points in time
Investment Property:
Lease Data
 Properties owned throughout the past 2 years
 Acquisitions
 Disposals
 Development property
 Exchange translation difference
 Total net rental income
Investment Property:
Like for Like Net Rental 
Income for the last two years
 Property valuation 
 Valuation movement in the year
 Gross/net initial yield 
 Reversion
Investment Property:
Valuation Data
 Gross rental income 
 Net rental income 
 Lettable space 
 Passing rent 
 Estimated rental value 
 Vacancy rate
Investment Property: 
Rental Data
Property-Specific Data Items
 
Source: Own illustration following EPRA (2006), pp. 30ff. 
 
                                            
217  See EPRA (2006), p. 5. 
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Pursuing the aim of encouraging uniform, comparable and transparent per-
formance reporting, they suggest applying fair value accounting rather than cost 
accounting. Not only does it reflect the current value of the properties more ac-
curately, but it also allows performance benchmarking with direct property mar-
ket indices, e.g. the Investment Property Databank (IPD).218 
To further enhance comparability, EPRA Best Practice Policy Recommen-
dations also propose standard formats for balance sheets, cash flow statements 
as well as the calculation and disclosure of key financial figures, such as earn-
ings per share (EPS) and net asset value (NAV).219 
 
3.2.3.2 German Corporate Governance Code for the Real Estate Economy 
The German Corporate Governance Code for the Real Estate Economy, re-
leased by CGI in 2003, supplements the more general German Corporate Gov-
ernance Code220 with the purpose to account for issues and characteristics that 
are unique to the real estate industry. 
These real estate-specific amendments are intended to increase profes-
sionalism and transparency in publicly traded real estate companies221, espe-
cially through regular real estate valuations, the regulation of conflicts of interest 
and better professional qualifications. For a deeper insight, the single amend-
ments are presented below: 
 
 “3.1.i: The executive board and the supervisory board in the principal com-
panies in groups of companies must carefully monitor the management of 
the transactions of dependent companies, in particular with regard to real 
estate activities. 
                                            
218  See EPRA (2006), p. 13. 
219  See EPRA (2006), pp. 19, 21, 35ff. 
220  The German Corporate Governance Code was developed by the Government Commission 
on Corporate Governance and came into effect in 2002. 
221  The amendments also apply to non-property companies with substantial real estate holdings 
and property companies that are intended for future listing on the stock exchange. 
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 3.3.i: As far as real estate enterprises are concerned, this222 in particular 
applies to fundamental alterations of valuation methods the purchase and 
sale of real estate and project development of the enterprise's own sites 
above a threshold to be fixed depending on the size of the enterprise.  
 3.9.i: Real estate transactions between the enterprise and members of the 
executive board or the supervisory board should be avoided. To the extent 
to which they are nevertheless concluded, they must be subject to the con-
sent of the supervisory board. 
 4.2.i: Members of the executive board of companies that operate in the real 
estate business must have relevant training or sufficient experience. In ex-
ecutive boards of companies whose group companies operate in the real es-
tate business to an extent that can have a considerable influence on the as-
sets situation, the financial situation and the income situation of the 
controlling enterprise, at least one member of the executive board should 
have special knowledge or sufficient experience in the real estate business. 
 4.3.6.i: In case of real estate transactions by the enterprise, even the ap-
pearance of a conflict of interest should be avoided. In every such transac-
tion, the interests of the enterprise alone must be safeguarded. Members of 
the executive board may under no circumstances derive personal advan-
tages from transactions of the enterprise. Privately conducted real estate 
transactions and private commissions regarding such transactions by mem-
bers of the executive board should be disclosed to the chairman of the su-
pervisory board. The members of the executive board should ensure com-
pliance with the principles for the avoidance of conflicts of interest, in 
particular in case of transactions between associated enterprises, the pur-
chase and sale of real estate and the award of commissions in the real es-
tate sphere. The supervisory board should establish rules of procedure for 
individual cases. 
                                            
222  “This” here refers to the specification of provisions by the articles of association or the Su-
pervisory Board, requiring the approval of the supervisory board for transactions of funda-
mental importance. 
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 5.1.1.i: In case of real estate transactions of considerable importance, the 
supervisory board should ensure that its members are informed sufficiently 
well and in good time, appropriately regulate the frequency and time budget 
for meetings in accordance with the transaction volume and the business 
requirements, and assist the members in fulfilling their supervisory function 
more easily. Banking institutions can establish special rules for rescue bids 
that may diverge from this. 
 5.3.2.i: In real estate enterprises, the supervisory board or the audit commit-
tee should deal with the valuation of the existing real estate assets. This 
task can also be transferred to a separate valuation committee. 
 5.4.1.i: In supervisory boards of companies whose group companies operate 
in the real estate business to an extent that can have a considerable influ-
ence on the assets situation, the financial situation and the income situation 
of the controlling enterprise, at least one member of the supervisory board 
should have special knowledge or sufficient experience in the real estate 
business. In supervisory boards of real estate companies, a sufficient num-
ber of supervisory board members should have such special knowledge or 
experience. 
 5.5.1.i: Paragraph 4.3.6.i applies by analogy to the members of the supervi-
sory board. 
 6.1.i: Real estate companies should also publicize real estate transactions 
without delay if their respective total volume exceeds 5% of the balance 
sheet value of the sites and buildings that are shown as fixed assets, float-
ing assets and participation assets. This does not apply to rescue bids by 
banking institutions. 
 7.1.1.i: Legally recognized valuation methods must be used for the valuation 
of real estate. These valuation methods, and changes to them, must be ex-
plained in the annex to the annual accounts, together with the reasons for 
them. The business report or the annex should also state the market value 
(excluding real estate investment assets used by the company itself) and the 
valuation methods used for its determination, together with any changes 
made to them. If no market value is stated in relation to the individual real 
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estate asset, the greatest possible transparency should be achieved by stat-
ing generally applicable (e.g. DIX) regional and/or use-specific clusters that 
were assessed on the basis of the individual market values. 
 7.2.2.i: Contracts with auditors concerning additional consultancy services 
for real estate companies should be submitted to the supervisory board for 
consent if the cumulative fees due for these services exceed 50% of the re-
muneration for the annual audit. Section 114 of the Stock Corporation Act 
applies by analogy to this extent.”223 
 
Although, the German Corporate Governance Code for the Real Estate 
Economy is not legally binding, it provides managers with a basic frame of ref-
erence in order to improve the governance structure of publicly traded real es-
tate companies. However, it does not appear to be useful in assessing the qual-
ity of firm-specific corporate governance since the extent to which the single 
recommendations have been implemented cannot always be verified by exter-
nal observers. 
To gain a deeper insight into the corporate governance structure of publicly 
traded real estate companies, the following chapter theoretically explores the 
influence of asset- and vehicle-specific characteristics on the relevance of par-
ticular governance mechanisms. 
 
                                            
223 ICG (2003). 
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3.3 Unique Corporate Governance Structure of Publicly Traded Real Estate 
Companies 
Previously conducted research by Gillan et al. (2003) suggests that corporate 
governance structures, in fact, do not necessarily resemble but differ across 
industries.224 Consistent with this view, publicly traded real estate companies, 
as opposed to listed companies from other business sectors, appear to have a 
special set of agency issues and a distinct corporate governance structure.225 
This distinctiveness largely stems from the unique characteristics of real estate 
as an asset class as well as the regulatory requirements associated with the 
adoption of a tax-transparent REIT structure226, including income and asset re-
strictions, ownership restrictions and dividend payout policy restrictions. The 
extent to which these characteristics affect the governance structure of publicly 
traded real estate companies shall be described in the subsequent chapters. 
 
3.3.1 Implications of the Characteristics of Real Estate Assets for Corporate 
Governance 
There are some unique characteristics and features of real estate that distin-
guish this particular asset class from other assets or commodities. Two of the 
most important characteristics include immobility and heterogeneity.227 
Real estate is an immobile asset that is bound to a particular location, em-
bedded in a micro economic and a macro economic environment. The fact that 
two properties can never share the exact same location, varying degrees of 
building quality as well as different property types make real estate a very het-
                                            
224  See Gillan et al. (2003), p. 28. 
225  See Sagalyn (1996), p. 35; Friday (1997), p. 8; Bebchuk et al. (2005), p. 16; Feng et al. 
(2005), p. 282; Bauer et al. (2006), p. 1; Eichholtz/Kok (2008), p. 142; Ghosh/Sirmans 
(2006), p. 328. 
226  See Sagalyn (1996), p. 35. 
227  For a more comprehensive depiction of the characteristics of real estate as an asset class 
see Bone-Winkel (1994), pp. 27ff. and Schäfers (1997), pp. 74ff. 
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erogeneous and non-standardized asset.228 These characteristics tend to ag-
gravate agency problems between management and shareholders in publicly 
traded real estate companies229 for the following reasons. 
Due to the heterogeneous nature of real estate, the collection of property-
specific information is very toilsome and costly230, entailing a general lack of 
transparency in real estate asset markets.231 In the corporate setting, outside 
shareholders may therefore find it extremely difficult to assess and to monitor 
corporate real estate transactions232, on the one hand, and the performance of 
the company’s current real estate portfolio, on the other hand. In this regard, 
shareholders are particularly interested in current market values of the underly-
ing properties in order to get a clear picture on whether wealth has been cre-
ated by management. Clearly, to accurately determine fair market values, 
shareholders need to closely investigate and analyze property-specific informa-
tion233 and have to develop a profound understanding of local real estate mar-
kets in which the respective properties are located.234 The difficulty to obtain 
such information and to assess fair market values235 leaves managers with a 
higher level of information than investors, implying greater information asymme-
tries with respect to the principal-agent relationship. Consequently, managers 
have the opportunity to exploit their informational advantage. Using data on US 
equity REITs, Damodaran/Liu (1993), for instance, find evidence that managers 
                                            
228  See Bone-Winkel (1994), p. 28; Friday (1997), p. 77; Sirmans (1999), p. 4. Based on this 
intuition, real estate markets tend to be highly segmented in terms of location and property 
type; see also Geltner/Miller (2001), p. 4. 
229  See Sirmans (1999), p. 4. 
230  See Sirmans (1999), p. 5. In a more general context, Brennan (1990), pp. 709f, makes a 
similar point for latent assets. 
231  See Bone-Winkel (1994), p. 28; Schäfers (1997), p. 76; Geltner/Miller (2001), p. 13.  
232  See Wang et al. (1993), pp. 189f; Friday (1997), p. 77; Friday/Sirmans (1998), p. 411; Friday 
et al. (1999), p. 87; Han (2006), p. 474. 
233  Such property-specific information may include rental rates, expense ratios and vacancy 
rates; see for instance Wang et al. (1993), p. 190; Friday (1997), p. 8. 
234  See Friday (1997), pp. 8f; Friday/Sirmans (1998), p. 411; Han (2006), p. 474. 
235  See Brueggeman et al. (1993), p. 573; Wang et al. (1993), p. 189; Friday/Sirmans (1998), p. 
411; Feng et al. (2005), p. 282. In a more general context, Brennan (1990), pp. 709f, makes 
a similar point for latent assets. 
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use property appraisals by professional real estate appraisers236 to divert finan-
cial wealth from shareholders by trading on the appraisal information prior to 
public disclosure.  
As a result of the lack of transparency as well as greater information asym-
metries, real estate asset markets are typically characterized by market ineffi-
ciencies237, preventing market mechanisms to work properly. As argued by Sir-
mans (1999), the mechanism of market competition does only reduce agency 
problems when the traded commodities are standardized. Thus, the more spe-
cific or unique the underlying assets, as it is the case with real estate, the 
greater the related agency problems.238 
In the light of the above, it can be concluded that the heterogeneous and 
non-standardized nature of real estate assets induces greater agency problems 
between managers and shareholders due to a substantial lack of transparency 
and increased information asymmetries. Based on this intuition, it is reasonable 
to presume that any effort to improve the transparency of listed property com-
panies’ operations by providing value-relevant information on the single proper-
ties of corporate portfolios and on the respective local real estate markets will 
be highly appreciated by capital market participants. As a consequence, it 
seems likely that transparency of disclosure239, plays an even more important 
role in the corporate governance structure of publicly traded real estate compa-
nies than in the one of publicly traded companies from other business sectors 
with more homogenous and standardized products. Following a similar line of 
argumentation, Friday/Sirmans (1998) stress the importance of the board of 
directors in monitoring management since real estate transactions are difficult 
to evaluate for shareholders. 
 
                                            
236  Such appraisals are conducted on a regular basis to provide shareholders of publicly traded 
real estate companies with information on the current aggregate property value. 
237  See Friday (1997), p. 77. 
238  See Sirmans (1999), p. 4. Williamson (1985), p. 56, pronounces the importance of asset 
specificity as a fundamental explanation for corporate governance issues.  
239 This particularly includes the dissemination of real estate-specific information. 
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3.3.2 Implications of REIT-specific Regulation for Corporate Governance 
The organizational form of a REIT is linked to a stringent set of regulations that 
constrain managers’ freedom of operational and strategic decision-making.240 
Such constraints are generally believed to offer less opportunities for agency 
conflicts to develop241 and thus to protect shareholders and other parties of in-
terest against managerial discretion242. Consistent with this view, REITs attain 
top scores in an inter-industry corporate governance ranking243 that is published 
by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). However, Ghosh/Sirmans (2003) 
and Bauer et al. (2006) further argue that the REIT-specific regulation leads to a 
situation in which there is less need for traditional corporate governance 
mechanisms. This implies that the restrictions, associated with a qualification 
for a REIT status, weaken alternative control mechanisms, which are important 
in the corporate governance structure of non-REIT companies.244 
 
3.3.2.1 Implications of Income and Asset Restrictions for Corporate Govern-
ance 
Depending on the respective REIT regime, typically more than 75% of a com-
pany’s income and assets must originate from or held in cash, government se-
curities and real estate assets, including direct property holdings, leaseholds, 
options in land or improvements, other REIT shares and mortgages.245 As a 
consequence, the scope of investment opportunities available to REIT manag-
ers is largely limited to sector-specific assets. This may have positive effects on 
                                            
240  See Sagalyn (1996), p. 34.  
241 See Kanda/Levmore (1991), p. 247; Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), p. 291; Jiraporn/Gleason 
(2007), pp. 23, 32. Eichholtz/Kok (2008) contend that the REIT-specific regulation contrib-
utes to more transparency. In a more general sense, Demsetz/Lehn (1985) argue that regu-
lation helps to discipline and control managers of regulated firms.  
242  See Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), p. 328. 
243  See Feng et al. (2005), p. 282. 
244 See Han (2006), p. 472. 
245  See Allen/Sirmans (1987), p. 176; Feng et al. (2005), p. 283; Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), p. 333. 
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the agency relationship, as potential value-destroying diversification strategies 
of managers to pursue empire building objectives are largely prevented.246  
At the same time, asset restrictions appear to have a negative implication 
for the corporate governance structure of REITs, especially with regard to the 
market for corporate control. The contention here is that managers are not able 
to gather experiences in other industries than real estate, which decisively limits 
their chances of employment after a potential hostile takeover.247 Therefore, 
there is an increased probability that managers will resist hostile takeover at-
tempts and, hence, entrench themselves in order to prevent losing their jobs.248 
Empirical support for this hypothesis is furnished by Allen/Sirmans (1987), 
Campbell et al. (1998), Campbell et al. (2001) and Eichholtz/Kok (2008) who 
find virtually no hostile takeovers in the REIT sector.249  
Accordingly, one may conclude that the market for corporate control does 
not work properly as a potential control mechanism in the REIT world.250 This 
conclusion suggests that alternative corporate governance mechanisms, par-
ticularly the monitoring role of the board of directors and the incentive effects of 
managerial ownership, are more critical in the corporate governance structure 
of REITs.251 
 
                                            
246  See Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), p. 328. 
247  See Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), p. 292; Feng et al. (2005), p. 283; Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), p. 
328; Han (2006), pp. 473f. As argued by Hartzell et al. (2004), labor market for managers 
with real estate-specific knowledge and experiences is very limited. 
248  See Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), p. 292; Hartzell et al. (2004), p. 11; Feng et al. (2005), p. 283; 
Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), pp. 328, 333; Han (2006), pp. 473f. 
249  Eichholtz/Kok (2008) contend that the market for corporate control does not work properly in 
the public real estate sector as a whole. They were neither able to find empirical evidence for 
hostile takeover activity for REITs nor for publicly traded real estate companies without REIT 
status. 
250  See Campbell et al. (2005), p. 230; Bauer et al. (2006), p. 1. 
251  See Hartzell et al. (2004), p. 11; Han (2006), p. 472. 
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3.3.2.2 Implications of Ownership Restrictions for Corporate Governance 
In addition to income and asset restrictions, REIT regulation sometimes also 
includes ownership restrictions that enhance dispersed shareholdings and pre-
vent larger accumulations of equity stakes.252  
Such restrictions may comprise the so-called “excess shareholder provi-
sion”, also known as the “5-50” rule, which requires that the five largest share-
holders of a US-REIT jointly do not own more than 50% of the total shares out-
standing.253 Similarly, ownership restrictions of the UK and German REIT 
regimes prohibit individual shareholders to own more than 10% of the total 
shares outstanding. Other ownership restrictions may demand a minimum 
number of shareholders.254 
It is commonly agreed among academics that such ownership restrictions 
intensify agency problems in REITs.255 The motivation for this belief is twofold. 
First, the active monitoring role, generally ascribed to large blockholders, is lim-
ited since the formation of blockholdings is essentially deterred.256 Edelstein et 
al. (2001) conjecture that a limited ownership stake may reduce large share-
holders’ ability, willingness and efforts to control the management of REITs. 
Consistent with this intuition, Ghosh/Sirmans (2003) find no empirical support 
for the monitoring and disciplining benefits by institutional shareholders in equity 
REITs. Hence, if institutional shareholders do not pursue a role of active inves-
tors, their relevance for the governance structure of REITs should be negligi-
ble.257  
Second, ownership restrictions of the kind described above can be an effec-
tive obstacle for unsolicited tender offers258 and thus may be an alternative ex-
                                            
252  The principal REIT regimes subject to the empirical analysis in chapter 5 do not have tight 
ownership restrictions. Despite its relevance in the global context, the following line of argu-
mentation seems to be of minor importance for the empirical analysis of this dissertation. 
253  See Sirmans (1999), pp. 8f; Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), p. 291; Feng et al. (2005), p. 282; 
Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), p. 333. 
254  See Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), p. 291; Feng et al. (2005), p. 282. 
255  See Sirmans (1999), p. 23; Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), p. 291. 
256  See Sirmans (1999), p. 23; Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), p. 291; Bauer et al. (2006), p. 1; 
Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), p. 328. 
257  See Han (2006), p. 474. For a similar argumentation see Campbell et al. (2001), p. 362. 
258  See Sirmans (1999), p. 9; Chan et al. (2003), p. 85.  
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planation for the absence of hostile takeovers in the REIT universe259. This view 
further supports the notion of ineffectiveness of the market for corporate control 
as a disciplinary force. Parallel to the argumentation in the previous chapter, it 
therefore appears that board monitoring plays a more important role in the case 
of REITs.260 
 
3.3.2.3 Implications of Dividend Payout Restrictions for Corporate Governance 
To qualify as a REIT, a company also has to pay out most of its net taxable 
profits to shareholders. Depending on the respective REIT regime, the manda-
tory dividend payout ratio lies between 85% and 100%.  
One may argue that such high dividend payouts alleviate agency problems 
by reducing the discretionary cash flows at managers’ disposal.261 Accordingly, 
managers have less opportunity to waste capital on non-profitable, value-
decreasing investment projects.  
On the other hand, substantial dividend payout ratios leave managers with 
limited internal funds to finance corporate growth.262 As a result, REITs are 
forced to rely more heavily on external financing than other companies which 
induces them to return to capital markets more often.263 The necessity of raising 
funds externally on a regular basis exposes REITs to greater scrutiny by capital 
markets.264 In this respect, Hartzell et al. (2004) emphasize the importance of 
institutional investors. Contrary to the contention in the previous chapter, they 
argue that institutional monitoring and disciplining may be more important for 
REITs than for other companies.265 Eventually, REITs will only be successful in 
                                            
259 See Sirmans (1999), p. 8; Feng et al. (2005), p. 282. 
260  See Feng et al. (2005), p. 282. 
261  See the free-cash-flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986), p. 323. 
262  See Campbell et al. (2001), p. 362. Despite substantial costs related to the issuance new 
securities, REITs frequently pay out more dividends than required by regulations. Wang et 
al. (1993) and Chan et al. (2003) attribute the fact to the monitoring role of capital markets, 
which helps to reduce agency costs. 
263  See Sirmans (1999), p. 8; Hartzell et al. (2004), p. 7; Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), p. 328. For a 
more generalized conclusion see Easterbrook (1984), pp. 654f. 
264  See Friday (1997), p. 21.  
265  See Hartzell et al. (2004), pp. 4f. 
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their quest for capital if their management has proven to be motivated and 
competent enough to create sufficient shareholder value, if there are promising 
investment opportunities on the way266 and if a sound corporate governance 
setting is in place267. 
In summary, the requirement of high dividend payouts, as opposed to the 
other restrictions, merely seems to have a positive effect on the corporate gov-
ernance structure of REITs.  
 
 
                                            
266  See Ghosh/Sirmans (2006), p. 331. 
267  See Martin (2007), p. 13. 
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4 Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Value 
4.1 Theoretical Relationship between Corporate Governance and Firm Value 
From a theoretical as well as a professional perspective a decisive issue with 
respect to corporate governance is whether capital markets actually reward it. 
To better understand the theoretical relationship between corporate governance 
and firm value, it is necessary to go back to the fundamentals of corporate 
valuation. According to Williams (1964), Copeland et al. (1994), Damodaran 
(2006) and Kruschwitz/Löffler (2006), among many others, the value of a com-
pany is generally dependent on its ability to generate cash flows in the future. 
Firm value is determined by discounting future free cash flows268 with an appro-
priate opportunity cost of capital reflecting the risks associated with the com-
pany being valued.269 In general terms, the value of a company can be written 
as: 
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where FCF  stands for free cash flows, n  for the final year of the forecast 
period, TV  for terminal value270 and r  for the opportunity cost of capital. The 
latter is basically composed of the cost of debt and the cost of equity. Unlike the 
interest rate on debt, the cost of equity cannot be directly observed and largely 
varies across different investors depending on their expectations regarding a 
company’s future returns.271 Companies that investors perceive as being more 
risky entail higher expected future returns in order to adequately compensate 
for that risk. Equation 4.1 is based on the intuition that for a given level of ex-
                                            
268  Free cash flow corresponds to the amount of cash that the company generates after deduc-
tion of operating expenses, capital expenditures and taxes. It only includes real cash items; 
non-cash expenses, such as depreciation and amortization, are excluded. 
269  See Copeland et al. (1994), p. 71; Damodaran (2006), p. 27. 
270  The terminal value equals the projected value of a company at the end of the forecast hori-
zon where a period of extraordinary growth passes into a period of stable growth. It is added 
to the free cash flows of the final year of projections which are discounted to the present. 
271  See Damodaran (2006), p. 28. 
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pected future free cash flows the market is willing to pay more to the extent that 
realization of these free cash flows is more certain and less to the extent that 
their realization is less certain.  
In this context, agency costs can be interpreted as one of the risk factors 
being accounted for in the cost of capital. This notion is consistent with the ar-
gumentation of Lombardo/Pagano (2000) who extend the classical capital as-
sets pricing model (CAPM)272 to account for costs resulting from the agency 
relationship between managers and shareholders. In the presence of agency 
costs, rational investors demand a premium for bearing agency risk273, ulti-
mately raising a company’s cost of capital.274 In other words, the higher the 
agency costs of a particular firm, the higher the inherent risk and the lower the 
value of the firm. From a theoretical point of view “good” corporate governance 
is expected to reduce agency costs275 and therefore to have a positive effect on 
corporate value.276 It seems quite reasonable that investors are willing to pay a 
premium for companies with better corporate governance structures in expecta-
tion to receive higher dividends in the future.277  
 
                                            
272  The capital asset pricing model, developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Treynor, is 
a conceptual cornerstone of modern capital market theory which serves as an instrument to 
measure the risk of a company and to translate this risk into an expected rate of return cor-
responding to the cost of equity capital. It is based on the assumption of perfect capital mar-
kets and relies merely on beta as firm-specific risk measure. However, capital markets are in 
fact imperfect due to the existence of transaction costs and information asymmetries. There-
fore Chatterjee et al. (1999) and others argue that beta by itself is an unreliable proxy of a 
firm’s risk premium because other relevant firm-specific risk factors are being ignored. 
273  See Williamson (1985), p. 305. 
274  See Stulz (1996), p. 16; Ashbaugh et al. (2004), p. 1; Pham et al. (2007), p. 2. 
275  Lombardo/Pagano (2000), Schillhofer (2003) and Doidge et al. (2004) indicate that corporate 
governance reduces the cost of capital since it allows investors to sacrifice less time and re-
sources to monitoring while expecting that the company is governed well. 
276  See Lombardo/Pagano (2002), p. 1. 
277  See La Porta et al. (2002), p. 1147. 
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4.2 Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Value 
4.2.1 Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm 
Value in Finance Literature 
The effect of corporate governance on firm performance has been subject to 
numerous empirical studies in Finance literature. Most of them rely on Tobin’s 
Q as the principal measure of firm performance.278 Nevertheless, the studies 
are characterized by a lack of standardization; they differ in terms of country-
focus, choice of corporate governance mechanisms, data sources and the 
choice of the statistical methodology being applied.  
The majority of the empirical studies examining the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm value focus on single governance mechanisms 
in isolation, as the ones depicted in figures 12 and 13.  
 
Figure 12: Selected Finance Studies on the Impact of Single Corporate Governance Mecha-
nisms on Firm Value (I) 
Authors Measure of Firm ValueSample Methodology Details
Loderer/Martin
(1997) Tobin‘s Q
n = 867
1978 - 1988
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(2SLS)
Chung/Pruitt
(1996) Tobin‘s Q
n = 404
1986
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(3SLS)
Morck et al.
(1988a) Tobin‘s Q
n = 371
1980
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
 No evidence that larger executive ownership leads to better performance
 Find that acquisition performance and Tobin’s Q affect the size of 
managers’ stockholdings
 Significantly positive relationship between the level of CEO ownership and 
firm value
 At the same time, Tobin’s Q is a determinant of CEO ownership 
 Significant, non-monotonic relationship between management ownership 
and firm value: Tobin’s Q first increases, then decreases, and finally 
increases again slightly as insider ownership rises
 Older firms, run by member of founding family, have lower firm values
McConnell/Servaes
(1990) Tobin‘s Q
n = 1,173, 
1,093
1976, 1986
(USA) 
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
 Significant curvilinear relationship between insider ownership and firm 
value: Positive relation until insider ownership level reaches 40-50%, then 
a slightly negative relation
Yermack
(1996) Tobin’s Q
n = 452
1984 - 1991
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
 Significantly negative relationship between board size and firms‘ market 
value
 Smaller boards are more likely to dismiss CEOs for bad performance
Hermalin/Weisbach
(1991) Tobin‘s Q
n = 142
1971 - 1983
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
 No noticeable relationship between the proportion of outside directors and 
firm value
Conyon/Peck
(1998) Tobin‘s Q
n = 3,690
1990 - 1995
(Europe)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(GMM)
 Significantly negative relationship between board size and firm 
performance for all countries being reviewed: UK, France, Netherlands, 
Denmark and Italy
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
                                            
278  Tobin’s Q represents the relation between market value and replacement costs and serves 
as a popular valuation measure in financial literature. For more details on Tobin’s Q and its 
qualities over other performance measures it is referred to chapter 5.3.1.1. 
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Figure 13: Selected Finance Studies on the Impact of Single Corporate Governance Mecha-
nisms on Firm Value (II) 
Authors Measure of Firm ValueSample Methodology Details
Beiner et al.
(2004) Tobin‘s Q
n = 165
2001
(Switzerland)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(2SLS)
Anderson/Reeb
(2003) Tobin‘s Q
n = 403
1992 - 1999 
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(2SLS)
Himmelberg et al. 
(1999) Tobin‘s Q
n = 330 - 600
1982 - 1992
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
 Board size is an endogenous governance mechanism 
 No significant relationship between board size and firm valuation
 Significantly positive relationship between founding-family ownership and 
firm value
 Evidence of better firm performance when family members serve as CEO 
instead of outside CEOs
 No evidence that changes in managerial ownership affect firm value
Bhagat/Black
(2002) Tobin‘s Q
n = 780 - 934
1988 - 1993
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(3SLS)
 Strong inverse relation between firm performance and board 
independence
 Evidence that low-profitability firms increase the independence of their 
boards
Gompers et al.
(2003) Tobin’s Q
n = 1,500
1990 - 1998
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
 Construction of a CG-index considering 24 governance-rules as proxies for 
shareholder rights (focus on the defense of hostile takeovers)
 Companies with strong shareholder rights feature higher market values
Loderer/Peyer
(2002) Tobin‘s Q
n = 169
1980 - 1995
(Switzerland)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
 Significantly negative relationship between board size and firm value
 Seat accumulation (increasing number of board mandates) is negatively 
related to firm value
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
A great deal of attention has thereby been drawn to insider ownership and 
its impact on firm value. Chung/Pruitt (1996), for instance, present strong em-
pirical evidence that the level of CEO stockholdings is positively related to 
Tobin’s Q.279,280 Similarly, Anderson/Reeb (2003) reveal a significantly positive 
association between founding family ownership and firm value. In turn, Morck et 
al. (1988a) and McConnell/Servaes (1990) find a non-monotonic, curvilinear 
relationship between the level of insider ownership and Tobin’s Q, character-
ized by a positive effect for the lower ownership percentiles and a negative ef-
fect for the upper ownership percentiles. Other studies, including Loderer/Martin 
(1997) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) do not find any indication that changes in 
managerial ownership affect the market value of companies. 
Another aspect of corporate governance that has attracted major attention 
in financial literature is board structure. Yermack (1996) provides a prominent 
study concentrating on board size. Consistent with the notion that small boards 
of directors tend to work more effectively and perform a better monitoring job, 
                                            
279  In addition, they were able to find support for the hypothesis that firm value affects CEO 
ownership. This notion has also been supported by Loderer/Martin (1997). 
280  Consistent with these findings, Eisenberg et al. (1998) document a significantly negative 
association between board size and firm profitability, as proxied by ROA. 
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he finds an inverse relationship between the size of the board and firm value for 
a sample of US companies. With the exception of Beiner et al. (2004), these 
findings are supported by Conyon/Peck (1998) and Loderer/Peyer (2002) who 
conduct a similar analysis for a European and a Swiss sample, respectively. 
Apart form board size, corporate governance studies on board structure fre-
quently deal with the independence of the board. Though it is often alleged that 
a greater proportion of outside directors affects the quality of corporate govern-
ance, Hermalin/Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat/Black (2002) fail to find a positive 
association between board independence and Tobin’s Q.281  
As opposed to the studies mentioned above, Gompers et al. (2003) study 
anti-takeover provisions for 1,500 US firms during the 1990s. Using Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) data, they classify 24 indicators into five 
groups: tactics for delaying hostile takeover, voting rights, director/officer pro-
tection, other takeover defenses and state laws. Overall, they report evidence 
that firms with stronger shareholder rights have higher firm values. 
Another strain of empirical work investigates the influence of a broad set of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the market valuation of publicly traded 
companies. A representative selection for this type of studies is presented in 
figure 14. 
 
                                            
281  In contrast, Baysinger/Butler (1985) and Rosenstein/Wyatt (1990) find a positive linkage 
between board independence and firm performance, as measured by ROE and stock return. 
Similarly, Weisbach (1988) finds evidence that CEOs of poorly performing firms are more 
likely to be replaced if the firm has a majority of outside directors on the board. 
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Figure 14: Selected Finance Studies on the Impact of a Set of Corporate Governance Mecha-
nisms on Firm Value 
Authors Measure of Firm ValueSample Methodology Details
Black et al.
(2006)
Tobin‘s Q, 
Market-to-
Book
n = 515
2001
(Korea)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(2SLS/3SLS)
Klapper/Love
(2004) Tobin‘s Q
n = 374
1999
(Emerging 
Markets) 
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
Agrawal/Knoeber
(1996) Tobin‘s Q
n = 383
1987
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(2SLS)
 Construction of a broad CG-index (survey-based)
 Strong positive relationship between CG and valuation of publicly traded 
companies in Korea
 Application of CG-ranking provided by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia
 Significantly positive relationship between CG and firm valuation
 Evidence that firm-level CG provisions matter more in countries with weak 
legal environments
 Selection of 7 control mechanisms
 No significantly positive impact of any corporate governance mechanisms 
on firm value after accounting for endogeneity
Bauer et al.
(2004) Tobin‘s Q
n = 249 - 269
2000 - 2001
(Europe)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
 Application of CG-ranking provided by Deminor
 Positive relationship between CG and valuation of companies that are 
listed in the FTSE Eurotop 300
Beiner et al.
(2006)
Tobin’s Q, 
Market-to-
Book
n = 235
2002
(Switzerland)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(3SLS)
 Construction of a CG-index (survey-based) plus additional CG-
mechanisms
 Positive relationship between CG and valuation of publicly traded 
companies in Switzerland
Drobetz et al.
(2004)
Tobin‘s Q,
Market-to-
Book
n = 91
2001
(Germany)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
 Construction of a broad CG-index following the German Corporate 
Governance Code (survey-based)
 Significantly positive relationship between CG and valuation of publicly 
traded companies in Germany
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The seminal paper of Agrawal/Knoeber (1996) examines seven corporate 
governance mechanisms and their relevance in controlling agency problems 
between managers and shareholders. The selected mechanisms comprise 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership and blockownership, board inde-
pendence, leverage, the labor market for managers and the market for corpo-
rate control. The relevant data is obtained from Forbes magazine’s annual sur-
vey of top executive compensation, a Disclosure CD-ROM, Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives, as well as the 
COMPUSTAT annual files. Although, they are not able to find a significant im-
pact of any of the corporate governance mechanisms on firm value, they pro-
vide direct evidence for interdependence among the single mechanisms for a 
large sample of US firms. 
The studies of Bauer et al. (2004) and Klapper/Love (2004) follow a different 
approach, insofar as they use corporate governance rankings provided by pro-
fessional organizations. Bauer et al. (2004) apply Deminor corporate govern-
ance ratings for companies listed in the FTSE Eurotop 300 and reveal a positive 
relationship between good corporate governance and firm valuation. Klap-
per/Love (2004) make use of data on firm-level corporate governance rankings 
provided by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia. Covering companies from 14 
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emerging markets, they do not only find a strong positive correlation between 
corporate governance and Tobin’s Q, but also report evidence that firm-level 
corporate governance provisions matter more in countries with weak legal envi-
ronments. 
Contrary to the two previous studies, Drobetz et al. (2004) develop their 
own corporate governance rating which has been tested for plausibility by the 
German stock exchange. The rating is based on survey data and captures 30 
governance proxies divided into five broad categories, that are corporate gov-
ernance commitment, shareholder rights, transparency, management and su-
pervisory board matters and auditing. Using a sample of 91 publicly traded 
companies from Germany, Drobetz et al. (2004) show evidence for a positive 
correlation between firm-specific governance practices and firm valuation, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q and Market-to-Book. 
In line with Drobetz et al. (2004), Beiner et al. (2006) construct a survey-
based corporate governance index for companies listed on the Swiss stock ex-
change. However, they apply five additional corporate governance mechanisms 
including shareholdings of the largest shareholder, shareholdings of large out-
side blockholders, board size, board independence and leverage. Allowing for 
interdependencies among the governance mechanisms, they document a sig-
nificantly positive association between the aggregate corporate governance 
index and Tobin’s Q, on the one hand, and between leverage and Tobin’s Q, on 
the other hand. Like Agrawal/Knoeber (1996), they also find evidence for com-
plementary and substitution effects between the single governance variables. 
Black et al. (2006) provide another important empirical study relying on a 
corporate governance index. The index is based on a 2001 Korea stock ex-
change survey and is comprised of the following five subindices: shareholder 
rights, board structure, board procedure, disclosure and ownership parity. Using 
a similar estimation methodology as Agrawal/Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. 
(2006), they document a significantly positive impact of corporate governance 
on firm market valuation for a sample consisting of 515 Korean companies. 
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4.2.2 Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm 
Value in Real Estate Literature 
While finance literature is replete with empirical studies on the impact of corpo-
rate governance on firm value, there is only limited research on the issue in real 
estate literature, which, in turn, is entirely concerned with the US REIT market. 
A selection of real estate studies analyzing the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm value is presented in figure 15.282  
 
Figure 15: Selected Real Estate Studies on the Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Value 
Authors Measure of Firm ValueSample Methodology Details
Han
(2006) Tobin‘s Q
n = 156
1994 - 2000
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(2SLS)
Hartzell et al.
(2004) Tobin‘s Q
n = 66
1992 - 2000
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
Friday/Sirmans
(1998)
Market-to-
Book
n = 135
1980 - 1994
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
 Significant non-linear relationship between valuation of US equity REITs
and insider ownership that is positive at low levels but turns negative at 
high levels of insider ownership
 Using governance data from proxy-statements 
 No significant relationship between corporate governance and valuation of 
US equity REITs
 Higher percentage of external board members (up to 50%) and greater 
equity participation by inside directors leads to higher shareholder value 
for a sample of US REITs
Friday et al.
(1999)
Market-to-
Book
n = 675
1980 - 1994
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
 Non-linear relationship between M/B-ratios and ownership structure of US 
equity REITs
 Insider ownership (up to 5%) is associated with increased M/B-ratios, 
thereafter M/B-ratios decline
Bauer et al.
(2006) Tobin’s Q
n = 134 - 228
2002 - 2005
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(OLS)
 Application of governance data provided by Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) and Governance Metrics International (GMI)
 Significantly positive relationship between corporate governance and 
valuation of US REITs
Focus on a broad set of corporate governance mechanisms Focus on single corporate governance mechanisms
Capozza/Seguin
(2003) Tobin‘s Q
n = 75
1985 - 1992
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate regression 
(WLS)
 Evidence that higher levels of insider ownership are associated with a 
higher valuation of US REITs
 REITs with greater insider ownership choose properties with lower levels 
of systematic risk and capital structures with less debt
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
Most of these studies examine the effect of particular aspects of corporate 
governance. Friday/Sirmans (1998), for instance, investigate the influence of 
board of director composition and insider ownership on the market value of US 
REITs, as proxied by the Market-to-Book ratio. They find evidence that greater 
                                            
282  Other real estate studies investigating wealth effects of corporate governance use alternative 
measures of firm performance, such as ROA and ROE. Analyzing a sample of 38 US REITs 
between 1972 and 1981, Solt/Miller (1985) find evidence that the payment of incentive fees 
is generally positively related to financial performance, as measured by ROA and ROE. In 
turn, Ghosh/Sirmans (2003) provide results indicating that greater board independence en-
hances ROE-levels of US REITs whereas greater CEO stock ownership appears to have an 
adverse effect on firm performance. In addition, Feng et al. (2005) find support for the view 
that board structure plays an important role in financial performance of US REITs. Their find-
ings indicate that a smaller and more independent board of directors is associated with 
higher levels of ROA. 
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board independence283 of up to 50% and greater dollar values of director stock 
ownership are associated with higher firm values. Using different measures of 
firm value, Friday et al. (1999), Capozza/Seguin (2003) and Han (2006) focus 
exclusively on insider ownership. They document a significantly positive rela-
tionship between the level of insider ownership and the market valuation of US 
REITs. In contrast to Capozza/Seguin (2003), Friday et al. (1999) and Han 
(2006) find a non-linear relationship with a positive effect up to the 5% owner-
ship threshold. 
Studies examining the impact of a broad set of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the market value of publicly traded real estate companies are 
hard to trace. However, two studies falling into that particular category include 
Hartzell et al. (2004) and Bauer et al. (2006). Using deviating samples of US 
REITs and different sets of governance variables, these studies obtain inconsis-
tent results. 
Hartzell et al. (2004) select board size, board independence, insider owner-
ship, block ownership and institutional ownership as the principal mechanisms 
to capture the companies’ corporate governance structure, while the corre-
sponding data is directly extracted from the companies’ proxy statements. Run-
ning a regular OLS regression of Tobin’s Q against the different corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms and a set of control variables, they are not able to detect 
any significant association between corporate governance and firm value. 
By contrast, Bauer et al. (2006) make use of corporate governance ratings, 
provided by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Governance Metrics 
International (GMI). Applying the same estimation methodology as Hartzell et 
al. (2004), they, in turn, find that the corporate governance ratings are signifi-
cantly positive related to firm value.  
After all, it has to be pointed out that the studies presented above, particu-
larly the ones in real estate literature, suffer from severe econometric problems 
that may cast doubt on the reliability of the obtained empirical results. In this 
                                            
283  Similarly, Ghosh/Sirmans (2003) and Feng et al. (2005) report a significantly positive asso-
ciation between greater outsider representation on REIT boards and performance, as meas-
ured by ROE and ROA.  
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respect, the following chapter is going to present some of the most relevant 
econometric shortcomings of previous empirical studies examining the impact 
of corporate governance on firm value.  
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4.3 Econometric Problems Related to Empirical Studies on Wealth Effects of 
Corporate Governance 
Empirical research on the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance is often concerned with a variety of econometric issues, which can 
basically be traced back to the highly complex nature of corporate governance 
systems. Three major econometric problems that will be addressed in this chap-
ter are measurement error in variables, omitted variable bias and endogene-
ity.284 
In order to better understand these issues in the context of corporate gov-
ernance research, it is necessary to point out that a well-developed theory 
about the multi-dimensional character of corporate governance or a conceptual 
framework of reference, capturing the entireness of all relevant control mecha-
nisms and its interactions do not yet exist.285 Therefore, it remains a challenge 
to adequately select governance characteristics that should be included in an 
empirical model and to choose an appropriate estimation tool that accounts for 
possible interrelations among diverse corporate governance mechanisms. The 
validity and reliability of corporate governance measures, inconsistent sets of 
corporate governance mechanisms as well as a poor consideration of interde-
pendencies among different corporate governance measures might therefore 
be a possible explanation for often contradictory results of previous corporate 
governance studies.  
One econometric problem plaguing corporate governance studies is meas-
urement error in variables. Quite frequently, it is questioned whether single 
structural indicators286 typically used to measure corporate governance actually 
reflect the essential aspects of this complex construct. A similar line of argu-
                                            
284  For an excellent review of econometric problems in empirical studies on corporate govern-
ance see Börsch-Supan/Köke (2002). 
285  See Larcker et al. (2007), p. 965. As discussed by Harris/Raviv (2006) and Larcker et al. 
(2007), there is relatively little formal theoretical work on corporate governance. 
286  Larcker et al. (2007), p. 964, define structural indicators as measures of corporate govern-
ance that can be generated by external observers, such as board size, equity owned by offi-
cers, etc. Though it is also possible to develop corporate governance measures from inside 
the corporation, e.g. from interviews with board members, it is frequently infeasible for large 
sample analysis. 
92 Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Value 
 
mentation emerges in the case of (self-constructed) corporate governance indi-
ces. These aggregate ratings are likely to be inadequate proxies for corporate 
governance for three basic reasons. First, important governance characteristics 
might not be considered. Second, the construction of the index is necessarily 
biased to the extent that weights are more or less arbitrarily assigned to certain 
governance indicators.287 And third, corporate governance indices in terms of 
aggregate measures per se do not allow capturing the effect of dynamic interac-
tions among governance mechanisms in an empirical model.  
In recent corporate governance research, it has been a popular approach to 
apply governance indices offered by professional service providers288, such as 
Deminor, Governance Metrics International (GMI) or Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS). It is often argued that their knowledge and experience in that 
field should translate into the quality of their measures and therefore corre-
spond to an adequate way of explaining the corporate governance structure of 
companies. However, this perception does not seem to hold for the reasons 
stated above. Another problematic issue is the inherent “black box”-character of 
such indices. Details on the construction are not being published, leaving exter-
nal observers clueless on how the respective institution generates its index.289  
The measurement error in variables induced by the use of single structural 
indicators as well as corporate governance indices generally causes coefficient 
estimates to be biased and inconsistent.290  
A second, well known econometric problem in empirical corporate govern-
ance research is the one of omitted variable bias. It occurs if relevant explana-
tory variables are missing in the structural model. In this particular case the 
                                            
287  For a similar argumentation see Bruno/Claessens (2006), p. 4. 
288  Studies applying corporate governance indices of professional service providers include 
Bauer et al. (2004), Brown/Caylor (2004) and Bauer et al. (2006), among others. 
289  Sonnenfeld (2004) criticizes the quality of the governance metrics published by professional 
corporate governance data and service providers. He argues that they look merely at public 
records to score firms on their governance effectiveness by using simplistic checklists of 
standards or metrics based heavily upon myths, rather than on genuine research. He further 
points out that they also may cross the line from being independent raters to becoming ac-
tive consultants for the firms they study leading to doubts about their objective credibility. Fi-
nally and most importantly, he holds the opinion that their methods do not deliver reliable 
and accurate governance ratings. 
290  See Börsch-Supan/Köke (2002), p. 317. 
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model is said to be underspecified.291 Often, there is a practical limit to correctly 
specify a structural model since key explanatory variables are not available for 
inclusion. Sometimes, it is also the absence of a clear theory and the lack of 
knowledge on complex issues that cause relevant variables to be ignored or 
excluded. 
However, previous studies focusing on single corporate governance 
mechanisms in isolation are very likely to suffer from omitted variable bias be-
cause they disregard a major part of a complex system of mechanisms and its 
interrelations. The consequence of omitted governance and control variables is 
that the coefficients of the included variables will be biased and inconsistent.292 
An empirical study that omits important variables could infer that an included 
variable has a positive/negative coefficient or is significant/insignificant even 
though it would not be with a more extensive set of variables. 
A third, and according to Börsch-Supan/Köke (2002) probably the most se-
rious econometric concern in studies on corporate governance is endogeneity 
and reverse causality.293 Drawing on prior research, one may suspect that cor-
porate governance mechanisms are highly interrelated, complement and even 
substitute each other. Hence, a greater use of one mechanism does not neces-
sarily imply an increase in firm value; where one specific mechanism is used 
more others may be used less resulting in the same valuation.294 In addition, 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) emphasize that a variety of economic factors likely 
affect both firm value and firm governance.295 Therefore, it can be strongly as-
sumed that corporate governance mechanisms are not exogenously given but 
endogenously determined296, ultimately raising the econometric problem of joint 
endogeneity. 
                                            
291  See Wooldridge (2000), pp. 89f. 
292  See Börsch-Supan/Köke (2002), p. 315. 
293  See Börsch-Supan/Köke (2002), p. 299. 
294  See Agrawal/Knoeber (1996), pp. 378f; John/Senbet (1998), p. 391; Peasnell et al. (2003), 
p. 232; Beiner et al. (2004), p. 334. 
295  See Himmelberg et al. (1999), p. 355. 
296  A variable is considered endogenous if it is determined within the model and exogenous if it 
is determined outside the model; see Pindyck/Rubinfeld (1998), p. 338. Empirical studies 
that find evidence for endogeneity of corporate governance mechanisms include 
Agrawal/Knoeber (1996), Chung/Pruitt (1996), Loderer/Martin (1997), Eisenberg et al. 
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A closely related issue that needs to be mentioned in this respect is the one 
of reverse causality. The direction of causality between corporate governance 
and firm value is not quite clear on a priori grounds. For instance, companies 
with high market values and large growth opportunities (greater profitability and 
less growth opportunities) might adopt better (weaker) governance structures 
because they have a greater (less) need for outside capital, but at the same 
time better governance could improve firm value (profitability).297  
Previous literature largely ignores complex and dynamic interactions among 
governance mechanisms and the simultaneous nature of the process determin-
ing corporate governance and corporate value. In order to deliver more sophis-
ticated and more reliable results on the relationship between corporate govern-
ance and firm value, the problems of joint endogeneity and reverse causality 
need to be accounted for.298 
A standard econometric procedure to address these concerns is the estima-
tion of simultaneous equations models299 with the help of instrumental vari-
ables300, which serve as an approximation for the potentially endogenous ex-
planatory variables. Ideal instruments should be exogenous and preferably 
strongly correlated with the respective endogenous explanatory variable. At the 
same time, they should predict the dependent variable only indirectly via the 
endogenous explanatory variable and should not be influenced by the depend-
ent variable.301  
                                                                                                                                
(1998), Bhagat/Black (2002), Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), Klapper/Love (2004), Beiner et al. 
(2006), Black et al. (2006) and Ghosh/Sirmans (2006). 
297  See Drobetz et al. (2004), p. 287; Klapper/Love (2004), p. 706; Black et al. (2006), p. 367; 
Bauer et al. (2006), p. 13. 
298  Corporate governance literature addressing the problems of endogeneity and reverse cau-
sality include, among others, Hermalin/Weisbach (1991), Agrawal/Knoeber (1996), 
Chung/Pruitt (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Bhagat/Black (2002), 
Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), Hermalin/Weisbach (2003), Beiner et al. (2004), Klapper/Love 
(2004), Beiner (2005), Beiner et al. (2006), Black et al. (2006) and Ghosh/Sirmans (2006). 
299  Simultaneous equations models are models in which two or more endogenous variables are 
determined simultaneously; see Hausman (1983), p. 392; Davidson/MacKinnon (1993), pp. 
211f. 
300  As Davidson/MacKinnon (1993), p. 211, indicate there are numerous variants of instrumental 
variable estimation methods in econometrics, e.g. two-stage least squares (2SLS), three-
stage least squares (3SLS) and the generalized method of moments (GMM). 
301  See Black et al. (2006), p. 384. 
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Before going into the details of the empirical analysis in chapter 5, the sub-
sequent chapter is supposed to develop and summarize the main hypothesis 
that need to be tested. 
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4.4 Development of Hypotheses 
Based on the argumentation in chapter 3.3, the market for corporate control as 
well as the market competition in labor and product markets can be assumed to 
play a negligible role in the corporate governance structure of publicly traded 
real estate companies. This leaves board structure (board size and board inde-
pendence), incentive structure (insider ownership), ownership concentration 
(institutional ownership), capital structure (leverage) and transparency of disclo-
sure as the major corporate governance mechanisms to be investigated in the 
empirical analysis presented in chapter 5. 
With reference to chapters 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, “good” corporate governance is 
provided by a small and independent board of directors, a participation of man-
agement in the equity capital of the company, the presence of large profes-
sional shareholders, and a more transparent public disclosure practice. Placing 
this interpretation of “good” corporate governance in the context of the theoreti-
cal elaboration on the influence of corporate governance on firm value, as fur-
nished in chapter 4.1, the following hypotheses (H1-6) can be derived: 
 
H1:  A smaller board of directors is associated with a higher market valuation of 
publicly traded real estate companies, 
 
H2:  A more independent board of directors is associated with a higher market 
valuation of publicly traded real estate companies, 
 
H3:  A higher level of insider ownership is associated with a higher market 
valuation of publicly traded real estate companies, 
 
H4:  A higher level of institutional ownership is associated with a higher market 
valuation of publicly traded real estate companies, 
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H5:  A higher leverage ratio is associated with a higher market valuation of 
publicly traded real estate companies, 
 
H6:  A more transparent real estate-specific disclosure is associated with a 
higher market valuation of publicly traded real estate companies. 
 
In accordance with the intuition that corporate governance is a complex sys-
tem of interacting mechanisms and that there might be a possible reverse rela-
tionship between corporate governance and firm value, three more general hy-
potheses (H7-9) can be formulated: 
 
H7:  Different corporate governance mechanisms complement each other in 
the corporate governance structure of publicly traded real estate compa-
nies, 
 
H8:  Different corporate governance mechanisms substitute each other in the 
corporate governance structure of publicly traded real estate companies, 
 
H9:  Market valuation has an impact on the corporate governance structure of 
publicly traded real estate companies. 
 
Each of the above-listed hypotheses will be tested in the following empirical 
analysis. 
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5 Empirical Analysis of the Influence of Corporate Governance on the 
Market Valuation of Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies  
5.1 Introduction and General Background on the Applied Methodology 
The present study is intended to empirically explore the relationship between 
corporate governance and the market value of publicly traded real estate com-
panies across the four major European real estate capital markets.302 Instead of 
focusing on single corporate governance provisions and relying on self-
constructed or professionally prepared corporate governance indices, a set of 
widely-accepted corporate governance mechanisms303 is applied.304 In this con-
text the principal variables305 used to measure the companies’ governance 
strength include the following: 
 
 board size (proxy for board structure), 
 board independence (proxy for board structure), 
 insider ownership (proxy for incentive structure), 
 institutional ownership (proxy for concentrated ownership), 
 leverage (proxy for capital structure), 
 disclosure (proxy for transparency).306 
 
The selection of the governance mechanisms is based on the status quo of 
contemporary corporate governance literature. Due to a lack of data availability 
and for reasons of econometric feasibility, the corporate governance mecha-
                                            
302  For further details see chapter 5.2. 
303  Prior studies using a similar approach include Agrawal/Knoeber (1996), among others. 
304  According to Bebchuk et al. (2005), p. 5, governance quality could well be measured by 
focusing on a few provisions that matter instead of using a very broad index that includes 
numerous less important measures which only serve to introduce noise. 
305  In addition to the principal corporate governance variables, alternative measures of corpo-
rate governance of the respective corporate governance category will be applied in the 
course of the robustness check analysis. 
306  For a definition of the corporate governance variables see chapter 5.3.1.1. 
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nisms “product market competition”, “labor market competition” and “market for 
corporate control” are excluded from the analysis. This should not create major 
distortions with respect to the empirical results, since each of these mecha-
nisms is likely to be of minor importance with respect to the corporate govern-
ance structure of publicly traded real estate companies.307 However, country-
specific corporate governance structures, such as the respective legal frame-
work or board system, are implicitly considered by the use of different indicator 
variables. In addition to the corporate governance variables, an extensive set of 
control variables or predetermined variables308 is used in order to further reduce 
a potential omitted variable bias.  
The methodological approach of the empirical analysis essentially involves 
three steps. In a first step, firm value is regressed separately on each corporate 
governance mechanisms using OLS. Here, however, the problem of omitted 
variable bias is likely since the influence of the excluded corporate governance 
mechanisms is not being considered. 
Hence, in a second step, firm value is regressed on all corporate govern-
ance mechanisms, once again using OLS. In this setting, it remains unclear 
whether the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
value is causal even if they are correlated.309 Another major drawback of OLS is 
that it only yields consistent and unbiased estimates if the error terms are un-
correlated with the regressors.310 However, in the presence of endogenous ex-
planatory variables this is not the case.311 In order to properly address the po-
                                            
307  As pointed out in chapter 3.3.1, p. 72, real estate asset markets are characterized by market 
inefficiencies that prevent market mechanisms to work properly. This implies that product 
market competition does not provide an effective disciplining role in the case of publicly 
traded real estate companies. Furthermore, it is argued in chapter 3.3.2.1, p. 75, that the la-
bor market for managers of listed property companies is largely limited to the real estate sec-
tor. Therefore, the labor market does not appear to provide adequate governance of corpo-
rations either. Finally, as conjectured in chapters 3.3.2.1, p. 75, the market for corporate 
control does not work properly in the public real estate sector because of a higher tendency 
of managers to resist hostile takeovers which is related to limited opportunities of future em-
ployment. 
308  The definition and the rationale for the selection of the control variables can be found in 
chapter 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.3.3, respectively. 
309  See Black et al. (2006), p. 367. 
310  See Davidson/MacKinnon (1993), p. 209. 
311  See Davidson/MacKinnon (1993), p. 211; Eisenberg et al. (1998), p. 43. 
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tential problem of joint endogeneity and reverse causality, a more sophisticated 
estimation approach is employed in a third and final step. 
Following Agrawal/Knoeber (1996), Chung/Pruitt (1996), Beiner (2005), Be-
iner et al. (2006) and Black et al. (2006), a simultaneous equation model will be 
specified, whereas each endogenous variable (firm value and the six corporate 
governance variables) serves as a dependent variable in one of the equations 
and as an explanatory variable in all other equations.  
 
Figure 16: General Illustration of the System of Equations 
Equation 1: ValueFirm  ( )VariablesControlCGMf m ,1=  
Equation 2: 1=JCGM (Board Size) ( )VariablesControlCGMValueFirmf Jm ,,2 ≠=  
Equation 3: 2=JCGM (Board Independence) ( )VariablesControlCGMValueFirmf Jm ,,3 ≠=  
Equation 4: 3=JCGM (Insider Ownership) ( )VariablesControlCGMValueFirmf Jm ,,4 ≠=  
Equation 5: 4=JCGM (Institutional Ownership) ( )VariablesControlCGMValueFirmf Jm ,,5 ≠=  
Equation 6: 5=JCGM (Leverage) ( )VariablesControlCGMValueFirmf Jm ,,6 ≠=  
Equation 7: 6=JCGM (Disclosure) ( )VariablesControlCGMValueFirmf Jm ,,7 ≠=  
Note: The figure presents a generalized overview of the system of equations, where CGM refers 
to the principal corporate governance mechanisms used in the empirical analysis.  
 
Subsequently, the system of equations, as illustrated in figure 16, is esti-
mated simultaneously312 using three-stage least squares (3SLS), which will be 
described in further detail in chapter 5.3.3.2. This approach permits an inte-
grated analysis of the factors affecting both firm value and the different corpo-
rate governance mechanisms by explicitly incorporating the simultaneity of the 
process determining these variables. 
 
 
                                            
312  The equations of the system can be considered interdependent. Estimating each equation in 
isolation would not be sufficient to determine the actual meaning of the statistical relation-
ships between the variables; see Hausman (1983), p. 392. 
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5.2 Sample Selection 
The starting point in the sample selection process for the empirical study is the 
Datastream set of all publicly traded real estate companies in the UK, France, 
the Netherlands and Germany with a minimum market capitalization of USD 50 
million313 at year-end 2006. These countries represent the largest European 
real estate capital markets in terms of market capitalization. As an indicator for 
the size of the national real estate capital markets serve the respective country 
indices published by EPRA/NAREIT (see figure 17).  
 
Figure 17: Market Capitalization of FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Country Indices at Year-end 2006 
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Source: EPRA Index Database (2007). 
 
For the purpose of the study and for reasons of comparability, several ad-
justments need to be made to the basic Datastream sample consisting of 194 
companies. At first, 38 companies with a major or principal field of activity other 
than the investment in and management of real estate assets, drop out reduc-
ing the sample size to 156 companies. In a further step, only those 129 compa-
nies that report in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards 
                                            
313  The USD 50 million threshold corresponds to a common criterion of admittance to recog-
nized real estate indices such as GPR. For reasons of comparability and data availability 
companies with a smaller market capitalization were excluded from the sample. 
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(IFRS) and that dispose of investment properties in compliance with IAS 40 re-
main in the sample. Ultimately, 19 companies with insufficient data have to be 
excluded, leaving a final sample of 110 companies314, 39 companies from the 
UK, 34 companies from France, 7 companies from the Netherlands and 30 
companies from Germany. Among the 110 publicly traded real estate compa-
nies entering into the empirical analysis 42 hold a REIT status. The structure of 
the sample is graphically illustrated in figure 18. 
 
Figure 18: Sample Composition 
UK
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GERMANY
(30)
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(42)
Non-REIT
(68)
By Country By Listed Property Vehicle
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
                                            
314  For a comprehensive list of the companies in the sample see Appendix 1. 
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5.3 Methodology and Empirical Results 
5.3.1 Variables 
5.3.1.1 Definition of Variables 
The variables used to specify the structural model of the empirical analysis in-
clude firm value, the six principal corporate governance mechanisms and a 
large set of control variables, which will be defined individually in the following 
paragraphs. 
In accordance with numerous corporate governance studies starting with 
the work of Demsetz/Lehn (1985) and Morck et al. (1988a), Tobin’s Q (Q)315 is 
used as the principal measure of firm value. It is generally defined as the ratio 
of the market value of a firm to the replacement costs of its assets. The major 
advantage of Tobin’s Q over other measures is that it implicitly reflects the 
value of intangible factors, such as management competence, growth opportu-
nities or corporate governance.316 Well-managed companies should disclose 
values of Tobin’s Q greater than one, indicating that the allocation and the use 
of corporate assets have been value-increasing.317 As argued by Lang/Stulz 
(1994) and Capozza/Seguin (2000), relying on Tobin’s Q rather than on per-
formance some problems of previous studies can be avoided. Considering that 
Tobin’s Q can be interpreted as the present value of future free cash flows di-
vided by replacement costs, neither risk adjustment nor normalization is neces-
sary to compare Tobin’s Q across companies.318 Following Chung/Pruitt (1994), 
Perfect/Wiles (1994), Yermack (1996) and Loderer/Martin (1997), among oth-
ers, Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of market value of equity plus the book 
value of debt to the book value of total assets. For all companies stating in-
vestment properties at cost on their balance sheet, total assets is adjusted by 
                                            
315  The underlying concept goes back to Brainard/Tobin (1968). 
316  See Corgel (1997), p. 3; Friday (1997), p. 28; Hermalin/Weisbach (2003), p. 12. 
317  See Loderer/Martin (1997), p. 226; Beiner et al. (2004), p. 340; Studies using Tobin’s Q im-
plicitly assume that capital markets are efficient and correctly reflect the value of companies. 
Even though this might not correspond to the truth, Tobin’s Q might be the best performance 
measure available according to Börsch-Supan/Köke (2002), p. 318. 
318  See Lang/Stulz (1994), p. 1249; Capozza/Seguin (2000), p. 93. 
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the difference between fair value and book value of their investment proper-
ties.319 Due to the availability of annual appraisals determining the fair value of 
the companies’ properties and thereby delivering a better approximation of re-
placement costs than annually depreciated book values, publicly traded real 
estate companies, as opposed to companies from other industries, are likely to 
provide better measures of Tobin’s Q.320 
The six principal corporate governance mechanisms being analyzed in the 
course of the study are board size, board independence, insider ownership, 
institutional ownership, leverage and disclosure. 
In accordance with Yermack (1996), board size (lnBSIZE) is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board. The second proxy 
for board structure is board independence (BIND) which corresponds to out-
sider membership on the board. It is determined by the percentage of board 
seats held by non-officers without family relationships to the managing board as 
well as representatives of companies that are not involved in related party 
transactions. Insider ownership (INSIDER) is defined as the percentage of eq-
uity owned by the management of the company. Institutional ownership (INST), 
the proxy for ownership concentration, is measured as the percentage of equity 
held by institutions, such as pension funds, insurance companies, private equity 
funds or other firms that are not predominantly owned by managers or directors. 
Leverage (LEV) reflects the capital structure of a company and is defined as the 
ratio of book value of long-term and short-term debt to the book value of total 
assets.  
Disclosure (DISC) is a corporate governance variable capturing the trans-
parency with respect to the companies’ real estate-specific disclosure practice. 
The reasoning behind this variable is that the special character of the real es-
tate asset class requires publicly traded real estate companies to provide infor-
                                            
319  Companies reporting in accordance with IFRS basically have the option to state their in-
vestment properties at cost or at fair value. Nevertheless, those companies deciding to state 
their investment properties at cost are required disclose the fair value of these properties in 
the notes of the balance sheet. 
320  For a similar line of argumentation see Capozza/Seguin (2000), p. 95; Benveniste et al. 
(2001), p. 634; Gentry/Mayer (2003), p. 2; Hartzell et al. (2004), p. 3. 
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mation that goes beyond the scope of what is provided by companies of other 
industries. Particularly, more detailed information on property holdings and local 
real estate markets, in which the company is active in, should be published in 
the annual report in order to provide investors and shareholders with the rele-
vant knowledge for decision-making.  
In this context, a self-constructed index of real estate-specific transparency 
is developed on the basis of the EPRA Best Practice Policy Recommenda-
tions.321 Characteristics included in the original charter of recommendations that 
cannot be verified by external observers or that are already explicitly required 
by IFRS are excluded from the list of criteria relevant for the real estate trans-
parency index. The final criteria checklist which is depicted in table 6 contains a 
total of 117 characteristics subdivided in the following six categories: 
 
 General Items and Narrative, 
 Accounting and Valuation Principles, 
 Presentation of Accounts, 
 Notes and Additional Disclosure, 
 Portfolio Information, 
 Net Asset Value and Earnings per Share Disclosure. 
 
                                            
321  See chapter 3.2.3.1. 
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Table 6: Criteria Checklist for the Real Estate Transparency Index 
List of Criteria for the Real Estate Transparency Index 
    
1  GENERAL ITEMS AND NARRATIVE 
    
1.1 Status and Application of Best Practices Recommendations 
1.1.1 The company includes a statement in its accounts, indicating to which extent the accounts comply with the 
EPRA Best Practices Recommendations.  
1.1.2* The company specifies the reasons of non-compliance for the specific areas, if there is no (full) compliance. 
    
1.2 Exemptions for Compliance with Best Practices Recommendations 
1.2.1* Compliance with a recommendation would lead to substantial additional costs in gathering the information 
required. Or a recommendation relates to an amount or item that is of immaterial significance for the specific 
company. 
    
1.3 Management Review and Narrative – General 
1.3.1 In its financial statements, the company includes a management review and narrative. 
    
1.4 Management Review and Narrative – Strategy Information 
1.4.1 The company includes a “strategy segment” in its management review and narrative. 
1.4.2 This segment should at least cover the following elements and subjects: 
 corporate vision / mission 
 review of the strategy for the year under review  
(such as: review of activities for the year under review, review of strategy statement from the prior reporting 
year, success in following prior reporting years’ strategy, problems in year under review, any key personnel 
changes and impact on strategy, discussion of activities regarding principal properties) 
 current position  
(such as position in current principal markets, what is the principal nature of the business? How will that 
change?, discussion of principal asset classes (locations – countries / cities; property types; activity types 
such as investment, trading, facilities management, etc.), discussion of service activities – current and pro-
posed) 
 market outlook  
(such as principal issues, how do economic and market conditions impact on business?) 
 strategy for coming reporting year(s)  
(such as principal developments, and stage of development, general strategic direction, what are the com-
pany’s principal financial objectives (e.g. maximize asset value, return on equity, earnings per share)?, what 
is the company looking to do with properties: trade, invest, manage, etc?, is the company expanding / selling 
– any specific sales planned?, how do activities tie in with financial objectives?, discussion of principal asset 
classes, any corporate activities planned? (e.g. mergers, acquisitions, disposals), funding objectives – types 
of funding, gearing levels, rating objectives, any key personnel changes proposed and likely impact on strat-
egy, human resources strategy) 
 challenges envisaged in the coming reporting year(s). 
    
1.5 Management Review and Narrative – Supervisory Board and Executive Board Information 
1.5.1 For each of the members of the executive board, the following information is provided: 
 name, 
 age, 
 sex, 
 nationality, 
 expiration of current term, 
 title / role, 
 are they on the audit / remuneration committee?, 
 other interests / directorships, 
 photograph. 
Empirical Analysis 107 
 
continued 
1.5.2 For each of the members of the supervisory board and non-executive directors, the following information is 
provided: 
 name, 
 age, 
 sex, 
 nationality, 
 expiration of current term, 
 title / role, 
 are they on the audit / remuneration committee?, 
 other interests / directorships, 
 photograph, 
 main employment, 
 relevant work history, including prior directorships and any relationships with major shareholders. 
    
1.6 Language of Financial Reporting 
1.6.1* The annual report is issued in English.  
    
1.7 Timing of Annual and Interim Financial Reporting 
1.7.1 The company publishes its annual reports within 90 days after the close of the reporting period.  
    
1.8 Management Review and Narrative – Financial Risk Management Policies 
1.8.1 The company provides a clear description of its policies for managing financial risks, including: 
 a description and sensitivity analysis of the aggregate effect of interest rate changes on a company’s inter-
est and other financial expenses, 
 a description of the group’s policy in relation to fixed vs. floating interest rate exposures, 
 a description of the group’s policy in relation to interest rate maturity dates, 
 a description of the group’s policy in relation to managing currency positions. 
    
1.9 Development Assets 
1.9.1* The company provides the following information on sub-portfolios (as appropriate: e.g. appropriate sector, 
region or city) of development assets in its management narrative: 
 development costs, including costs to date, costs to completion and capitalized interest 
 breakdown of lettable area according to regions and usage (e.g. office, residential, etc) 
1.9.2* The company provides the following information for each development project in its management narrative: 
 address, 
 type of property (e.g. the respective proportion of office / retail / residential / storage / etc.), 
 lettable building space, 
 expected date of completion, 
 percentage of ownership (and commentary on control provisions), 
 status (e.g. planning permission / under construction / letting status, etc.). 
    
1.10 Investment Assets 
1.10.1 The company provides the following information on sub-portfolios (as appropriate: e.g. appropriate sector, 
region or city) of investment assets in its management narrative or in an exhibit: 
 area in square meters, 
 average rent per square meter, 
 annualized net rent based on current rent roll, 
 market rents (ERV) if fully leased at current market rents, 
 cash flow, 
 operating profit, 
 fair market value, 
 vacancy by area and rent, 
 description of lease expiration profile, 
 top 10 tenants by rental income, 
 rental income breakdown by tenant business sector. 
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1.10.2 In its management narrative or in an exhibit the company provides a list of the major investment properties 
owned, containing the following information for each major property / building in the portfolio: 
 address, 
 land area, 
 lettable building space, 
 type of property (e.g. the respective proportion of office, retail, residential, storage, etc.), 
 occupancy rate, 
 acquisition date, 
 percentage of ownership (and commentary on control provisions), 
 form of ownership (e.g. fee or leasehold ownership), 
 year of construction completion / major refurbishment. 
    
1.11 Like-for-like Rental Growth Reporting 
1.11.1 The company discloses the like-for-like rental growth at least twice a year for … 
 each significant sector of the portfolio and 
 each geographical business segment. 
1.11.2 The company publishes growth figures …  
 on a year-on-year basis, 
 in absolute amounts, applying fixed foreign currency exchange rates, 
 on a percentage basis. 
1.11.3 The company describes the size, in value, of the total portfolio or investment portfolio on which the like-for-like 
rental growth is based. 
    
    
2  ACCOUNTING AND VALUATION PRINCIPLES 
    
2.1 Investment Property – Accounting Basis 
2.1.1 The company accounts for their property investments based upon the fair value model.  
2.1.2* In case the company does not follow the above recommendation and instead accounts for their investment 
properties based upon the depreciated cost model, the rationale for this is clearly explained in the notes to the 
accounts. 
    
2.2 Investment Property – Valuation Standard 
2.2.1 Valuation: The fair value (market value) of investment property held by the company is assessed in accordance 
with International Valuation Standards (IVS), as set out by the International Valuation Standards Committee 
(IVSC). 
2.2.2 Timing: The company discloses if portfolio valuations are performed … 
 per reporting date. 
 at least once a year. 
2.2.3 Reporting: The company reports as a minimum … 
 the full-ungeared portfolio value and 
 a note of confirming compliance with IVS 
 (and any departures or additional assumptions employed)*. 
2.2.4 Disclosure: The company discloses … 
 the valuation methodology applied (e.g. open market value existing use, net of purchasers costs), and any 
changes in the valuation methodology and 
 the assumptions applied in valuing the investments property (on an average basis for each sector of the 
portfolio; for instance, when a DCF approach is used, the average growth rates, costs, discount rates and 
exit yields should be quoted). 
2.2.5 Balance Sheet: 
 The valuation of assets for the entire portfolio, and sub-portfolios, are directly and transparently tied to the 
company’s balance sheet. 
 A reconciliation of the movements in the value of investment properties from the prior year are provided in 
the notes to the accounts. 
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2.3 Borrowing Costs 
2.3.1* If the company is undertaking (re)development projects or refurbishments it capitalize borrowing costs during 
the development period. 
2.3.2* The company provides a description of the group’s policy regarding the capitalization of interest including …  
 interest rate assumptions and 
 the criteria for capitalization. 
    
    
3  PRESENTATION OF ACCOUNTS 
    
3.1 Profit and Loss Accounts 
3.1.1 The company presents its profit and loss accounts in a format, which resembles the one presented by EPRA 
(see EPRA (2006), p. 17).  
    
3.2 Balance Sheet 
3.2.1 The company presents its balance sheet according to the structure and elements presented by EPRA (see 
EPRA (2006), p. 19).  
    
3.3 Cash Flow Statement 
3.3.1 The company presents its cash flow statement according to the structure presented by EPRA (see EPRA 
(2006), p. 21).  
    
    
4  NOTES AND ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE 
    
4.1 Executive and Supervisory Board Compensation 
4.1.1 The company discloses the following information on their executive and supervisory board compensation, for 
each member individually: 
 remuneration; emoluments including taxable expenses (basic salary, bonus, fees (description), benefits, 
total) 
 contract duration 
 pensions and other retirement benefits 
 share options (number, date of grant, exercise price, exercise period, conditions for exercise) 
 holdings of ordinary shares (including related individuals, where relevant) 
 for supervisory board members: the nature and amount of compensation payments (e.g. aggregate pay-
ments to directors or past directors for loss of office) 
    
4.2 Investment Property – Appraiser Fee Basis 
4.2.1* The company discloses: 
 the basis for appraiser fees (fee based upon hours spent, as a result of appraised value or fixed amount); 
 the amount of annual non-valuation fees that have been paid to the appraiser(s); 
 whether the fee for each appraiser accounts for more than 10% of that appraiser’s turnover. 
    
4.3 Financing and Debt Position 
4.3.1 The company provides full narrative explanation of …  
 the components of the net finance charge in their accounts, 
 the market valuations of their hedging instruments and / or debt. 
4.3.2 The company provides a clear description of its debt profile, at least including information on …  
 the proportion of debt that is secured by specific assets versus unsecured, 
 the weighted average cost of debt. 
    
4.4 Historical Financial Results 
4.4.1 In its annual accounts the company includes key financial data on a consolidated basis for each of the last five 
financial years. 
    
4.5 Definitions 
4.5.1 The company includes a glossary of terms used in its annual accounts.  
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5  PORTFOLIO INFORMATION 
    
5.1 Property Performance Reporting 
5.1.1 The company provides additional information and disclosure on rental data of investment properties (for details 
see EPRA (2006), p. 30) … 
 disaggregated by characteristics  
(incl. gross rental income, net rental income, lettable area, passing rent, estimated rental value, vacancy) 
 disaggregated by segment. 
5.1.2 The company provides additional information and disclosure on valuation data of investment properties (for 
details see EPRA (2006), p. 31) … 
 disaggregated by characteristics  
(incl. property valuation, valuation movement in the year, gross / net initial yield, reversionary yield) 
 disaggregated by segment. 
5.1.3 The company provides additional information and disclosure on like-for-like net rental income of investment 
properties (for details see EPRA (2006), p. 32) … 
 disaggregated by characteristics  
(incl. properties owned throughout the two years, acquisitions, disposals, developments and total net rental 
income for the current year and the last year respectively) 
 disaggregated by segment. 
5.1.4 The company provides additional information and disclosure on development and redevelopment properties 
(for details see EPRA (2006), p. 33) … 
 disaggregated by characteristics  
(incl. cost to date, costs to complete, future interest to be capitalized, forecast total cost, forecast completion 
date, lettable area, % let, notional current estimated rental value on completion) 
 disaggregated by segment. 
5.1.5 The company provides additional information and disclosure on lease data of investment properties (for details 
see EPRA (2006), p. 34) … 
 disaggregated by characteristics  
(incl. lease expiry data, lease review data) 
 disaggregated by segment. 
    
    
6  NET ASSET VALUE AND EARNINGS PER SHARE 
    
6.1 Earnings per Share (EPS) 
6.1.1 The company adjusts the EPS figure per IFRS income statement according to the recommendations provided 
by EPRA (see EPRA (2006), p. 35).  
    
6.2 Net Asset Value per Share (NAV) 
6.2.1 The company adjusts the NAV per share figure per IFRS income statement according to the recommendations 
provided by EPRA (see EPRA (2006), p. 37).  
    
6.3 Tripple Net Asset Value (NNNAV) 
6.3.1 The company further adjusts the adjusted NAV per share figure according to the recommendations provided by 
EPRA (see EPRA (2006), p. 39).  
* indicates criteria that cannot be applied to all companies and are thus not being considered in 
the determination of the real estate-specific transparency score of the respective companies. 
Source: Own illustration following EPRA (2006). 
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Some of the included recommendations are not applicable to all companies. 
Therefore, a relative scoring system is selected. If a particular criterion is not 
relevant for a company it is not considered, reducing the total absolute score 
that can be achieved by this company accordingly. The final score of transpar-
ency is expressed in percent and is calculated by the ratio of points actually 
achieved to the total or maximum achievable points. The scoring scheme is ba-
sically straight-forward. Points are allocated to the single criteria depending on 
the extent of compliance. In case of full compliance, partial compliance and 
non-compliance, 1, 0.5 and 0 points were allocated respectively. 
Apart from Tobin’s Q, as the measure for firm value, and the different corpo-
rate governance mechanisms, diverse control variables are added to the struc-
tural model of the study. These are defined as follows. 
Firm size (lnASSETS) is approximated by the natural logarithm of the book 
value of total assets.322 This has been common practice in prior corporate gov-
ernance research, such as Shin/Stulz (2000), Gompers et al. (2003), Black et 
al. (2006) and Han (2006). Following Shin/Stulz (2000), Drobetz et al. (2004) 
and Black et al. (2006), among others, firm age (lnYEARS) corresponds to the 
number of years the company has been listed on the stock exchange. As an 
approximation for the listing date the Datastream item “base date” is em-
ployed.323 Consistent with Yermack (1996), Daines (2001) and Larcker et al. 
(2004) operating profitability is represented by the return on assets of the cur-
rent period (ROA(t)) and the return on assets of the previous period (ROA(t-1)). 
Return on assets is measured as net income divided by total assets. Revenue 
growth (GROWTH) is used as an additional measure for operating performance 
and refers to the average annual growth of revenues over the previous 2 years. 
GROWTH is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to correct for outliers. As a 
firm-specific risk measure, volatility (VOLA) is included. It is equivalent to the 
standard deviation of stock prices over the previous 12 months divided by the 
                                            
322  For all companies reporting their investment properties at cost, total assets are adjusted by 
the respective fair values, stated in the notes of the balance sheet. This is valid for all vari-
ables that are determined by total assets. 
323  For a similar proceeding see Shin/Stulz (2000) and Doyle et al. (2007). 
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average mean price and multiplied by 40.324 Share turnover is denoted liquidity 
(LIQUID) and is calculated as common shares traded during fiscal year 
2006/2007 divided by the company’s common shares outstanding. Another 
three control variables are the number of officers (NOFFICER), the number of 
outside blockholdings (NOBLOCK), and the number of years as CEO (TEN-
URE). 
In addition, several indicator variables are selected to account for potential 
effects on the endogenous variables. One of them is CEOPRES which is equal 
to one if the former or current CEO of the company is the president of the board 
of directors, zero otherwise. Another indicator variable is FOUNDER. It is equal 
to one if the CEO is the founder of the company, and zero if not. CEOPERF is 
an indicator variable reflecting the remuneration structure of CEOs. It is equal to 
one if the CEO receives a performance-based remuneration, zero otherwise. 
DIVERS is expected to capture whether the real estate portfolio of a company is 
diversified in terms of property type. It takes the value one, if the company’s 
property portfolio displays different property categories (such as retail, office or 
logistics), zero elsewise. Whether the company is managed internally or exter-
nally is captured by INTERN. This variable is one, if the company is run by an 
internal management, otherwise it is zero. REIT is an indicator variable equal to 
one, if the company has a REIT-structure, and equal to zero for a regular pub-
licly traded real estate company. An indicator variable for board system is 
BSYSTEM. It is equal to one for one-tier boards and equal to zero for two-tier 
boards.325 Finally, country indicator variables are used to reflect any country-
specific peculiarities. They are equal to one if the company’s headquarter is 
located in the respective country, zero otherwise. 
                                            
324  This calculation of volatility corresponds to one of Datastream item “vola”. 
325  In the countries subject to this study two different board systems exist which need to be dis-
tinguished: one-tier and two-tier boards. In countries with one-tier board systems, such as 
the UK, companies are governed by a single board where the functions of management and 
management control are combined in a single body. Hence, one-tier boards consist of ex-
ecutive and non-executive directors. On the contrary, in countries with two-tier board sys-
tems, such as Germany and the Netherlands, companies are governed by a management 
board and a supervisory board, two separate bodies differentiating between management 
and control function. In some countries, such as France, both board structures are possible. 
For a more detailed review of the two board systems see Jungmann (2006).  
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For an overview of all variables of the model and the variable-specific data 
sources see tables 7 and 8. The data for all variables has been collected at the 
corresponding fiscal year end 2006/2007326 for each company of the sample. 
The main data sources were the Datastream and Worldscope databases as 
well as the respective annual reports and webpages of the companies. 
 
Table 7: Definition of Endogenous Variables 
Endogenous Variables  
(Measure of Firm Value and Corporate Governance Mechanisms) 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Tobin’s Q  
(Q) 
Ratio of market value of equity plus the book value of debt to 
the book value of total assets 
Datastream: Market Value 
(MV); Worldscope: Total 
Assets (WC02999), Total 
Debt (WC03255); Annual 
Report 
Board Size  
(lnBSIZE) 
Natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board Annual Report 
Board Independence  
(BIND) 
Percentage of board seats held by non-officers without family 
relationship to the managing board and representatives of 
companies that are not involved in related party transactions 
Annual Report 
Insider Ownership  
(INSIDER) 
Percentage of equity held by the executive management of the 
company 
Worldscope: Major Share-
holders (WC18370); Annual 
Report 
Institutional Owner-
ship  
(INST) 
Percentage of equity held by institutions (legal entities) that are 
not predominantly owned by insiders  
Worldscope: Major Share-
holders (WC18370); Annual 
Report 
Leverage  
(LEV) 
Ratio of book value of debt to total assets Worldscope: Total Assets 
(WC02999), Total Debt 
(WC03255); Annual Report 
Disclosure  
(DISC) 
Self-constructed transparency index based on the EPRA Best 
Practice Policy Recommendations providing a relative score, 
expressed in percent, for transparency with respect to the 
companies’ real estate specific disclosure; while a lower score 
indicates a less transparent disclosure a higher score indicates 
a more transparent disclosure 
Annual Report 
Note: The data of the variables described above has been collected at the companies’ respec-
tive fiscal year end 2006/2007. 
 
                                            
326  The different fiscal year end dates range from September 30, 2006 to June 30, 2007. 
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Table 8: Definition of Exogenous Variables 
Exogenous Variables  
(Control Variables) 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Firm Size  
(lnASSETS) 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets Worldscope: Total Assets 
(WC02999); Annual Report 
Firm Age  
(lnYEARS) 
Natural logarithm of the number of years the company has been 
listed on the stock exchange 
Datastream : Base Date 
(BDATE) 
Return on Assets of 
previous period  
(ROA (t-1)) 
Net income divided by total assets in period t-1 Worldscope: ROA 
(WC08326); Annual Report 
Return on Assets of 
current period  
(ROA (t)) 
Net income divided by total assets in period t Worldscope: ROA 
(WC08326); Annual Report 
Revenue Growth  
(GROWTH) 
Average annual growth of revenues over the last 2 years; the 
variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 
Worldscope: Net Sales or 
Revenues (WC01001); 
Annual Report 
Volatility  
(VOLA) 
Standard deviation of stock returns estimated from daily stock 
prices over the previous 12 months divided by the mean price 
and multiplied by 40 
Datastream: Price (P) 
Liquidity  
(LIQUID) 
Share turnover, measured by common shares traded during 
fiscal year 2006/07 divided by common shares outstanding 
Datastream: Turnover by 
Volume (VO); Worldscope: 
Common Shares Out-
standing (WC05301); An-
nual Report 
Number of Officers  
(NOFFICER) 
Number of officers Annual Report 
Number of Outside 
Blockholders 
(NOBLOCK) 
Number of outside blockholders Worldscope: Major Share-
holders (WC18370); Annual 
Report 
Years as CEO  
(TENURE) 
Number of years as CEO Annual Report; Company 
Webpage 
CEO or former CEO 
as President of the 
Board 
(CEOPRES) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the current or former CEO is the 
president of the board, 0 otherwise 
Annual Report; Company 
Webpage 
Founding CEO  
(FOUNDER) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is the founder of the 
company, 0 otherwise 
Annual Report; Company 
Webpage 
CEO Performance-
based Remuneration 
(CEOPERF) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO receives an perform-
ance-based remuneration, 0 otherwise 
Annual Report 
Diversification 
(DIVERS) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company has a diversified 
real estate portfolio (office, retail, logistics, etc.), 0 otherwise 
Annual Report; Company 
Webpage 
Internal Manage-
ment  
(INTERN) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company is internally man-
aged, 0 otherwise 
Annual Report; Company 
Webpage 
REIT Structure  
(REIT) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company has a REIT struc-
ture, 0 otherwise 
Annual Report; Company 
Webpage 
Board System 
(BSYSTEM) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 in case of a one-tier board system, 
0 otherwise 
Annual Report 
Country 
(COUNTRY) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company’s headquarter is 
located in the respective country, 0 otherwise  
Annual Report; Company 
Webpage 
Note: The data of the variables described above has been collected at the companies’ respec-
tive fiscal year end 2006/2007. 
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5.3.1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
After having defined the relevant variables of the empirical study, it is necessary 
to take a closer look at their general statistical properties. The descriptive or 
summary statistics of all variables for the aggregate sample of 110 exchange-
traded real estate companies from the UK, France, the Netherlands and Ger-
many are presented in table 9. 
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of All Variables for the Total Sample 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Q 1.111 0.994 0.462 7.101 0.666 
BSIZE 7.127 6.000 3.000 18.000 3.376 
BIND 0.623 0.577 0.000 1.000 0.290 
INSIDER 0.109 0.001 0.000 0.990 0.234 
INST 0.198 0.112 0.000 0.983 0.225 
LEV 0.406 0.382 0.007 0.876 0.196 
DISC 0.450 0.435 0.172 0.799 0.154 
ASSETS 2,568,907,116 991,880,500 27,261,000 27,910,540,000 4,736,005,445 
YEARS 16.191 17.000 1.000 43.000 12.542 
ROA (t-1) 0.074 0.065 -0.113 0.419 0.071 
ROA (t) 0.103 0.095 -1.368 0.513 0.169 
GROWTH 1.944 0.118 -0.936 58.178 8.140 
VOLA 5.123 3.767 0.341 70.603 7.028 
LIQUID 0.381 0.166 0.000 1.944 0.475 
NOFFICER 3.255 3.000 1.000 11.000 1.937 
NOBLOCK 1.382 1.000 0.000 8.000 1.603 
TENURE 5.445 3.000 1.000 30.000 6.328 
CEOPRES 0.318 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.468 
FOUNDER 0.127 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.335 
CEOPERF 0.764 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.427 
DIVERS 0.664 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.475 
INTERN 0.945 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.228 
REIT 0.382 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.488 
BSYSTEM 0.555 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 
COUNTRY_UK 0.355 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.481 
COUNTRY_France 0.309 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.464 
COUNTRY_Netherlands 0.064 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.245 
COUNTRY_Germany 0.273 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.447 
Note: The variables are defined in tables 7 and 8. The sample consists of 110 publicly traded 
real estate companies from the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany in 2006/07. 
 
The arithmetic mean of Tobin’s Q equals 1.11 indicating that listed real es-
tate companies from all four countries are on average value increasing entities 
generating returns above the opportunity cost of capital. Board size ranges be-
tween 3 and 18 members and is on average 7.13. This corresponds to the op-
timal board size of 7 to 9 members recommended by Lipton/Lorsch (1992) and 
Jensen (1993). The fraction of independent members on the board for the over-
all sample is 62.3%. Clearly, board size as well as board independence are 
likely to be influenced by the prevalent board system. This intuition will be veri-
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fied later in this chapter. The percentage of shares owned by managers is on 
average 10.9% with a median of 0.1%. Taking into account the very large 
maximum value of 99% these values suggest that there are very few compa-
nies in the sample where managers hold a very high proportion of the com-
pany’s shares. Institutional ownership, as defined in table 7, ranges from 0 to 
98.3% and is on average 19.8%. The capital structure of the companies reveal 
debt or leverage ratios ranging from 0.7% to 87.6% with a mean of 40.6% and a 
median of 38.2%. Compared to other non-real estate samples, e.g. Ra-
jan/Zingales (1995) with average debt ratios ranging from 60% to 70%, these 
results are relatively low. The score of transparency regarding real estate-
specific disclosure practices vary from 17.2% to 79.9% with an average score of 
45%. 
The descriptive statistics of the exogenous variables shall be confined to a 
selection of noteworthy results. Total assets of the companies in the overall 
sample range from a minimum value of € 27 million to a maximum value of  
€ 27,911 million. On average, total assets of the companies is € 2,568 million. 
With 55.5% the majority of the companies from the total sample have a one-tier 
board structure. Approximately 95% of the companies are internally managed, 
38.2% have a REIT-structure and 66.4% hold a diversified real estate portfolio 
with respect to property type. Furthermore, in 12.7% of the companies the CEO 
is the founder of the company and in 31.8% of the companies the current or 
former CEO is president of the board.  
In order to gain a more profound insight into country-specific as well as 
REIT- and Non-REIT-specific characteristics, the descriptive statistics section is 
extended to several subsamples. The summary statistics of Tobin’s Q and the 
principal corporate governance mechanisms for the subsamples are depicted in 
table 10 and 11. 
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Tobin’s Q and Corporate Governance Mechanisms for Dif-
ferent Country Subsamples 
Variable Q BSIZE BIND INSIDER INST LEV DISC 
UK        
Mean 1.001 7.821 0.535 0.074 0.311 0.329 0.501 
Median 0.965 8.000 0.500 0.006 0.266 0.297 0.500 
Minimum 0.750 3.000 0.286 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.224 
Maximum 1.707 15.000 1.000 0.513 0.983 0.854 0.788 
Std. Dev. 0.177 2.694 0.174 0.133 0.222 0.166 0.135 
Sample Size 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
France        
Mean 1.011 8.912 0.409 0.100 0.130 0.489 0.426 
Median 0.992 9.000 0.394 0.000 0.052 0.494 0.436 
Minimum 0.462 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.172 
Maximum 1.615 18.000 0.800 0.990 0.936 0.876 0.649 
Std. Dev. 0.253 3.613 0.235 0.250 0.215 0.208 0.134 
Sample Size 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Netherlands        
Mean 1.044 4.714 0.923 0.011 0.211 0.354 0.725 
Median 1.065 4.000 1.000 0.000 0.280 0.352 0.718 
Minimum 0.932 4.000 0.714 0.000 0.000 0.204 0.645 
Maximum 1.149 7.000 1.000 0.054 0.366 0.491 0.799 
Std. Dev. 0.087 1.113 0.131 0.021 0.164 0.091 0.055 
Sample Size 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Germany        
Mean 1.383 4.767 0.909 0.186 0.124 0.422 0.347 
Median 1.100 3.500 1.000 0.000 0.009 0.455 0.340 
Minimum 0.504 3.000 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.173 
Maximum 7.101 15.000 1.000 0.970 0.766 0.825 0.609 
Std. Dev. 1.202 2.582 0.199 0.319 0.199 0.203 0.101 
Sample Size 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Note: The variables are defined in table 7. The sample consists of 110 publicly traded real es-
tate companies from the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany in 2006/07. 
 
Comparing the general statistical properties of Tobin’s Q across different 
country samples, it turns out that the German sample has the highest mean 
with a value of 1.38, followed by the Netherlands with a mean of 1.04, France 
with a mean of 1.01 and the UK with a mean value of 1.00. The comparably 
high value for the German sample is linked to some very high valuations of only 
a few companies. This can be concluded from the large maximum value of 7.10 
and the relatively low median value of 1.10. The extraordinarily high valuations 
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of German publicly traded real estate companies may be partially explained by 
a positive sentiment of investors caused by the expected upside potential of 
real estate companies prior to the introduction of a REIT-regime in Germany.  
As predicted before, board size and board independence seem to be influ-
enced by the respective board system. In the UK (and to some extent in 
France) where the one-tier board is the predominant board system, board size 
is almost twice as high as in Germany and the Netherlands, where only two-tier 
board structures can be found. In addition, companies with two-tier boards from 
Germany and the Netherlands reflect a much higher percentage of board inde-
pendence of roughly 90% which is close to twice as high as in the UK.  
The highest average fraction of insider ownership, as measured by the 
shareholdings of corporate management, can be observed for the German 
sample and is around 18.6%. The mean values for the UK, France and the 
Netherlands are 7.4%, 10.0% and 1.1%, respectively. The highest levels of in-
stitutional ownership can be found in the UK. Here, the average percentage of 
shares owned by institutions equals 31.1%, followed by the Netherlands with 
21.1%, France with 13.0% and Germany with 12.4%.  
Listed property companies from France and Germany have the highest av-
erage debt ratios with values of 48.9% and 42.2%. Leverage ratios of UK and 
Dutch companies are on average 32.9% and 35.4%. With respect to real es-
tate-specific disclosure, companies from the Netherlands reveal the highest 
transparency with a mean score of 72.5%. This exceptionally high score can 
certainly be traced back to the existence of only a few but very large and ma-
ture real estate companies in the Netherlands. The second highest scores are 
on average generated by UK companies with a value of 50.1%, followed by 
French companies with a value of 42.6%. With an arithmetic mean of 34.7% 
German publicly traded real estate companies perform worst in terms of trans-
parent real estate-specific disclosure.  
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics of Tobin’s Q and Corporate Governance Mechanisms for REIT 
and Non-REIT Subsamples 
Variable Q BSIZE BIND INSIDER INST LEV DISC 
REITs        
Mean 1.009 8.405 0.522 0.071 0.174 0.441 0.534 
Median 0.997 8.000 0.458 0.000 0.097 0.443 0.531 
Minimum 0.477 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.217 
Maximum 1.470 18.000 1.000 0.990 0.936 0.876 0.799 
Std. Dev. 0.171 3.493 0.260 0.203 0.201 0.190 0.151 
Sample Size 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Non-REITs        
Mean 1.174 6.338 0.685 0.132 0.212 0.384 0.398 
Median 0.991 6.000 0.667 0.002 0.131 0.367 0.391 
Minimum 0.462 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.172 
Maximum 7.101 15.000 1.000 0.970 0.983 0.854 0.788 
Std. Dev. 0.832 3.069 0.292 0.250 0.239 0.198 0.131 
Sample Size 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Note: The variables are defined in table 7. The sample consists of 110 publicly traded real es-
tate companies from the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany in 2006/07. 
 
A glance at REITs versus Non-REITs shows that REITs on average have 
lower Tobin’s Q ratios (1.01) than Non-REITs (1.17). Considering that the me-
dian value of Tobin’s Q is slightly larger for the REIT-sample (0.997) than in the 
Non-REIT-sample (0.991) one has to be careful with statements inferring that 
Non-REITs are generally valued higher by the capital market. As table 11 indi-
cates, REITs have on average larger and less independent boards than listed 
real estate companies without a REIT-status. Furthermore, the mean of insider 
ownership for the REIT-sample of 7.1% is almost half of the value for the Non-
REIT-sample of 13.2%. Surprisingly, REITs exhibit lower levels of institutional 
ownership than regular publicly traded real estate companies. This result may 
to a certain extent be explained by the fact that listed property companies in the 
UK, representing a capital market characterized by high levels of institutional 
ownership, have not converted to a REIT at the time the data was collected for 
the study. Moreover, REITs as opposed to Non-REITs appear to have slightly 
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higher leverage ratios327 as well as much higher scores of transparency with 
respect to real estate-specific disclosure. 
 
Table 12: Pearson Correlation Matrix of Endogenous Variables 
Variable Q lnBSIZE BIND INSIDER INST LEV DISC 
Q 1.000 
(--/--) 
      
lnBSIZE -0.230** 
(-2.460) 
1.000 
(--/--) 
     
BIND 0.207** 
(2.200) 
-0.369*** 
(-4.122) 
1.000 
(--/--) 
    
INSIDER 0.058 
(0.609) 
-0.304*** 
(-3.314) 
-0.019 
(-0.193) 
1.000 
(--/--) 
   
INST -0.058 
(-0.607) 
-0.019 
(-0.193) 
0.025 
(0.257) 
-0.261*** 
(2.809) 
1.000 
(--/--) 
  
LEV -0.003 
(-0.034) 
0.089 
(0.926) 
-0.038 
(-0.397) 
0.124 
(1.294) 
-0.124 
(-1.294) 
1.000 
(--/--) 
 
DISC -0.133 
(-1.397) 
0.465*** 
(5.454) 
-0.097 
(-1.009) 
-0.274*** 
(-2.962) 
0.076 
(0.797) 
-0.114 
(-1.196) 
1.000 
(--/--) 
Note: The table shows the correlation coefficients between the endogenous variables. The re-
spective t-values are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. The variables are defined 
in table 7. The sample consists of 110 publicly traded real estate companies from the UK, 
France, the Netherlands and Germany in 2006/07. *, ** and *** indicates that the respective 
correlation coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Significant results 
(at 10% or better) are shown in boldface.  
 
Table 12 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between Tobin’s Q 
and the principal corporate governance mechanisms.328 The results depicted in 
column 1 (Q) show two statistically significant correlations at the 5% level that 
at the same time represent the highest absolute values within the same column. 
These include the correlation between lnBSIZE and Q, on the one hand, and 
the correlation between BIND and Q, on the other hand. LnBSIZE is signifi-
cantly negative whereas BIND is significantly positive correlated with Q. While 
INSIDER and Q are positively correlated, INST, LEV and DISC are negatively 
correlated with Q. However, it has to be pointed out that neither of these corre-
lations is statistically significant.  
                                            
327  This finding may possibly be explained by country-specific peculiarities. 
328  A Pearson correlation matrix of the continuous exogenous variables can be found in Appen-
dix 2. 
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The significantly positive correlation between DISC and lnBSIZE and the 
highly significant negative correlation between INSIDER and INST as well as 
between INSIDER and DISC might be an indication for possible substitution 
effects among the governance mechanisms. This notion will be further investi-
gated at a later point of the study. 
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5.3.2 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Analysis 
5.3.2.1 Specification of the OLS Regression Model 
The dependent variable of the OLS regression equation, presented below, is 
Tobin’s Q (Q) which serves as an approximation for the market value of the 
firm.  
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In addition to the six corporate governance mechanisms, several control 
variables with a potential impact on market valuation have been selected to 
serve as explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the equation. In litera-
ture, it is frequently argued that firm value depends positively on future invest-
ment opportunities or growth opportunities.329 Following Shin/Stulz (2000), 
Gompers et al. (2003), Anderson/Reeb (2003), Drobetz et al. (2004) and Black 
et al. (2006), among others, firm size (lnASSETS) and firm age or rather the 
number of years listed on the stock exchange (lnYEARS) are used as proxies 
for such growth opportunities. In this context, it is expected that larger and older 
firms have less growth opportunities implying a negative relationship between 
lnASSETS and Q as well as between lnYEARS and Q. Another important factor 
influencing firm value is a company’s current and past profitability.330 In line with 
Yermack (1996) and Daines (2001), return on assets of the previous year 
(ROA(t-1)) and return on assets of the current year (ROA(t)) are included as 
measures of operating profitability. The relationship between ROA and Q is 
generally expected to be positive. Furthermore, it is anticipated that firm risk 
                                            
329  See Myers (1977), p. 148f, and Smith/Watts (1992), p. 267, among others. 
330  See Yermack (1996), p. 192; Daines (2001), p. 532. 
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has an effect on firm value. As a proxy for firm risk the standard deviation of 
stock returns (VOLA) is used. Further control variables of the first equation in-
clude diversification of the property portfolio with regard to property type (DI-
VERS) and REIT structure (REIT). Prior research by Capozza/Seguin (1999) 
and Cronqvist et al. (2001) has shown that unfocused publicly traded real estate 
companies (REITs), particularly those diversified by property type, are intrans-
parent, very expensive to manage and ultimately less successful.331 Moreover, 
it can be argued that there is no need for publicly traded real estate companies 
to hold a diversified portfolio since investors can diversify their portfolios on their 
own.332 Therefore, a negative relation is anticipated between DIVERS and Q. In 
contrast to the corporate structure of regular publicly traded companies, the 
REIT structure provides a set of characteristics with a special appeal to inves-
tors. These characteristics include among others tax efficiency and transpar-
ency due to the elimination of corporate level taxes and greater investor secu-
rity due to increased regulation. Consequently, REIT is assumed to be 
positively related to Q. Finally, the board system (BSYSTEM) and country 
(COUNTRY) indicator variables are added to the equation in order to control for 
board system and country effects. 
 
5.3.2.2 Results of OLS Estimation 
Based on equation 5.1, this chapter provides the results of various multivariate 
OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on different corporate governance mechanisms 
and control variables. The OLS regression models are depicted in table 13. All 
of them treat the corporate governance mechanisms as exogenous333 and ac-
count for the previously defined set of control variables.  
The OLS analysis basically follows two steps. At first, the influence of each 
corporate governance mechanism on Tobin’s Q is analyzed by six separate 
                                            
331  According to Cronqvist et al. (2001), p. 91, gains from specialization with respect to particu-
lar property types arise from the specific knowledge of the management team on the individ-
ual properties, how to value them and about potential buyers and sellers in the market. 
332  See Cronqvist et al. (2001), p. 90; Chan et al. (2003), p. 113. 
333  As previously pointed out this assumption is disputable and will be repealed in chapter 5.3.3. 
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regression models (see model (1)-(6) of table 13). The results of these regres-
sions will indicate whether there is a significant influence of the single corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm value after controlling for other value-relevant 
variables. These regression results need to be handled with caution since they 
ignore other corporate governance mechanisms that might be relevant for a 
correct specification of the model (problem of omitted variable bias). Therefore, 
in a second step all corporate governance mechanisms are included in the re-
gression model (see model (7) of table 13).  
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Table 13: Coefficient Estimates from OLS Regressions of Tobin’s Q on different Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms and Control Variables  
Dependent Variable = Tobin’s Q 
Independent 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
lnBSIZE -0.111 
(-0.722)      
-0.232* 
(-1.704) 
BIND  0.239 (1.227)     
0.406* 
(1.982) 
INSIDER   0.291 (1.281)    
0.384* 
(1.755) 
INST    0.251 (1.420)   
0.379** 
(2.376) 
LEV     0.152 (0.708)  
0.194 
(1.032) 
DISC      1.134*** (2.841) 
1.726*** 
(4.177) 
lnASSETS -0.005 
(-0.122) 
-0.026 
(-0.828) 
-0.010 
(-0.329) 
-0.022 
(-0.683) 
-0.027 
(-0.889) 
-0.086*** 
(-2.557) 
-0.044 
(-1.256) 
lnYEARS -0.118** 
(-2.445) 
-0.114** 
(-2.350) 
-0.122** 
(-2.565) 
-0.105** 
(-2.151) 
-0.113** 
(-2.344) 
-0.096** 
(-2.028) 
-0.105** 
(-2.408) 
ROA (t-1) 2.620*** 
(3.325) 
2.546*** 
(3.220) 
2.542*** 
(3.287) 
2.644*** 
(3.434) 
2.700*** 
(3.374) 
2.549*** 
(3.159) 
2.724*** 
(3.777) 
ROA (t) -3.396*** 
(-4.526) 
-3.377*** 
(-4.507) 
-3.454*** 
(-4.640) 
-3.424*** 
(-4.578) 
-3.387*** 
(-4.484) 
-3.413*** 
(-4.461) 
-3.667*** 
(-5.193) 
VOLA 0.005* 
(1.822) 
0.006** 
(2.168) 
0.007*** 
(2.688) 
0.005* 
(1.801) 
0.005* 
(1.820) 
0.005* 
(1.806) 
0.008** 
(2.521) 
DIVERS -0.130 
(-1.448) 
-0.134 
(-1.467) 
-0.115 
(-1.370) 
-0.142 
(-1.543) 
-0.135 
(-1.475) 
-0.164* 
(-1.836) 
-0.152* 
(-1.958) 
REIT 0.374*** 
(2.987) 
0.373*** 
(3.082) 
0.375*** 
(3.186) 
0.350*** 
(3.087) 
0.349*** 
(3.002) 
0.215* 
(1.795) 
0.215* 
(1.744) 
Constant 1.901*** 
(2.996) 
1.924*** 
(3.161) 
1.779*** 
(3.110) 
2.027*** 
(3.211) 
2.109*** 
(3.587) 
2.924*** 
(4.645) 
1.660*** 
(2.942) 
BSYSTEM + + - - - - + 
COUNTRY + + + + + + + 
F-Statistic  
(p-value) 
15.800*** 
(0.000) 
15.959*** 
(0.000) 
17.795***
(0.000) 
17.588***
(0.000) 
17.269***
(0.000) 
18.838*** 
(0.000) 
14.450*** 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R² 0.620 0.622 0.629 0.626 0.621 0.643 0.677 
Note: The table shows the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on different 
corporate governance mechanisms and control variables. The variables are defined in tables 7 
and 8. The sample consists of 110 publicly traded real estate companies from the UK, France, 
the Netherlands and Germany in 2006/07. All t-values, reported in parentheses below the re-
spective coefficients, are calculated on the basis of White heteroskedasticity-consistent stan-
dard errors. *, ** and *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Signifi-
cant results (at 10% or better) are shown in boldface.  
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Five of the seven control variables, that is lnYEARS, ROA(t-1), ROA(t), 
VOLA and REIT, are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% level in all 
regressions, indicating that they are actually value-relevant. As predicted, 
Tobin’s Q is higher for younger firms (lnYEARS) with larger growth opportuni-
ties and supports the findings of Chung/Pruitt (1996), Anderson/Reeb (2003) 
and Black et al. (2006), among others. In line with Larcker et al. (2004), operat-
ing profitability of the previous period (ROA(t-1)) is significantly positive corre-
lated with Tobin’s Q, whereas the operating profitability of the current period 
(ROA(t)) is significantly negative correlated with Tobin’s Q. In addition, more 
risky companies, as measured by VOLA, are valued higher by the capital mar-
ket which corresponds to the empirical results of Beiner et al. (2006). Further-
more, companies with a REIT structure (REIT) exhibit, as expected, higher mar-
ket valuations. Firm size, as measured by lnASSETS, and diversification, 
denoted as DIVERS, remain statistically insignificant except for regression 
models (6) and (6)-(7), respectively. Nevertheless, both variables always exhibit 
a negative coefficient, as predicted. 
With respect to the analysis of the single corporate governance mecha-
nisms on firm value, presented by regression models (1)-(6) of table 13, all re-
gression models have a relatively high and constant adjusted coefficient of de-
termination (adjusted R²)334 ranging from 0.620 to 0.643. However, only 
disclosure (DISC) has a significantly positive coefficient. This result suggests 
that companies with a more transparent real estate-specific disclosure practice 
have higher market valuations. Once again, it should be emphasized that these 
results might suffer from omitted variable bias and therefore need to be scruti-
nized. 
Adding all corporate governance mechanisms in one model should reduce 
omitted variable bias and improve the quality of the model. This can be verified 
by the increase in adjusted R² to 0.677, reflecting the highest value of all re-
                                            
334  R² is a measure of the proportion of variability of the dependent variable explained by the 
model and corresponds to a number between zero and one. A value close to zero suggests 
a poor model. 
128 Empirical Analysis 
 
gression models. The result for disclosure (DISC) of model (6) remains robust 
in model (7) reflecting a significant positive coefficient at the 1% level.  
As opposed to the regressions focusing on the corporate governance 
mechanisms in isolation, the combined regression of all corporate governance 
mechanisms leads the variables board size (lnBSIZE), board independence 
(BIND) and insider ownership (INSIDER) to become statistically significant at 
the 10% level and institutional ownership (INST) to become significant at the 
5% level. In accordance with Yermack (1996), Conyon/Peck (1998), Eisenberg 
et al. (1998) and Loderer/Peyer (2002), smaller boards are considered more 
efficient and lead to a higher valuation by the capital market. In support of the 
findings by Rosenstein/Wyatt (1990), Byrd/Hickman (1992) and Mill-
stein/MacAvoy (1998), a significantly positive correlation between board inde-
pendence (BIND) and market valuation can be documented. Furthermore, 
companies with greater fractions of insider ownership (INSIDER)335 and institu-
tional ownership (INST) reveal higher Tobin’s Q ratios. The former is consistent 
with empirical results of Chung/Pruitt (1996) and Capozza/Seguin (2003), 
whereas the latter is in line with prior research by Pound (1988). Though having 
a positive coefficient, leverage (LEV) remains insignificant in all regressions.  
 
5.3.2.3 Robustness Check of OLS Results 
For the robustness checks model (7) of table 13 is referred to as the base or 
standard model and is once more depicted in column 1 of table 14 for reasons 
of comparison. In order to test whether the OLS-results presented in chapter 
5.3.2.2 are robust, model (1) of table 14 is modified in several ways.  
First, following Drobetz et al. (2004), Beiner et al. (2006) and Black et al. 
(2006), among others, the Market-to-Book ratio (MB) is used as measure of firm 
value instead of Tobin’s Q. MB is defined as the market value of equity to the 
                                            
335  Stulz (1988) and Morck et al. (1988a) theoretically argue that the market value of the firm 
first increases and then decreases as the percentage of insider ownership rises. Empirically, 
this notion of a curvilinear relationship between firm value and insider ownership is sup-
ported by studies of Morck et al. (1988a), McConnell/Servaes (1990) and Han (2006). How-
ever, having accounted for INSIDER² in regression models (3) and (7), a parabolic relation-
ship between insider ownership and Tobin’s Q could not be observed. 
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book value of equity. Second, INSIDER is replaced by CEOEQ, an alternative 
proxy for the incentive alignment of corporate management. CEOEQ is an indi-
cator variable reflecting the remuneration structure of CEOs. It is equal to one if 
the CEO receives an equity-based remuneration, zero otherwise. Third, INST is 
subsequently substituted by three alternative measures of ownership concen-
tration: BINST, OBLOCK and LARGE. BINST stands for institutional blockown-
ership and corresponds to the percentage of equity held by institutions with 
shareholdings of 5% or above. OBLOCK denotes outsider blockholdings. It is 
defined as the percentage of equity held by owners of 5% or more of total eq-
uity without close relations to corporate officers or directors. LARGE, the last 
proxy for ownership concentration, is measured as the percentage of equity 
held by the largest shareholder. Fourth, consistent with Yermack (1996), Black 
et al. (2006) and Beiner et al. (2006) the natural logarithm of total sales 
(lnSALES) is used as an alternative measure of firm size. Finally, robustness is 
tested by re-estimating the base model for the REIT and Non-REIT subsam-
ples. 
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Table 14: Coefficient Estimates from OLS Regressions of Tobin’s Q and Market-to-Book on 
different Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Control Variables  
 Dependent Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Q 
(1) 
MB 
(2) 
Q 
(3) 
Q 
(4) 
Q 
(5) 
Q 
(6) 
Q 
(7) 
Q 
(8) 
Q 
(9) 
        REIT 
Non-
REIT 
lnBSIZE -0.232* 
(-1.704) 
-0.291 
(-1.234) 
-0.298** 
(-2.000) 
-0.238** 
(-1.728) 
-0.233* 
(-1.709) 
-0.263* 
(-1.896) 
-0.276** 
(-2.189) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.307* 
(-1.811) 
BIND 0.406* 
(1.982) 
0.692** 
(2.159) 
0.305 
(1.543) 
0.417** 
(2.025) 
0.416** 
(2.014) 
0.483** 
(2.194) 
0.409** 
(2.011) 
0.242 
(1.656) 
0.495* 
(1.703) 
INSIDER 0.384* 
(1.755) 
0.339 
(1.044)  
0.360 
(1.658) 
0.390* 
(1.751) 
0.242 
(1.123) 
0.426* 
(1.976) 
0.139 
(1.097) 
0.351 
(1.364) 
CEOEQ   0.148* (1.678)     
  
INST 0.379** 
(2.376) 
0.661** 
(2.107) 
0.272 
(1.638)    
0.386** 
(2.303) 
-0.045 
(-0.395) 
0.414 
(1.532) 
BINST    0.298* (1.849)    
  
OBLOCK     0.391** (2.462)   
  
LARGE      0.284* (1.723)  
  
LEV 0.194 
(1.032) 
0.503 
(1.529) 
0.264 
(1.329) 
0.184 
(0.958) 
0.183 
(0.964) 
0.156 
(0.745) 
0.171 
(0.916) 
0.232 
(1.175) 
-0.116 
(-0.419) 
DISC 1.726*** 
(4.177) 
3.192*** 
(4.218) 
1.515*** 
(3.166) 
1.738*** 
(4.160) 
1.807*** 
(4.372) 
1.825*** 
(3.943) 
1.567***
(3.536) 
0.900*** 
(4.249) 
2.242*** 
(3.452) 
lnASSETS -0.044 
(-1.256) 
-0.092 
(-1.284) 
-0.061* 
(-1.679) 
-0.045 
(-1.245) 
-0.042 
(-1.174) 
-0.046 
(-1.204)  
-0.006 
(-0.180) 
-0.030 
(-0.570) 
lnSALES       -0.007 (-0.323) 
  
lnYEARS -0.105** 
(-2.408) 
-0.176** 
(-2.480) 
-0.090* 
(-1.966) 
-0.105** 
(-2.392) 
-0.103** 
(-2.370) 
-0.117** 
(-2.611) 
-0.114***
(-2.722) 
-0.083** 
(-2.148) 
-0.082 
(-1.660) 
ROA (t-1) 2.724*** 
(3.777) 
3.815*** 
(3.752) 
2.901*** 
(4.024) 
2.695*** 
(3.643) 
2.721*** 
(3.751) 
2.709*** 
(3.524) 
2.811***
(3.524) 
1.281* 
(1.958) 
2.871*** 
(3.533) 
ROA (t) -3.667*** 
(-5.193) 
-5.522*** 
(-7.197) 
-3.560*** 
(-4.933) 
-3.640***
(-5.086) 
-3.667***
(-5.155) 
-3.525***
(-5.182) 
-3.711***
(-5.301) 
-0.513** 
(-2.402) 
-4.197*** 
(-11.32) 
VOLA 0.008** 
(2.521) 
0.017*** 
(2.924) 
0.005* 
(1.877) 
0.008** 
(2.490) 
0.008** 
(2.502) 
0.010** 
(2.565) 
0.008** 
(2.625) 
0.054*** 
(2.838) 
0.009* 
(1.897) 
DIVERS -0.152* 
(-1.958) 
-0.277** 
(-2.094) 
-0.180** 
(-2.145) 
-0.154* 
(-1.974) 
-0.163** 
(-2.151) 
-0.160** 
(-2.039) 
-0.146* 
(-1.870) 
-0.016 
(-0.282) 
-0.294** 
(-2.555) 
REIT 0.215* 
(1.744) 
0.113 
(0.490) 
0.194 
(1.596) 
0.213* 
(1.701) 
0.205 
(1.643) 
0.184 
(1.463) 
0.227* 
(1.688) 
  
Constant 1.660*** 
(2.942) 
2.260** 
(2.010) 
2.273*** 
(3.743) 
1.682*** 
(2.921) 
1.595*** 
(2.740) 
1.617*** 
(2.542) 
1.045***
(3.086) 
0.168 
(0.270) 
1.407* 
(1.743) 
BSYSTEM + + + + + + + + + 
COUNTRY + + + + + + + + + 
Sample Size 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 42 68 
F-Statistic  
(p-value) 
14.450*** 
(0.000) 
13.578*** 
(0.000) 
14.104*** 
(0.000) 
14.135***
(0.000) 
14.421***
(0.000) 
14.163***
(0.000) 
14.220***
(0.000) 
2.615** 
(0.015) 
15.687*** 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R² 0.677 0.662 0.671 0.672 0.677 0.672 0.673 0.371 0.767 
Note: The table shows the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q and market-
to-book on different corporate governance mechanisms and control variables. The variables are 
defined in tables 7 and 8. The sample consists of 110 publicly traded real estate companies 
from the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany in 2006/07. All t-values, reported in paren-
theses below the respective coefficients, are calculated on the basis of White heteroskedastic-
ity-consistent standard errors. *, ** and *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level. Significant results (at 10% or better) are shown in boldface.  
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Using MB as dependent variable in model (2) of table 14 provides largely 
similar results to the ones of the base model with the standard specification. 
Only BSIZE, INSIDER and REIT cease to have significant coefficients. Replac-
ing CEOEQ by INSIDER in model (3) also largely delivers robust results. How-
ever, INST has become insignificant with a p-value slightly above the 10% 
threshold. CEOEQ reveals a significantly positive coefficient at the 10% level. It 
appears that incentive alignment of managers has a positive effect on firm 
value.  
Altering the variables of ownership concentration in models (4) to (6) gener-
ates robust results for almost all variables of the model except for INSIDER and 
REIT. While INSIDER turns insignificant in models (4) and (6), REIT ceases to 
be significant in models (5) and (6). The variables BINST, OBLOCK and 
LARGE are all statistically significant at the 10% or 5% level. Furthermore, ba-
sically all results are robust to a substitution of lnASSETS for lnSALES in model 
(7). It can be observed that the results for lnBSIZE and BIND become even 
more significant than in the standard model. 
A glance at the OLS regression results of the base model using the REIT-
sample, which are presented in model (8) of table 14, indicates that the only 
corporate governance mechanism that remains statistically significant is DISC. 
In contrast, when estimating the standard model using the Non-REIT sample in 
model (9) lnBSIZE and BIND stay significant at the 10% level, whereas DISC 
remains significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, the impact of DIVERS on Q is 
significantly negative for the Non-REIT sample but not for the REIT sample. 
Overall, LEV is statistically insignificant in all models of table 14. By con-
trast, DISC remains highly significant at the 1% level in all regressions. It ap-
pears that a transparent real estate-specific disclosure has a positive effect on 
firm value. 
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5.3.3 Instrumental Variable (IV) Analysis 
5.3.3.1 Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
Before making use of instrumental variable estimation, such as 3SLS, it needs 
to be examined whether the six corporate governance variables are endoge-
nous or in other words whether they are correlated with the error term. In case 
they are not endogenous, there will be no need for instrumental variable estima-
tion since OLS will yield efficient estimates. 
A commonly used method to check for joint endogeneity is a test often re-
ferred to as Hausman test or Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, which was proposed by 
Durbin (1954), Wu (1973) and Hausman (1978). The basic idea behind this test 
is to compare OLS and 2SLS estimators to find out whether the differences are 
statistically significant. If they differ significantly, it can be concluded that the 
suspected endogenous variables are in fact endogenous.336  
The implementation of the Hausman test is basically straight-forward and 
resembles the procedure of a 2SLS regression.337 In the first stage, the reduced 
form is estimated for each potentially endogenous corporate governance vari-
able. The residuals of these first-stage regressions are included in equation 5.1 
(Q) which is then estimated using OLS. If the coefficient of one of the residuals 
is significantly different from zero there is evidence that at least one of the gov-
ernance variables is indeed endogenous.  
                                            
336  See Davidson/MacKinnon (1993), pp. 237ff; Wooldridge (2000), p. 483. 
337  For a general and intuitive description of the Hausman test for endogeneity see 
Pindyck/Rubinfeld (1998), pp. 353f and Wooldridge (2000) pp. 483f. 
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Table 15: Results of the Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
 Dependent Variable = Tobin’s Q 
Variable Coefficient t-value p-value 
Residuals_lnBSIZE -0.103 (-0.241) (0.810) 
Residuals_BIND 0.174 (0.273) (0.786) 
Residuals_INSIDER -0.555 (-0.951) (0.344) 
Residuals_lNST 0.332 (0.802) (0.425) 
Residuals_LEV -0.230 (-0.373) (0.710) 
Residuals_DISC -3.277*** (-3.054) (0.003) 
lnBSIZE -0.246 (-0.692) (0.491) 
BIND 0.355 (0.594) (0.554) 
INSIDER 0.838 (1.452) (0.150) 
INST 0.350 (1.103) (0.273) 
LEV 0.333 (0.636) (0.527) 
DISC 4.347*** (4.488) (0.000) 
lnASSETS -0.153*** (-2.959) (0.004) 
lnYEARS -0.100** (-2.272) (0.026) 
ROA (t-1) 2.731*** (3.792) (0.000) 
ROA (t) -3.900*** (-5.806) (0.000) 
VOLA 0.009 (1.554) (0.124) 
DIVERS -0.173** (-2.238) (0.028) 
REIT -0.055 (-0.413) (0.681) 
Constant 2.817 (3.164) (0.002) 
BSYSTEM +   
COUNTRY +   
F-Statistic 12.781***  (0.000) 
Adjusted R² 0.713   
Note: The table shows the coefficient estimates from an OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on differ-
ent corporate governance mechanisms, control variables and the residuals of a reduced form 
regression for each corporate governance variable. The variables are defined in tables 7 and 8. 
The sample consists of 110 publicly traded real estate companies from the UK, France, the 
Netherlands and Germany in 2006/07. All t-values and p-values, reported in parentheses on the 
right-hand side of the respective coefficients, are calculated on the basis of White heteroske-
dasticity-consistent standard errors. *, ** and *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level. Significant results (at 10% or better) are shown in boldface.  
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As can be observed in table 15, the first-stage residual of DISC is negative 
and significant at the 1% level for a joint F-test yielding an F-value of 12.781 
and p-value of 0.000. As a result, the null hypothesis of no endogeneity has to 
be rejected.  
Accordingly, all corporate governance variables are explicitly treated as en-
dogenous variables in the subsequent analysis using 3SLS estimation. In order 
to gain a more comprehensive understanding of this particular estimation 
method, it will be described in the following chapter. 
 
5.3.3.2 Concept of Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) 
The system of equations, which will be specified in chapter 5.3.3.3, is estimated 
using three-stage least squares (3SLS) which was originally introduced by Zell-
ner/Theil (1962). This estimation method accounts for joint endogeneity and 
basically relies on instrumental variables as well as the least squares method. 
3SLS is a so-called full system estimation method, indicating that all equations 
of the system are estimated jointly.338 
As its name suggests, 3SLS is computed in three stages, whereas the first 
two stages are equivalent to the ones of two-stage least squares (2SLS)339 and 
are applied separately to each equation of the system. In the first stage, the 
reduced form of the system340 is estimated, implying that each endogenous 
variable is regressed on all exogenous variables of the system. In the second 
stage, the structural form of the system is estimated, whereas the explanatory 
                                            
338  See Schmidt (1976), p. 201; Davidson/MacKinnon (1993), p. 651; Greene (2003), pp. 396ff. 
339  2SLS was originally proposed by Theil (1953) and Basmann (1957). It is a single equation 
estimation method in the sense that the estimation procedure is performed separately for 
each equation. 
340  Basically two general forms of the system of equations have to be differentiated: the struc-
tural form and the reduced form. The structural form of the system is given by the underlying 
theory. It contains endogenous variables on the left-hand side and (in the presence of joint 
endogeneity) endogenous as well as exogenous or predetermined variables on the right-
hand side. The reduced form is derived from the structural form of the system. It contains all 
endogenous variables as a function solely of the predetermined variables of the model; see 
Pindyck/Rubinfeld (1998), p. 340. 
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endogenous variables are replaced by the fitted values341 from the first stage 
regressions.342 Once the 2SLS parameters have been retrieved, the residuals 
of each equation are used to estimate the covariance matrix of the error terms. 
This information is required to apply generalized least squares (GLS) in the 
third and final stage of the 3SLS estimation procedure, in which all equations 
are estimated simultaneously.343  
As opposed to 2SLS, 3SLS explicitly takes into account the cross-equation 
error covariances and thereby captures the correlation among the equations of 
the system. As a consequence, 3SLS parameter estimates generally reveal 
smaller variances than their 2SLS counterparts yielding asymptotically more 
efficient estimates.344 
A formal description of the essential ideas underlying the concept of 3SLS is 
provided below. Before getting into the details of the estimation procedure, it is 
necessary to depict the basic notations and assumptions of the system of equa-
tions.  
The corresponding notation is fairly standard and closely follows Zell-
ner/Theil (1962), Schmidt (1976), Wooldridge (2002) and Greene (2003). Con-
sidering a complete system345 of G  linear structural equations with G  endoge-
nous, K  exogenous or predetermined variables and T  observations the i th 
equation can be written in the following form: 
 
iiiiii uXYy ++= δγ ,           Gi ,,2,1 K=  (5.2) 
                                            
341  A fitted value corresponds to the y output value that is predicted by a regression equation. 
342  See Davidson/MacKinnon (1993), p. 220; Pindyck/Rubinfeld (1998), p. 361. 
343  See Zellner/Theil (1962), pp. 54, 57; Schmidt (1976), p. 203; Pindyck/Rubinfeld (1998), p. 
361. 
344  See Belsley (1988), p. 21; Pindyck/Rubinfeld (1998), pp. 361, 364; Greene (2003), p. 407. 
For a theoretical proof of the efficiency of 3SLS relative to 2SLS see Schmidt (1976), pp. 
209ff. According to Pindyck/Rubinfeld (1998), p. 364, the gain in efficiency associated with 
the application of 3SLS is around 5%. Nevertheless, 3SLS does not necessarily need to be 
more efficient than 2SLS, e.g. if there is no cross-equation covariation. In this case both es-
timation techniques are equally efficient; see Schmidt (1976), p. 211. 
345  The system of equations is complete if there are as many equations as there are endoge-
nous variables; see Greene (2003), p. 378. 
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where iy  is a [ ]1×T -vector of the dependent variables, iY  a ( )[ ]1−× GT -
matrix of the endogenous explanatory variables, iγ  a ( )[ ]11 ×−G -vector of the 
endogenous explanatory variable coefficients, iX  a [ ]KT × -matrix of the ex-
ogenous variables, iδ  a [ ]1×K -vector of the exogenous variable coefficients, 
and iu  a [ ]1×T -vector of the error terms. 
A more general notation for systems of equations which is commonly used 
is the following: 
 
iiii uZy += β ,           Gi ,,2,1 K=  (5.4) 
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or 
uZy += β  (5.6) 
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whereas ( )iii XYZ ,=  and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
i
i
i δ
γβ . 
With respect to the estimation of the system of equations with 3SLS some 
assumptions need to be made. First, all exogenous variables are assumed to 
be uncorrelated with the disturbances. Second, it is assumed that cross-
equation correlations among different equations exist. These assumptions can 
be written as follows. 
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where Σ  refers to the error covariance matrix and Ι  to an identity matrix. 
As previously indicated, the estimation procedure of 3SLS includes three 
stages. At stage one, each iY  is regressed separately on all iX  of the system 
of equations (with iX  being the instruments for iY ) 
 
( )[ ]ii YXXXXY ′′= −1ˆ  (5.8) 
 
At the second stage, the obtained fitted values iYˆ  are used to replace all 
endogenous explanatory variables iY  of matrix iZ  resulting in matrix iZˆ  (where 
iZˆ  refers to the predictions of iZ ). Afterwards, iβ  is estimated by a least 
square regression of iy  on iZˆ  for each equation i . 
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( ) ( )[ ] ( ) iiiiiiiiSLSi yXXXXZZXXXXZyZZZ ′′′′′′=′′= −−−− 11112, ˆˆˆˆβˆ  (5.9) 
 
In a next step, the covariance matrix of the disturbances Σ  needs to be es-
timated. For this purpose the residuals of the second stage regressions are 
used. 
 
( ) ( )
T
uu
T
ZyZy jiSLSjjjSLSiii ˆˆˆˆˆ 2,2, ′=−
′−=Σ ββ ,          Gji ,,2,1, K=  (5.10) 
 
At stage three, the estimated error covariance matrix is explicitly accounted 
for in a GLS estimation of the complete system of equations in order to consider 
any cross-equation correlations. The corresponding standard 3SLS estimator is 
computed in the following way: 
 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) yZZZyZZZSLS 1111113 ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ −−−−−− ΩΩ′=Ι⊗Σ′Ι⊗Σ′=β . (5.11) 
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5.3.3.3 Specification of the System of Equations 
Before going into further detail on the specification of the structural model some 
general thoughts on what can be expected from theoretical models should be 
kept in mind. They necessarily involve oversimplifications and abstractions but, 
postulating a correct specification, they are the closest one can get in explaining 
real life situations and relationships.346 
The basic assumption underlying the simultaneous equation model subject 
to the present empirical study is that firm value and corporate governance 
mechanisms are endogenous and therefore jointly determined. The system is 
composed of seven equations, whereas Tobin’s Q and each of the previously 
described principal corporate governance mechanisms respectively appear as a 
dependent variable on the left-hand side of one equation and as an explanatory 
variable on the right-hand side of all other equations. This allows each of the 
corporate governance mechanisms to affect Tobin’s Q and at the same time 
Tobin’s Q to affect each of the corporate governance mechanisms (see figure 
19). 
 
                                            
346  See Baumol (1959), p. 1; Hausman (1983), p. 397. 
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Figure 19: Illustration of Variable Dependencies within the Empirical Model 
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Source: Own illustration. 
 
In order to produce consistent parameter estimates, the specification of the 
simultaneous equation model must satisfy the order and rank condition for iden-
tification.347 Testing each of these conditions equation-by-equation, it can be 
confirmed that the system is jointly identified. 
Denoting CGMm (with m ranging from one to six) as the explanatory corpo-
rate governance variables appearing on the right-hand side, the system of 
equations is specified as follows: 
The first equation with Tobin’s Q (Q) as dependent variable is equivalent to 
the one of the OLS analysis that is described and specified in chapter 5.3.2.1. 
To avoid redundancies, it is referred to that chapter for a detailed explanation of 
                                            
347  The order condition for identification claims, that the exogenous (instrumental) variables, 
excluded from the respective equation, must be greater than or equal to the number of equa-
tions in the system minus one. The rank condition for identification states that the column 
rank of the joint coefficient matrix, with the ith row as well as the ith column being set to zero, 
must be greater than or equal to the number of equations in the system minus one. For a 
general discussion of the rank and order condition for identification see Hausman (1983), pp. 
402ff; Judge et al. (1988), pp. 623ff; Pindyck/Rubinfeld (1998), pp. 368ff; David-
son/MacKinnon (1993), pp. 631ff; Greene (2003), pp. 389ff. 
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the choice of variables. Nevertheless, for reasons of completeness the Q-
equation is once more presented below. 
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Board size (lnBSIZE) serves as dependent variable in the second equation 
of the system which is specified as follows.  
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In addition to Q and the remaining corporate governance mechanisms, the 
specification of the lnBSIZE-equation relies on firm size, REIT-structure, board 
system and the different country indicator variables. In line with e.g. Yermack 
(1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998) and Beiner et al. (2006), larger companies are 
expected to have larger boards of directors. Consequently, lnASSETS should 
be positively related to lnBSIZE. Moreover, REIT, BSYSTEM and COUNTRY348 
are included to control for REIT, board system and country effects. 
                                            
348  Among others, La Porta et al. (2002), Doidge et al. (2004), Klapper/Love (2004), Durnev/Kim 
(2005) and Agrawal et al. (2007) emphasize the importance of country-level effects in pre-
dicting corporate governance. Therefore, the COUNTRY indicator variables will be utilized in 
equations 5.12 to 5.18. 
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The dependent variable of the third equation, depicted below, is board inde-
pendence (BIND).  
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(5.14) 
 
Again, firm size is selected as the first control variable of equation 5.14. As 
argued by Agrawal/Knoeber (1996), a greater visibility of larger firms might in-
duce a higher percentage of board seats devoted to representatives of the pub-
lic. Accordingly, BIND is expected to depend positively on lnASSETS. To ac-
count for a possible relationship between board independence and the number 
of years as CEO, TENURE is introduced as second control variable. Based on 
empirical evidence of Hermalin/Weisbach (1988), it is expected that board in-
dependence declines over a CEO’s tenure. As third control variable CEOPRES 
is added to the equation. Empirical findings of Shivdasani/Yermack (1999) and 
Ghosh/Sirmans (2003) suggest that CEO involvement in the board selection 
process goes along with a decrease in the number of independent board mem-
bers. Hence, the presence of a CEO or former CEO serving as chairman is as-
sumed to reduce the independence of the board, implying a negative relation-
ship between CEOPRES and BIND. Parallel to equation 5.13, the indicator 
variables REIT, BSYSTEM and COUNTRY are included in equation 5.14.  
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Insider ownership (INSIDER) represents the regressand of the fourth equa-
tion of the system, which is specified in the following way. 
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(5.15)
 
Agrawal/Knoeber (1996) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) hypothesize that in-
sider ownership is lower when the costs of holding an undiversified portfolio are 
higher. Consistent with their intuition and specification, firm size (lnASSETS) 
and the standard deviation of stock returns (VOLA) are used as indicators for 
these costs. For both variables a negative relationship with INSIDER is antici-
pated. To control for a potential relationship between insider ownership and the 
number of executive officers in the company, NOFFICER is introduced as third 
exogenous variable to the INSIDER-equation. Due to a likely influence of the 
presence of a founding CEO on insider ownership, FOUNDER represents an-
other relevant control variable. Founding CEOs may be reluctant to dispose a 
greater fraction of their companies’ shares to other shareholders, e.g. to stay in 
control over the company. Chung/Pruitt (1996) further state that the executive 
who founded the firm and his family successors may hold a significant percent-
age of the firm's equity capital strictly for historical reasons. Therefore, it is con-
jectured that INSIDER will depend positively on FOUNDER. Another possible 
relationship accounted for in equation 5.15 is the one between a performance-
based remuneration of the CEO (CEOPERF) and the level of insider ownership 
in a company. In this context, it may be assumed that CEOs receive equity as 
part of their performance-based pay, implying a possible positive relationship 
between CEOPERF and INSIDER. Drawing on prior research by Anderson et 
al. (2000) who document a smaller fraction of CEO stock ownership in diversi-
fied relative to focused firms, it is further expected that DIVERS will negatively 
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affect INSIDER. Once again, REIT, BSYSTEM and COUNTRY are included as 
last control variables in equation 5.15. 
The fifth equation of the simultaneous equation model focuses on institu-
tional ownership (INST). 
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Evidently, the motivation and determinants of stock ownership by institu-
tions differ decisively from the ones of insiders. This difference is reflected in 
the specification of equation 5.16. 
Firm size is selected as the first control variable. In accordance with Smith 
(1996), Chan et al. (1998) and Ghosh/Sirmans (2003), it is postulated that insti-
tutional investors tend to invest in larger and more mature firms. Hence, lnAS-
SETS should be positively correlated with INST. As opposed to equation 5.15, 
VOLA is not included as a control variable since institutions generally hold large 
and diversified portfolios. In other words, VOLA should not necessarily be an 
important issue with respect to the selection of a particular stock.349 Instead, 
different measures of operating performance are accounted for, including return 
on assets of the previous period ROA(t-1), return on assets of the current pe-
riod ROA(t) and revenue growth GROWTH. Since it is likely to be more appeal-
ing to institutional investors to own stock in profitable firms, these variables are 
expected to be positively related to INST. In order to capture a potential effect 
of liquidity on the level of institutional shareholdings, LIQUID is determined to 
serve as fifth control variable. However, the sign of a possible relationship is 
difficult to predict a priori. On the one hand, Chan et al. (1998) and Benveniste 
et al. (2001) point out that greater liquidity may induce higher levels of institu-
                                            
349  For a similar argumentation see Agrawal/Knoeber (1996), p. 383. 
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tional ownership. This belief may be based on the argument by Dia-
mond/Verrecchia (1991) and Maug (1998) that institutions target more liquid 
stocks in order to be able to sell large stakes in a company at a lower cost. On 
the other hand, Holmström/Tirole (1993), Maug (1998) and Becht (1999) con-
tend that an increased concentration of ownership implies less liquidity since 
the company’s shares are less widely held. Another variable with a potential 
relation to INST is the number of outside blockholders NOBLOCK. Since institu-
tional share owners often correspond to outside blockholders, INST should be 
higher for firms with a greater number of blockholders. Again, REIT, BSYSTEM 
and COUNTRY are taken into account.  
Leverage (LEV) is the dependent variable of the sixth equation of the sys-
tem. 
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According to Rajan/Zingales (1995), larger and more mature firms with sta-
ble cash flows are less prone to bankruptcy and are therefore able to take on 
higher levels of debt.350 As a result, a positive relationship between lnASSETS 
and LEV can be inferred. Furthermore, companies with a lower historical profit-
ability may have more trouble to raise equity and therefore rely more on debt 
when it comes to financing future investments. Alternatively, Agrawal/Knoeber 
(1996) make the point that the availability of internal funds acts as a substitute 
to debt financing. This argumentation is in line with the pecking order theory, 
developed by Myers (1984), in which a company prefers internal over external 
                                            
350  See also Smith/Watts (1992). 
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financing and debt over equity financing.351 Following these intuitions, LEV 
should depend negatively on ROA(t-1). Due to higher costs of financial distress, 
higher levels of debt should entail a greater risk associated with the company 
and lead to more volatile equity prices. This reasoning has been supported by 
recent research of Drees/Eckwert (2000) and Chaudhry et al. (2004). It is there-
fore hypothesized that VOLA and LEV are positively correlated. Liquidity is util-
ized as an additional control variable in equation 5.17. LIQUID should have an 
adverse effect on LEV for the following reason. The lower the liquidity of a firm 
the more difficult it is for a company to raise capital on equity markets. In this 
situation, it may be cheaper and more advantageous to raise capital on debt 
markets. This notion is consistent with empirical findings of Butler et al. (2005) 
and Frieder/Martell (2006). In order to account for a potential impact of the 
CEO’s tenure on the capital structure of the firm, TENURE is introduced to the 
LEV-equation. Consistent with the previous equations, REIT, BSYSTEM, and 
COUNTRY are taken into account as final control variables in equation 5.17. 
The dependent variable of the last equation of the system is disclosure 
(DISC). 
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Similar to the other equations, DISC is assumed to not only depend upon Q 
and the choice of the remaining corporate governance mechanisms but also on 
different control variables, such as firm size, operating profitability, liquidity and 
management style.  
                                            
351  Numerous empirical studies, such as Titman/Wessels (1988) and Fama/French (2002), were 
able to find evidence for an inverse relationship between profitability and leverage, eventu-
ally supporting the pecking order theory. 
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Larger and more mature firms are generally believed to have a more trans-
parent disclosure. Diamond/Verrecchia (1991) and Lang/Lundholm (1993) ar-
gue that total cost of disclosure is decreasing with firm size and therefore pre-
dict a better disclosure for larger firms. This line of argumentation is supported 
by empirical results of Bushman et al. (2004), Khanna et al. (2004) and Hossain 
et al. (2005), among others. Hence, a positive relation is anticipated between 
lnASSETS and DISC. Besides, a greater profitability may go along with greater 
transparency because there is less motivation to hide information if the bottom 
line results are good. Support for this hypothesis comes from Lang/Lundholm 
(1993), Miller (2002) and Khanna et al. (2004). In order to control for a potential 
impact of management style on disclosure, INTERN is inserted as fifth control 
variable into the equation. According to Howe/Shilling (1990), Hsieh/Sirmans 
(1991), Cannon/Vogt (1995), Wei et al. (1995), Sagalyn (1996) and 
Ambrose/Linneman (2001) externally managed real estate companies suffer 
from severe agency costs, such as self-dealing by the external management 
team. In this respect, it can be argued that the management of externally ad-
vised companies is supposedly less willing to disseminate voluntary information 
than the management of internally managed companies in order to hide any 
diversion of corporate resources. Therefore, it may be concluded that internally 
managed companies are presumably more transparent than their externally 
managed counterparts, implying a positive association between DISC and IN-
TREN. In addition, Diamond/Verrecchia (1991) and Kim/Verrecchia (1994) indi-
cate that voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetries between in-
formed and uninformed investors and thereby increases liquidity of the stock. 
Taking the view that a more transparent disclosure is linked to a higher share 
turnover, LIQUID is included in equation 5.18, anticipating a positive relation-
ship between the two variables. Ultimately, REIT, BSYSTEM and the four coun-
try indicator variables COUNTRY are added to control for potential influences. 
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5.3.3.4 Results of 3SLS Estimation 
This chapter describes the results obtained from the estimation of the simulta-
neous equation system using 3SLS. At first, the coefficient estimates of equa-
tion 5.12 of the system are compared to the ones of the OLS standard regres-
sion model in chapter 5.3.2.2 to visualize the bias related to joint endogeneity. 
Apart from the impact of the different corporate governance mechanisms on 
firm value, the relationship among the corporate governance mechanisms is 
examined in further detail to detect potential complementary and substitution 
effects. Finally, the issue of reverse causation will be investigated. 
Table 16 displays the coefficient estimates from the 3SLS regression treat-
ing Tobin’s Q and the single corporate governance mechanisms as endoge-
nous variables. Each column represents one equation of the system, ranging 
from the Q-equation in column (1) to the DISC-equation in column (7). 
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Table 16: Coefficient Estimates from 3SLS Regression with Tobin’s Q and different Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms as Endogenous Variables  
 Dependent Variable 
Variable 
Q 
(1) 
lnBSIZE 
(2) 
BIND 
(3) 
INSIDER 
(4) 
INST 
(5) 
LEV 
(6) 
DISC 
(7) 
Q  0.034 (0.562) 
-0.001 
(-0.015) 
-0.077* 
(-1.700) 
-0.039 
(-0.399) 
0.012 
(0.325) 
0.055 
(1.430) 
lnBSIZE -0.726* 
(-1.762)  
-0.072 
(-0.293) 
-0.174 
(-0.389) 
-0.705*** 
(-2.652) 
-0.091 
(-0.474) 
0.248*** 
(3.891) 
BIND 0.494 
(0.792) 
-0.122 
(-0.320)  
-0.331 
(-0.829) 
-0.003 
(-0.013) 
-0.217 
(-0.735) 
0.123 
(0.952) 
INSIDER 1.088** 
(2.156) 
-0.181 
(-0.630) 
0.210 
(0.868)  
-0.239 
(-1.274) 
0.401** 
(2.262) 
-0.066 
(-0.692) 
INST 0.457 
(1.178) 
-0.116 
(-0.455) 
0.117 
(0.612) 
-0.392** 
(-2.445)  
0.056 
(0.368) 
-0.034 
(-0.434) 
LEV 0.277 
(0.442) 
-0.043 
(-0.124) 
-0.823*** 
(-2.583) 
-0.118 
(-0.293) 
0.312 
(1.294)  
-0.011 
(-0.098) 
DISC 6.315*** 
(5.707) 
2.337*** 
(3.579) 
-0.643 
(-0.847) 
0.896 
(0.755) 
1.900* 
(1.908) 
0.020 
(0.032)  
lnASSETS -0.150** 
(-2.097) 
0.059 
(1.324) 
0.066 
(1.639) 
-0.045 
(-0.476) 
0.027 
(0.796) 
0.054* 
(1.836) 
0.002 
(0.113) 
lnYEARS -0.085*** 
(-2.757)       
ROA (t-1) 2.701*** 
(3.330)    
0.353 
(0.938) 
-0.426* 
(-1.751) 
-0.209 
(-1.440) 
ROA (t) -4.062*** 
(-11.826)    
-0.102 
(-0.279)  
0.265** 
(1.966) 
GROWTH     0.004 (1.398)   
VOLA 0.011* 
(1.813)   
-0.004 
(-1.080)  
0.005 
(1.367)  
LIQUID     -0.098* (-1.693) 
-0.047 
(-0.813) 
-0.001 
(-0.067) 
NOFFICER    -0.009 (-0.355)    
NOBLOCK     0.092*** (5.718)   
TENURE   -0.007* (-1.688)   
-0.008*** 
(-2.973)  
FOUNDER    0.217*** (3.348)    
CEOPRES   -0.092 (-1.352)     
CEOPERF    -0.161 (-0.873)    
DIVERS -0.100* 
(-1.761)   
-0.084 
(-1.371)    
INTERN       0.048 (1.311) 
REIT -0.249 
(-1.516) 
-0.207* 
(-1.820) 
0.070 
(0.696) 
-0.110 
(-0.675) 
-0.164* 
(-1.649) 
0.031 
(0.398) 
0.076*** 
(2.734) 
Constant 2.550** 
(2.270) 
-0.374 
(-0.482) 
0.277 
(0.449) 
1.704 
(1.564) 
-0.168 
(-0.289) 
-0.387 
(-0.717) 
-0.261 
(-0.950) 
BSYSTEM + + + + + + + 
COUNTRY + + + + + + + 
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continued 
Wald Test  
(p-value) 
206.063*** 
(0.000) 
197.609*** 
(0.000) 
108.943***
(0.000) 
55.496*** 
(0.000) 
113.823***
(0.000) 
44.077*** 
(0.000) 
277.652*** 
(0.000) 
Overidentification Test 
Chi² (0.05) 
0.459 
(7.815) (3) 
10.007 
(15.507) (8) 
7.353 
(12.592) (6) 
6.049 
(7.815) (3) 
0.755 
(7.815) (3) 
7.534 
(9.488) (4) 
5.552 
(9.488) (4) 
Hausman System Sp. Test 
Chi² (0.05) 
32.496 
(41.337) (28)       
Note: The table shows the coefficient estimates from 3SLS regressions with Tobin’s Q and dif-
ferent corporate governance mechanisms as endogenous variables. The variables are defined 
in tables 7 and 8. The sample consists of 110 publicly traded real estate companies from the 
UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany in 2006/07. All t-values are reported in parentheses 
below the respective coefficients. *, ** and *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level. Significant results (at 10% or better) are shown in boldface. With respect to the 
Overidentification test and the Hausman system specification test the 5% critical values of the 
Chi² distribution and the corresponding degrees of freedom are reported below the respective 
value of test statistic. 
 
Taking a closer look at the Q-equation in column (1) reveals that three of 
the six principal corporate governance mechanisms have a significant impact 
on the companies’ market value. These include board size (lnBSIZE) which is 
significantly negative at the 10% level and insider ownership (INSIDER) as well 
as a transparent real estate-specific disclosure (DISC) which are both signifi-
cantly positive at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. All coefficients basically 
show the same signs as in the OLS regression. However, in contrast to the OLS 
results the coefficients of board independence (BIND) and institutional owner-
ship (INST) are no longer significantly positive in the 3SLS regression. At the 
same time, leverage (LEV) remains statistically insignificant also in 3SLS. By 
comparing the elasticities of the 3SLS regression with those of the OLS regres-
sion, it can be further observed that the absolute values of the coefficients are a 
lot higher in the case of 3SLS, indicating that the impact of the corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms on market valuation has been underestimated in the OLS 
estimation. This can be explained by the fact that OLS ignores joint endogeneity 
and the simultaneity of the process by which these variables are determined 
which ultimately leads to considerably misleading values. To provide a sense of 
the difference in magnitude between OLS and 3SLS coefficient estimates, DISC 
is referred to as an example. According to OLS estimates, an increase of DISC 
by one unit results in a 1.567 unit increase in Tobin’s Q, whereas the 3SLS es-
timation results predict that an equivalent increase in DISC results in a 6.315 
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unit increase in Tobin’s Q. Hence, the 3SLS elasticity is approximately four 
times higher than in the case of OLS. 
With the exception of REIT, basically all control variables of equation 1 
show the same coefficients as in the standard OLS regression model and are 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. The change in sign for the 
REIT variable can be explained by the following intuition. The REIT-structure 
basically corresponds to a type of regulation that limits managerial latitude and 
thereby provides more security for shareholders. Assuming that the advantages 
of this regulation are largely captured by the principal corporate governance 
mechanisms may have caused REIT to become negative and insignificant. 
On balance, it can be concluded from the results for equation (1) of table 16 
that the previously developed hypotheses H1, H3 and H6 can be confirmed, 
whereas hypotheses H2, H4 and H5 have to be rejected. In other words, after 
taking into account the issue of joint endogeneity a smaller board of directors, a 
greater percentage of managerial ownership as well as a more transparent real 
estate-specific disclosure have a positive impact on firm value as determined by 
the capital market. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the latter governance 
provision reveals the most significant coefficient and has the greatest value-
increasing effect. 
In addition to a significant impact of certain corporate governance mecha-
nisms on firm value, columns (2) to (7) in the upper part of table 16 provide evi-
dence for statistically significant interdependencies among various governance 
provisions. The significantly negative correlations in column (5) between 
lnBSIZE and INST, the significantly positive correlations between INSIDER and 
LEV in column (6) as well as between DISC and INST in column (5) indicate a 
complementary relationship between the respective provisions and therefore 
corroborate hypothesis H7 of chapter 4.4. Institutional investors appear to be 
attracted by companies with smaller boards of directors. This implies that the 
belief of institutional investors is in line with the one of Lipton/Lorsch (1992), 
Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) who argue that small boards generally tend 
to operate more effectively. This hypothesis is further supported by previous 
research of Wu (2000) who documents empirical evidence for a decrease in 
board size after the engagement of active institutional investors. Complemen-
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tarity is also suggested for the relationship between INSIDER and LEV which is 
consistent with empirical findings of Agrawal/Knoeber (1996). According to the 
3SLS results, an increase in insider ownership suggests a greater use of debt. 
This may indicate that incentive alignment of managers in conjunction with ex-
ternal monitoring of lenders generally provides more effective corporate gov-
ernance. The significantly positive relationship between DISC and INST points 
out that institutional investors on average prefer to invest in companies with 
more transparent real estate-specific reporting practices. This result is similar to 
the empirical findings of Ajinkya et al. (1999) and Healy et al. (1999) who 
document that sustained increases in overall corporate disclosure ratings result 
in higher levels of institutional ownership. Consequently, it can be inferred that 
the combination of both mechanisms contribute to a more disciplining govern-
ance structure.  
Furthermore, there is evidence for substitution effects between various gov-
ernance mechanisms, e.g. between lnBSIZE and DISC in column (7), between 
INST and INSIDER in column (4), between LEV and BIND in column (3) and 
between DISC and lnBSIZE in column (2), confirming hypothesis H8 of chapter 
4.4. The significantly positive relation between lnBSIZE and DISC shows that 
publicly traded real estate companies with larger boards of directors tend to 
have higher transparency with respect to their real estate-specific disclosure. 
The opposite relationship turns out to be significant as well. Accordingly, com-
panies with better disclosure generally dispose of larger boards of directors. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that board size and disclosure serve as substi-
tutes in a firm-specific corporate governance structure. The same interpretation 
holds for the significantly negative relationship between INST and INSIDER, 
indicating that monitoring of large and professional shareholders constitutes an 
alternative to insider ownership. Beiner (2005), for instance, also finds a nega-
tive but insignificant correlation between insider ownership and concentrated 
ownership. A final indication for substitutability is the significantly negative rela-
tion between LEV and BIND. It appears that a lower leverage ratio is compen-
sated by a greater independence of the board and vice versa. 
Referring to the issue of reverse causation, it remains interesting to see 
whether firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, affects any of the principal cor-
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porate governance mechanisms. The first row of table 16 with Q as endoge-
nous explanatory variable provides a clear indication of reverse causality due to 
the significantly negative correlation with INSIDER at the 10% level. Thus, hy-
pothesis H9 of chapter 4.4 can also be confirmed. The finding seems to indicate 
that managers sell their shares as the stock price increases in order to lock in 
profits. Being the insiders of the company, they dispose of information that is 
not available to the public. Therefore, they are in a position that enables them to 
more adequately assess the value of the company. As a result, they will tend to 
sell their shares as the market value exceeds the perceived intrinsic value of 
the company. 
The coefficients of the exogenous variables of equations (2) to (3), pre-
sented in the lower part of table 16, generally have the predicted sign but are 
not always statistically significant. As predicted, firm size has a positive coeffi-
cient in the lnBSIZE-equation. Nonetheless, the relation is statistically insignifi-
cant and therefore does not require further consideration. Similarly, lnASSETS 
reveals a positive but marginally insignificant coefficient in the BIND-equation. 
In contrast, TENURE is statistically negative at the 10% level, implying that the 
board of directors becomes less independent the longer the CEO is in office. 
This result supports previous findings of Hermalin/Weisbach (1988) and 
Ghosh/Sirmans (2003). Furthermore, CEOPRES shows a negative but insignifi-
cant coefficient. With respect to the INSIDER-equation, all control variables ex-
hibit the expected sign except NOFFICER and CEOPERF. However, both coef-
ficients are statistically insignificant. In accordance with Chung/Pruitt (1996), a 
highly significant positive correlation between FOUNDER and INSIDER can be 
documented. Thus, the existence of a founding CEO generally induces higher 
levels of managerial ownership. Focusing on the INST-equation, the only con-
trol variables revealing statistically significant coefficients include LIQUID, 
NOBLOCK and REIT. LIQUID is significantly negative at the 10% level which is 
largely consistent with the hypothesis of Holmström/Tirole (1993) and Maug 
(1998). Thereafter, greater liquidity implies less ownership concentration. In 
addition, there is a highly positive correlation between NOBLOCK and INST at 
the 1% significance level, supporting the intuition previously stated in chapter 
5.3.3.3. Finally, the coefficient of REIT is statistically negative at the 1% level. 
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Consequently, it seems that on average REITs have lower levels of institutional 
ownership. Turning to the LEV-equation, it can be lined out that the coefficients 
of the control variables largely possess the predicted signs. Nevertheless, only 
three of them are statistically significant: lnASSETS, ROA(t-1) and TENURE. 
Consistent with Beiner et al. (2004), firm size is significantly positive correlated 
with leverage. This result is germane to the general argumentation of 
Smith/Watts (1992) and Rajan/Zingales (1995) that larger firms are able to take 
on more debt due to lower costs of financial distress. Moreover, ROA(t-1) is 
significantly negative related to LEV at the 10% level. As anticipated, a higher 
operating profitability entails lower debt ratios corroborating the pecking order 
theory of finance. Interestingly, TENURE is significantly negative at the 1% 
level, indicating that a company’s leverage is generally less the longer the ten-
ure of the CEO. In the last equation ROA(t) and REIT are the only control vari-
ables with a significant impact on the dependent variable DISC. In line with the 
assumption, forwarded in chapter 5.3.3.3, ROA(t) has a significantly positive 
effect on DISC which corresponds to the empirical findings of Lang/Lundholm 
(1993), Miller (2002) and Khanna et al. (2004). Accordingly, more profitable 
firms tend to provide a more transparent real estate-specific disclosure to the 
public. A striking result is the highly significant positive correlation between 
REIT and DISC. In support of the data in the descriptive statistics section, 
REITs generally provide more real estate-specific information in their annual 
reports, eventually resulting in a more transparent disclosure. 
To alleviate any concerns about a potential misspecification of the system of 
equations, several specification tests are applied.352 These include the Wald 
test, an overidentification test and the Hausman system specification test. The 
Wald test generally measures how close the unrestricted estimates come to 
satisfying the restrictions under the null hypothesis. It specifically verifies 
whether the single equations of the system actually have explanation content. If 
all coefficients of an equation are jointly zero there is indication that the equa-
                                            
352  With regard to the OLS estimation adjusted R² was reported as a measure for the goodness-
of-fit. In the case of instrumental variable estimation R² can be negative because the sum of 
squared residuals can be larger than the total sum of squares. Therefore, reporting R² does 
not appear to be very useful in 3SLS estimation. See also Wooldridge (2002), pp. 471f. 
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tion does not have explanation content. With respect to the simultaneous equa-
tion model of the present empirical study the Wald test for simultaneous signifi-
cance of all coefficients rejects the null hypothesis of no explanation content at 
the 1% level for each equation of the system. Consequently, it can be assumed 
that all equations have certain explanation content. 
The overidentification test353 basically examines whether the instruments 
used in the regression are valid. In order to be considered as valid instruments, 
they have to be uncorrelated with the error terms, on the one hand, and corre-
lated with the respective endogenous explanatory variable, on the other hand. 
Testing for overidentifying restrictions indicates that the instrumental variables 
used in the course of the 3SLS estimation, described above, are actually valid.  
Finally, the Hausman system specification test354 verifies whether the entire 
system of equations is specified correctly. This is particularly important for 3SLS 
estimation, since any misspecification in the single equations will be transmitted 
to all other equations of the system in the third stage of the estimation proc-
ess.355 Running the test for the whole system, the null hypothesis of no mis-
specification cannot be rejected providing an indication for a correct specifica-
tion of the simultaneous equation model.  
                                            
353  In order to test for overidentifying restrictions it is necessary to first estimate each structural 
equation of the system by 2SLS. The corresponding residuals are then regressed on all ex-
ogenous variables using OLS. Afterwards, the respective R² are multiplied by the number of 
observations to obtain the overidentification test statistic. If this test statistic exceeds e.g. the 
5% critical value in the Chi² distribution with the number of overidentifying restrictions as de-
grees of freedom the null hypothesis of instrument validity must be rejected. The number of 
overidentifying restrictions equals the number of instrumental variables of the total system 
minus the number of regressors of the equation. For a comprehensive description of the im-
plementation of the overidentification test it is referred to Wooldridge (2002), pp. 484ff. 
354  The Hausman system specification test compares 2SLS and 3SLS estimators under the null 
hypothesis of no misspecification. If the system of equations is specified correctly, 3SLS es-
timates are consistent and efficient, whereas 2SLS estimates are consistent but not efficient. 
The Hausman system specification test statistic is calculated as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ).varvar 3213232 SLSSLSSLSSLSSLSSLSh ββββββ −−′−= −  
h is Chi² distributed with the number of unknown parameters in β as degrees of freedom. If 
this test statistic exceeds e.g. the 5% critical value in the Chi² distribution with the corre-
sponding degrees of freedom the null hypothesis of no misspecification must be rejected. 
For a more detailed theoretical elaboration on the Hausman system specification test see 
Hausman (1978), Hausman (1983) and Judge et al. (1985). 
355  See Hausman (1983), p. 414; Judge et al. (1985), p. 617. 
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Overall, it can be concluded that the system of equations is correctly speci-
fied and therefore should provide reliable coefficient estimates. The detailed 
results of the respective tests are reported below the coefficient estimates in the 
lower part of table 16. 
 
5.3.3.5 Robustness Check of 3SLS Results 
As a robustness check on the 3SLS results, presented in the previous chapter, 
the system of equations is re-estimated using Market-to-Book as alternative 
measure for the market value of the firm. The corresponding results are exhib-
ited in table 17. 
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Table 17: Coefficient Estimates from 3SLS Regressions with Market-to-Book and different 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms as Endogenous Variables  
 Dependent Variable 
Variable 
MB 
(1) 
lnBSIZE 
(2) 
BIND 
(3) 
INSIDER 
(4) 
INST 
(5) 
LEV 
(6) 
DISC 
(7) 
MB  0.014 (0.366) 
-0.003 
(-0.085) 
-0.052* 
(-1.803) 
-0.028 
(-0.508) 
0.008 
(0.332) 
0.036* 
(1.963) 
lnBSIZE -1.607** 
(-2.426)  
-0.060 
(-0.248) 
-0.198 
(-0.457) 
-0.712*** 
(-2.688) 
-0.094 
(-0.491) 
0.250*** 
(4.377) 
BIND 0.328 
(0.319) 
-0.094 
(-0.249)  
-0.358 
(-0.907) 
-0.020 
(-0.085) 
-0.194 
(-0.660) 
0.170 
(1.370) 
INSIDER 1.274 
(1.542) 
-0.209 
(-0.722) 
0.205 
(0.830)  
-0.257 
(-1.432) 
0.402** 
(2.254) 
-0.045 
(-0.501) 
INST 0.801 
(1.263) 
-0.146 
(-0.585) 
0.112 
(0.592) 
-0.372** 
(-2.328)  
0.050 
(0.330) 
-0.031 
(-0.414) 
LEV 0.447 
(0.442) 
-0.031 
(-0.089) 
-0.821** 
(-2.577) 
-0.156 
(-0.389) 
0.323 
(1.335)  
-0.014 
(-0.126) 
DISC 11.312*** 
(6.331) 
2.382*** 
(3.801) 
-0.680 
(-0.904) 
1.219 
(1.024) 
1.924** 
(1.991) 
0.042 
(0.066)  
lnASSETS -0.212* 
(-1.830) 
0.053 
(1.219) 
0.064 
(1.598) 
-0.051 
(-0.556) 
0.026 
(0.768) 
0.054* 
(1.825) 
0.002 
(0.164) 
lnYEARS -0.142*** 
(-2.918)       
ROA (t-1) 3.775*** 
(2.928)    
0.354 
(1.045) 
-0.430* 
(-1.771) 
-0.176 
(-1.452) 
ROA (t) -6.173*** 
(-10.987)    
-0.098 
(-0.320)  
0.245*** 
(2.600) 
GROWTH     0.004 (1.433)   
VOLA 0.021* 
(2.094)   
-0.004 
(-1.079)  
0.005 
(1.424)  
LIQUID     -0.093 (-1.590) 
-0.051 
(-0.893) 
-0.009 
(-0.703) 
NOFFICER    -0.014 (-0.547)    
NOBLOCK     0.092*** (5.688)   
TENURE   -0.007 (-1.636)   
-0.008*** 
(-2.976)  
FOUNDER    0.210*** (3.228)    
CEOPRES   -0.101 (-1.449)     
CEOPERF    -0.172 (-0.962)    
DIVERS -0.197** 
(-2.101)   
-0.091 
(-1.495)    
INTERN       0.064* (1.869) 
REIT -0.687*** 
(-2.582) 
-0.208* 
(-1.864) 
0.074 
(0.738) 
-0.156 
(-0.945) 
-0.173* 
(-1.723) 
0.031 
(0.409) 
0.082*** 
(3.166) 
Constant 3.771** 
(2.058) 
-0.274 
(-0.358) 
0.299 
(0.487) 
1.794* 
(1.692) 
-0.133 
(-0.235) 
-0.399 
(-0.752) 
0.322 
(1.327) 
BSYSTEM + + + + + + + 
COUNTRY + + + + + + + 
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continued 
Wald Test  
(p-value) 
184.775*** 
(0.000) 
201.067*** 
(0.000) 
109.036***
(0.000) 
55.460*** 
(0.000) 
113.007***
(0.000) 
44.074*** 
(0.000) 
289.887*** 
(0.000) 
Note: The table shows the coefficient estimates from 3SLS regressions with Market-to-Book 
and different corporate governance mechanisms as endogenous variables. The variables are 
defined in tables 7 and 8. The sample consists of 110 publicly traded real estate companies 
from the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany in 2006/07. All t-values are reported in 
parentheses below the respective coefficients. *, ** and *** respectively indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Significant results (at 10% or better) are shown in boldface.  
 
Comparing the 3SLS results for the Q-equation in table 16 with the ones for 
the MB-equation in table 17, it can be observed that board size and disclosure 
stay statistically significant. While the significance level of DISC remains un-
changed at the 1% level, lnBSIZE turns significant at the 5% level. As opposed 
to the Q-equation, INSIDER is marginally insignificant in the MB-equation. With 
respect to the control variables, the results are largely robust to a substitution of 
Q with MB. Merely, some control variables, such as lnASSETS, lnYEARS and 
DIVERS reveal a change in significance level. In addition, REIT becomes sig-
nificant at the 1% level.  
Turning to the other equations of the system, one can point out that the 
variables generally do not change qualitatively with the exception of TENURE in 
the BIND-equation, LIQUID in the INST-equation as well as MB and INTERN in 
the DISC-equation. While TENURE and LIQUID marginally cease to be signifi-
cant in the BIND- and INST-equation, respectively, MB and INTERN turn mar-
ginally significant in the DISC-equation. 
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6 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
6.1 Summary of Essential Findings 
The need for a well-functioning corporate governance system, which is basically 
composed of an interdependent set of internal and external mechanisms, stems 
from the separation of corporate ownership and corporate control as well as the 
related conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers that are sub-
ject to agency theory. In a changing capital market environment in which inves-
tors highly appreciate better protection of shareholder rights and increasingly 
demand tighter controls on managerial behavior, corporate governance has 
become a crucial success factor for companies that are dependent on external 
finance. 
Parallel to its increasing relevance in practice, corporate governance has at-
tracted major attention in academic literature. Although, a comprehensive and 
well-developed theory on the complex nature of corporate governance does not 
yet exist, numerous theoretical and empirical studies, predominantly originating 
from finance literature, have contributed to a better understanding on the topic. 
However, despite the fact that publicly traded real estate companies provide a 
unique experimental laboratory in corporate governance research due to a 
number of peculiarities arising from the characteristics of real estate assets and 
the regulatory requirements in connection with the REIT structure, corporate 
governance in general as well as its impact on firm value remain largely unex-
plored in real estate literature. Most of the existing studies merely focus on US 
REIT samples, investigate only single aspects of a complex corporate govern-
ance system in isolation and do not account for interdependencies among dif-
ferent corporate governance mechanisms.  
This thesis supplements contemporary real estate literature by theoretically 
and empirically analyzing the impact of corporate governance on the market 
valuation of publicly traded real estate companies across four principal Euro-
pean real estate capital markets – the UK, France, the Netherlands and Ger-
many – while addressing major econometric shortcomings of previous corpo-
rate governance studies, including omitted variable bias, endogeneity and 
reverse causality.  
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Based on contemporary corporate governance literature and the theoretical 
argumentation in chapter 3.3 that market competition and the market for corpo-
rate control do not work properly for publicly traded real estate companies, six 
widely-accepted principal corporate governance mechanisms are identified and 
empirically examined. These are board size, board independence, insider own-
ership, institutional ownership, leverage and transparency of real estate-specific 
disclosure. In order to adequately consider any bi-directional interdependencies 
among the different mechanisms as well as between the single mechanisms 
and firm value, a simultaneous equation model is specified, whereas firm value, 
as proxied by Tobin’s Q, and each of the corporate governance mechanisms 
serve as a dependent variable in one of the equations and as an explanatory 
variable in all other equations.  
Estimating this system of equations simultaneously using 3SLS reveals that 
board size, insider ownership and the transparency of real estate-specific dis-
closure are the corporate governance mechanisms that have a significant im-
pact on the market valuation of publicly traded real estate companies. Board 
size is significantly negative correlated with firm value at the 10% level, corrobo-
rating the hypothesis of Lipton/Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993) and Yermack 
(1996) that smaller boards tend to operate more effectively and hence perform 
a better monitoring function. In contrast, insider ownership is significantly posi-
tive related to firm value at the 5% level. This result is supportive of the conver-
gence-of-interest hypothesis presented by Jensen/Meckling (1976), indicating 
that higher levels of managerial ownership help to align the interests of manag-
ers with those of shareholders and thereby reduce agency costs. Finally, trans-
parency of real estate-specific disclosure is significantly positive related to firm 
value at the 1% level. It not only reveals the most significant coefficient but also 
appears to be the economically most relevant corporate governance mecha-
nism for it has the greatest value-increasing effect. This empirical evidence is 
intuitive and supports the argumentation forwarded in chapter 3.3.1 that the 
transparency of disclosure is particularly important to publicly traded real estate 
companies due to the comparably high level of intransparency in real estate 
asset markets. 
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Consistent with Agrawal/Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. (2006), among 
others, this study further provides evidence for complementary and substitution 
effects among single corporate governance mechanisms. A complementary 
relationship, implying that two mechanisms jointly provide more effective corpo-
rate governance, can be identified between board size and institutional owner-
ship, insider ownership and leverage as well as between transparency of dis-
closure and institutional ownership. By contrast, substitutability can be observed 
for the relationship between board size and transparency of disclosure, institu-
tional ownership and insider ownership as well as between leverage and board 
independence. These mechanisms serve as substitutes in the corporate gov-
ernance structure of publicly traded real estate companies. In other words, 
where one of the mechanisms is used more the other is used less providing the 
same or a similar disciplining effect. 
Ultimately, there is evidence for reverse causality which is reflected by the 
significantly negative correlation between Tobin’s Q and insider ownership. This 
result implies that managers of publicly traded real estate companies in Europe 
trade upon their informational advantage. Hence, they tend to sell shares in the 
company as the market value exceeds the perceived intrinsic value of the com-
pany. 
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Figure 20: Comparison of Results with Empirical Real Estate Corporate Governance Literature 
Authors Measure of Firm ValueSample Methodology Results
Han
(2006) Tobin‘s Q
n = 156
1994 - 2000
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate 
regression (2SLS)
Hartzell et al.
(2004) Tobin‘s Q
n = 66
1992 - 2000
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate 
regression (OLS)
Friday/Sirmans
(1998)
Market-to-
Book
n = 135
1980 - 1994
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate 
regression (OLS)
 Significant relationship between valuation of US equity REITs and 
insider ownership that is positive at low levels but turns negative at 
high levels of insider ownership
 No significant relationship between governance data from proxy-
statements and valuation of US equity REITs
 Greater board independence (up to 50%) and higher levels of 
insider ownership are associated with higher firm values of US 
REITs
Friday et al.
(1999)
Market-to-
Book
n = 675
1980 - 1994
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate 
regression (OLS)
 Insider ownership (up to 5%) is associated with higher M/B-ratios of 
US equity REITs, thereafter M/B-ratios decline
Bauer et al.
(2006) Tobin’s Q
n = 134 - 228
2002 - 2005
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate 
regression (OLS)
 Significantly positive relationship between ISS and GMI corporate 
governance indices and valuation of US REITs
Capozza/Seguin
(2003) Tobin‘s Q
n = 75
1985 - 1992
(USA)
Empirical study 
using multivariate 
regression (WLS)
 Evidence that higher levels of insider ownership are associated with 
a higher valuation of US REITs
present
study Tobin‘s Q
n = 110
2006/2007
(GB, F, NL, D)
Empirical study 
using multivariate 
regression (3SLS)
 Smaller boards, higher levels of insider ownership and greater 
transparency of real estate-specific disclosure are associated with 
higher market values of listed property companies 
Comparison
Ø
Ø
+
Ø
+
+
Ø No consistency between empirical results + (Partial) consistency between empirical results
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The empirical findings of this dissertation lend support to some of the previ-
ous corporate governance studies focusing on US REIT samples (see figure 
20), as for instance Friday/Sirmans (1998) and Capozza/Seguin (2003) who 
document a significantly positive association between insider ownership and 
market valuation or Bauer et al. (2006) who provide evidence that corporate 
governance, as measured by an aggregate score, has a positive impact on firm 
value. 
By contrast, the findings do not support Hartzell et al. (2004) who find no 
significant relationship between corporate governance and firm value, even 
though they apply a similar set of corporate governance mechanisms. However, 
it has to be pointed out that Hartzell et al. (2004) apply OLS estimation method-
ology, which leads to biased estimates in the presence of endogeneity of corpo-
rate governance variables. This might be a reasonable explanation for the in-
consistency of their results.  
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6.2 Concluding Remarks 
The empirical results of this study suggest that corporate governance does, in 
fact, matter in European public real estate markets. Capital market participants 
investing in listed property companies particularly seem to appreciate smaller 
boards of directors, higher levels of managerial ownership and greater trans-
parency of real estate-specific disclosure. The implications of these findings for 
top-executives of publicly traded real estate companies, on the one hand, and 
real estate investors, on the other hand, can be summarized as follows.  
To increase shareholder value, managers of listed property companies are 
recommended to support any efforts to reduce board size, to implement equity-
based compensation packages or to increase their equity stake in the company 
and to improve transparency of real estate-specific disclosure by complying with 
the EPRA Best Practice Policy Recommendations. The latter is particularly 
worthwhile since it has the greatest impact on current market valuation. 
Real estate investors, by contrast, may adapt their investment strategy to 
account for the above listed governance characteristics which are generally 
perceived to provide effective corporate governance in the public real estate 
sector. Furthermore, those investors with sufficient voting power may use the 
information to actively participate in the process of improving the corporate 
governance structure of listed property companies in which they are invested 
with the objective to increase the total value of their portfolios. 
After all, it has to be pointed out that good firm-specific corporate govern-
ance structures will not be able to completely abandon agency risks. In the end, 
it still depends on the mental attitude of the management whether publicly 
traded real estate companies are directed in the best interest of shareholders. 
Therefore, it is not a question of meticulously complying with certain corporate 
governance codes or standards but a question of whether managers are pro-
foundly interested in providing transparency and creating long-term shareholder 
value. Though, good corporate governance cannot compensate bad business 
models or strategic failure, it helps companies to restore investor confidence 
and to access capital markets at better terms, eventually reducing its cost of 
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capital. This is an essential advantage for companies that want to succeed in an 
increasingly aggravating competition for international capital. 
Despite the insightful findings of this study on the corporate governance 
structure of publicly traded real estate companies in Europe, a number of pos-
sible avenues remain to be explored by future research. To verify the empirical 
results of this study and to obtain even more reliable insights into the causal 
relationship between corporate governance and the market valuation of publicly 
traded real estate companies over a certain period of time, it would be interest-
ing to conduct a similar research study using panel data. However, at present 
the availability of historical accounting data that can be compared across Euro-
pean and International companies is limited to the extent that a uniform ac-
counting system has only been in place since 2006, when publicly traded com-
panies were legally required to report in accordance with IFRS for the first time. 
Therefore, it will still take some years for such a study to be feasible. 
Moreover, future research may extend the European sample to account for 
publicly traded real estate companies from the US and Australia to further in-
vestigate any regional differences with regard to the corporate governance 
structure of listed property companies. 
In addition, it would be valuable to gain a deeper understanding on the dif-
ferences between the corporate governance structure of REITs and Non-REITs. 
This, however, necessitates the use of larger samples that permit to run sepa-
rate regressions for each type of listed property vehicle. 
Eventually, future research should examine the hostile takeover activity of 
publicly traded real estate companies outside the US in more detail to shed 
some more light on the functioning and effectiveness of the market for corpo-
rate control in the public real estate sector. 
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Appendix 1:  List of Publicly Traded Real Estate Companies in the Sample 
No. Company Name  Country 
1. ASSURA UK 
2. BIG YELLOW UK 
3. BRITISH LAND UK 
4. BRIXTON UK 
5. CAPITAL & REGIONAL UK 
6. CLS HOLDINGS UK 
7. DAEJAN HOLDINGS UK 
8. DAWNAY DAY CARPATHIAN UK 
9. DERWENT LONDON UK 
10. DEVELOPMENT SECURITIES UK 
11. GRAINGER UK 
12. GREAT PORTLAND ESTATES UK 
13. HAMMERSON UK 
14. HELICAL BAR UK 
15. HIGHCROFT INVESTMENTS UK 
16. INVISTA FOUNDATION PROPERTY TRUST UK 
17. ISIS PROPERTY TRUST UK 
18. ISIS PROPERTY TRUST II UK 
19. LAND SECURITIES UK 
20. LEWIS CHARLES SOFIA PROPERTY FUND UK 
21. LIBERTY INTERNATIONAL UK 
22. LONDON & ASSOCIATED PROPERTIES UK 
23. LONDON TOWN UK 
24. MAPELEY UK 
25. MARYLEBONE WARWICK BALFOUR UK 
26. MCKAY SECURITIES UK 
27. MINERVA  UK 
28. MUCKLOW UK 
29. PANTHER SECURITIES UK 
30. QUINTAIN ESTATES & DEVELOPMENT UK 
31. RAVEN RUSSIA  UK 
32. SEGRO UK 
33. SHAFTESBURY UK 
34. SOVEREIGN REVERSIONS UK 
35. ST MODWEN PROPERTIES UK 
36. TOWN CENTRE SECURITIES UK 
37. UNITE GROUP UK 
38. WARNER ESTATE UK 
39. WORKSPACE GROUP UK 
40. ACANTHE DEVELOPPEMENT France 
41. AFFINE  France 
42. ALTAREA France 
43. CAPELLI France 
44. CEGEREAL France 
45. COMPAGNIE LUCETTE France 
46. DOCKS LYONNAIS France 
47. EUROSIC France 
48. FIDUCIAL REAL ESTATE France 
49. FONCIERE DES MURS France 
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continued 
No. Company Name  Country 
50. FONCIERE DES REGIONS France 
51. FONCIERE DEVELOPPEMENT LOGEMENTS France 
52. FONCIERE EURIS France 
53. FONCIERE INEA France 
54. FONCIERE PARIS ILE DE FRANCE France 
55. GECIMED France 
56. GECINA France 
57. ICADE France 
58. ICADE EMGP France 
59. ICADE FONCIERE DES PIMONTS France 
60. IPBM France 
61. KLEPIERRE France 
62. LUCIA France 
63. MB RETAIL EUROPE France 
64. MERCIALYS France 
65. NEXITY France 
66. PAREF France 
67. SIIC DE PARIS France 
68. SILIC France 
69. SOCIETE DE LA TOUR EIFFEL France 
70. SOCIETE FONCIERE LYONNAISE France 
71. UNIBAIL France 
72. VECTRANE France 
73. ZUEBLIN IMMOBILIERE France 
74. CORIO Netherlands 
75. EUROCOMMERCIAL PROPERTIES Netherlands 
76. NIEUWE STEEN INVESTMENTS Netherlands 
77. RODAMCO EUROPE Netherlands 
78. VASTNED OFFICES INDUSTRIAL Netherlands 
79. VASTNED RETAIL Netherlands 
80. WERELDHAVE Netherlands 
81. AAA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT ALLGEMEINE ANLAGEVERWALTUNG Germany 
82. AIG INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE Germany 
83. ALTA FIDES Germany 
84. ANTERRA Germany 
85. BAUVEREIN HAMBURG Germany 
86. COLONIA REAL ESTATE Germany 
87. DESIGN BAU Germany 
88. DEUTSCHE EUROSHOP Germany 
89. DEUTSCHE REAL ESTATE Germany 
90. DEUTSCHE WOHNEN Germany 
91. DGAG DEUTSCHE GRUNDVERMOEGEN Germany 
92. DIC ASSET Germany 
93. DIH DEUTSCHE IMMOBILIEN HOLDING Germany 
94. FRANCONOFURT Germany 
95. GAG IMMOBILIEN  Germany 
96. GAGFAH  Germany 
97. HAGEDA Germany 
98. HAHN  Germany 
99. HAMBORNER Germany 
100. IFM IMMOBILIEN  Germany 
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continued 
No. Company Name  Country 
101. IMW IMMOBILIEN  Germany 
102. IVG IMMOBILIEN  Germany 
103. OTTO STUMPF Germany 
104. PATRIZIA IMMOBILIEN Germany 
105. RSE GRUNDBESITZ  Germany 
106. STILWERK REAL ESTATE Germany 
107. TAG TEGERNSEE Germany 
108. VIB VERMOEGEN  Germany 
109. VIVACON Germany 
110. WESTGRUND Germany 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Appendix 2:  Pearson Correlation Matrix of the Continuous Exogenous Variables 
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Note: The table shows the correlation coefficients between the continuous exogenous variables. 
The respective t-values are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. The variables are 
defined in table 8. The sample consists of 110 publicly traded real estate companies from the 
UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany in 2006/07. *, ** and *** indicates that the respective 
correlation coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Significant results 
(at 10% or better) are shown in boldface. 
BISHER IN DIESER REIHE ERSCHIENEN: 
 
 
Band 1 
 
Stephan Bone-Winkel 
Das strategische Management von offenen Immobilienfonds  
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Projektentwicklung von 
Gewerbeimmobilien 
ISBN 978-3-932687-15-0 
 
Band 2 
 
Matthias Thomas  
Die Entwicklung eines Performanceindexes für den  
deutschen Immobilienmarkt 
ISBN 978-3-932687-23-5 
 
Band 3 
 
Wolfgang Schäfers  
Strategisches Management von Unternehmensimmobilien  
Bausteine einer theoretischen Konzeption und Ergebnisse einer  
empirischen Untersuchung 
ISBN 978-3-932687-24-2 
 
Band 4 Daniela Kirsch 
Public Private Partnership  
Eine empirische Untersuchung der kooperativen Handlungsstrategien in 
Projekten der Flächenerschließung und Immobilienentwicklung 
ISBN 978-3-932687-27-3 
 
Band 5 
 
Sven-Eric Ropeter 
Investitionsanalyse für Gewerbeimmobilien 
ISBN 978-3-932687-30-3 
 
Band 6 
 
Gerrit Leopoldsberger 
Kontinuierliche Wertermittlung von Immobilien 
ISBN 978-3-932687-28-0 
 
Band 7 
 
Kerstin Hiska Brade 
Strategischer Marketing-Planungsprozeß für Büroimmobilien 
ISBN 978-3-932687-34-1 
 
Band 8 
 
Björn Isenhöfer 
Strategisches Management von Projektentwicklungsunternehmen 
ISBN 978-3-932687-35-8 
 
Band 9 
 
Christoph Buse 
Strategisches Management von industrieverbundenen 
Wohnungsunternehmen 
ISBN 978-3-932687-39-6 
 
Band 10 
 
Nicole Vaaßen 
Gewerbliches Immobilienleasing 
Eine quantitative und qualitative Analyse aus Sicht des Leasingnehmers 
ISBN 978-3-932687-40-2 
 
Band 11 
 
Arno Väth 
Die Grundstücks-Investmentaktiengesellschaft als Pendant zum REIT  
Entwicklung einer Konzeption auf der Basis der KAGG-Novelle ‘98 
ISBN 978-3-932687-41-9 
 
Band 12 
 
Petra Straßheimer 
Internationales Corporate Real Estate Management 
Implikationen der Internationalisierung von Unternehmen auf das betriebliche 
Immobilienmanagement 
ISBN 978-3-932687-51-8 
 
Band 13 Markus Hens 
Marktwertorientiertes Management von Unternehmensimmobilien  
ISBN 978-3-932687-52-5 
 
Band 14 
 
Barbara Pierschke 
Die organisatorische Gestaltung des betrieblichen 
Immobilienmanagements 
ISBN 978-3-932687-71-6 
 
Band 15 
 
Victoria Walbröhl 
Die Immobilienanlageentscheidung im Rahmen des 
Kapitalanlagemanagements institutioneller Anleger – eine Untersuchung am 
Beispiel deutscher Lebensversicherungsunternehmen und Pensionskassen 
ISBN 978-3-932687-78-5 
 
Band 16 
 
Ramon Sotelo 
Ökonomische Grundlagen der Wohnungspolitik 
ISBN 978-3-932687-80-8 
 
Band 17 
 
Marcel Crommen 
Finanzierung von Unternehmensimmobilien 
Eine Shareholder Value-orientierte Analyse 
ISBN 978-3-932687-79-2 
 
Band 18 
 
Marcus Cieleback 
Bausparen und Optionstheorie 
ISBN 978-3-932687-86-0 
 
Band 19 
 
Antje Schulz-Eickhorst 
Die Bauherren-Architekten-Beziehung 
– eine institutionenökonomische Problemanalyse mit Lösungsansätzen  
ISBN 978-3-932687-87-7 
 
Band 20 
 
Jeannette Werner 
Die Besteuerung von Gewerbeimmobilien in Europa  
Effektive Steuerbelastung und Steuerbeständigkeit in einem  
Fünf-Länder-Vergleich. 
ISBN 978-3-932687-88-4 
 
Band 21 
 
Irene Hagemeier 
Der Einsatz staatlicher Instrumente in der Wohnungs- und Bodenpolitik 
des  
20. Jahrhunderts 
Deutschland, Spanien, Schweden und die USA im Vergleich 
ISBN 978-3-932687-95-2 
 
Band 22 
 
Ludwig Vogel 
Projektentwicklung von Factory Outlet Centern 
– eine akzeptanztheoretische Untersuchung 
ISBN 978-3-932687-97-6 
 
Band 23 
 
Felix Iblher 
Internetbasierte Immobilienfinanzierung 
Auswirkungen des Electronic Business auf die Finanzierung privater 
Wohnimmobilien 
ISBN 978-3-932687-96-9 
 
Band 24 
 
Jan Gerhard 
Immobilienportfoliomanagement mit Immobilienindex-Derivaten 
– eine kritische Analyse und Bewertung der Einsatzmöglichkeiten 
immobilienindexbasierter Finanzinstrumente auf dem deutschen Markt. 
ISBN 978-3-932687-98-3 
 
Band 25 
 
Pamela Busz 
Seniorenimmobilien als Investitionsobjekte 
– Entwicklung und empirische Analyse eines Beurteilungsmodells 
ISBN 978-3-89984-106-0 
 
Band 26 
 
Carsten Fischer 
Projektentwicklung: Leistungsbild und Honorarstruktur 
ISBN 3-89984-114-5 
 
Band 27 
 
Christian Ecke 
Strategisches Immobilienmanagement der öffentlichen Hand 
ISBN 978-3-89984-119-0 
 
Band 28 
 
Ira Blumenthal 
Anforderungen an ein Marketingkonzept für Facilities-Management-
Dienstleistungsunternehmen 
– Ein Vergleich zwischen Theorie und Empirie 
ISBN 978-3-89984-120-6 
 
Band 29 
 
Nico Rottke 
Investitionen mit Real Estate Private Equity 
– Herleitung eines anreizkompatiblen Beteiligungsmodells unter 
Berücksichtigung der Transaktionskosten- und Agency-Theorie 
ISBN 978-3-89984-126-8 
 
Band 30 
 
Christoph Pitschke 
Die Finanzierung gewerblicher Immobilien-Projektentwicklungen unter 
Basel II 
ISBN 978-3-89984-125-1 
 
Band 31 
 
Martin Wernecke 
Büroimmobilienzyklen 
ISBN 978-3-89984-131-2 
 
Band 32 
 
Frank J. Matzen 
Unternehmensbewertung von Wohnungsbauunternehmen 
ISBN 978-3-89984-138-1 
 
Band 33 
 
Christian Focke 
Gewerbeimmobilien-Investments in Polen 
ISBN 978-3-89984-140-4 
 
Band 34 
 
Marc Breidenbach 
Real Estate Securitisation 
ISBN 978-3-89984-139-8 
 
Band 35 
 
Sonja Gier 
Bereitstellung und Desinvestiton von Unternehmensimmobilien 
ISBN 978-3-89984-153-4 
 
Band 36 
 
Andrea Pelzeter 
Lebenszykluskosten von Immobilien 
– Einfluss von Lage, Gestaltung und Umwelt 
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